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This dissertation explores the intellectual landscape of academic philosophy in the 
Philippines, shaped and torn by diverse currents of desires for universal truths and an 
engagement in globally dominant philosophical traditions, as well as for the self, local 
relevance, and national identity. Language, translation and the localization of 
philosophical ideas and streams emerge as recurring key issues, as do politics and 
religion. Chapter One is a preparatory reflection on how the philosophical 
preoccupation in the Philippines has been, in the context of nationalism, one of a search 
for roots, revealing a feeling of exile, which is here not merely the unhappy 
consequence of colonial experience, but the existential human condition of always 
moving between the self and the foreign. In Chapter Two, the journey through the 
landscape of Filipino philosophy starts from—but never quite leaves behind—the 
author’s teacher, Father Ferriols, S.J. The chapter discusses his involvement in the 
1960s Filipinization movement in the Ateneo de Manila University, situating the event 
in a broader historical context, but equally showing how his position, inspired by 
theological and philosophical precepts, was an attempt to challenge and overcome the 
limits of political thinking.  In Chapter Three, the great journey of exploration takes us 
to a different world, all the way across the street to the University of Philippines, in 
order to glimpse the struggle, between liberalism and conservative forces of Catholic 
thinking. Here, the focus is on the outspoken logical positivist Ricardo Pascual, whose 
philosophy and politics contrast starkly with the theologically-inspired thinking of 
Ferriols. While Chapters Two and Three are focused explorations, primarily on events 
in the 1950s and 1960s, Chapter Four takes a broader view, expressing the desires and 
frustrations of philosophers in their search for Filipino philosophy, a long-standing 
preoccupation, which began in the 1970s and continues to persist until the present. My 
aim here is to unravel the hopes and fetishes that have led to the idealization of the 
Western philosophical, resulting to an undervaluation of the work and efforts of fellow 
philosophers. In further exploring philosophical discourse in the Philippines, Chapter 
 vi 
Five focuses on the work of philosophers who have sought to expose and go beyond 
the limits of the Western philosophical tradition.  But despite their critical spirit, I argue 
that a certain form of humanism has continued to delimit their thinking. To bring out 
these antinomies, I juxtapose their ideas to those of social scientists who have equally 
concerned themselves with the fate of the philosophical discipline in the country, 
critiquing the essentializing and universalizing tendencies of philosophical concepts. 
In doing so, I present the contributions of the social sciences as an important critique 
of the philosophical discipline.  Finaly, the Epilogue ventures (further) beyond 
academic philosophy, its distinctions, assumptions, and desires, not only to suggest 
possibilities for further research into Filipino thought and ways of going beyond its 
limits and prejudices, but also to remind ourselves of a larger world of thought, within 
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 Chapter One 
Learning to Speak 
 
Exposition and Iconoclasm 
 When I was writing my master's thesis in philosophy, my supervisor, John 
Giordano, would always urge me to contextualize my ideas. Seeing that his advice was 
not getting through, he once chastised me for writing in a vacuum.  Anyone would have 
been easily jolted by that comment, but I was too confident that I was only doing what 
was expected of a philosophy thesis. My intention was simple: to present a clear and 
comprehensive exposition of ideas. I could not see how a philosophy thesis could or 
why it should be more than that. After all, this was how scholarship was often practiced 
in the Ateneo Philosophy department. 
 It was only long after I passed my thesis that my supervisor’s words began to 
haunt me. I began to doubt the relevance of my own writing, and what I regarded as 
the norm suddenly appeared strange. In a discipline that underscores the importance of 
thinking, how did exposition become, with no discussion or explanation, the “stuff” of 
philosophical research? And if philosophy were a reflection of one’s context and lived 
experience, as my Ateneo philosophy teachers coming from an existential 
phenomenological tradition claim, then why has scholarship been more often than not 
a mere description of ideas and theory? 
 Dissatisfied with philosophy and the disconnectedness it fostered in my own 
thinking, I decided to seek out a kind of scholarship that would demand, beyond the 
reflection of dis-embodied ideas, a more palpable engagement with the world. It was 
then that, instead of taking a doctorate in Philosophy, in Europe, and on a Western 
philosopher as I had initially planned, I decided to pursue Southeast Asian Studies, in 
Southeast Asia, and under the supervision of a Filipino historian.  
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Eager to embark on a new field of studies and to get past the inadequacies of 
my philosophical training, I was disheartened when my supervisor, Professor Reynaldo 
Ileto suggested that, for my dissertation, I explore the intellectual landscape of 
academic philosophy, to understand its history and the way it is practiced at home. I 
was not happy about the prospect of having to go back to the discipline that I so 
anxiously wanted to leave, even if now it meant examining it from the outside. Besides, 
I had already fantasized myself in a remote, exotic village, immersed in “hard-core” 
anthropological work, and the idea of interviewing university professors and poring 
over academic texts did not exactly fit the “Indiana Jones” or “Lara Croft” image of 
academic research that I thought Southeast Asian Studies would be. 
 Despite my misgivings, I saw the wisdom in Prof Rey’s advice. If I wanted to 
produce scholarship that was relevant, it would not just be about how well I described 
and analyzed reality’s complexities.  It was also about putting myself at stake 
(sometimes even, on the stake), to reflect not on some random, “curious” matter but on 
something I was concerned about and/or intimately part of who I was.  And that was 
exactly what I was encouraged to do: to make use of my years as a student and teacher 
of Philosophy, not to shun or abandon my past but to embrace it. Not only because it 
provided me an “inside perspective,” but also because I embodied the antinomies of 
philosophical practice.  
 Ironically, while I was anxious for relevant scholarship, it took me a while to 
realize the importance of a study on local/localized philosophy. Two biases prevented 
me from seeing. As a philosophy student, I had always looked at (and up to) foreign 
sources, and therefore could never imagine that I would be perusing the works of my 
colleagues at the university, much less make them the focus of my study. Thus, I 
thought to myself: was I not better off trying to understand the convoluted theories of 
the “great” philosophers, who were  reliably at the “cutting edge” of knowledge?  I was 
also uncertain that such study could yield a significant or relevant contribution to 
Philippine Studies, since Philosophy in the Philippines has more popularly been a 
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preoccupation not so much with the Filipino specifically as with the humanist traditions 
of the West and the “great(er)” Eastern civilizations of India and China. Of course  I 
came to understand later in my research that this preoccupation was only symptomatic 
and a fragment of a far richer and more complex reality. And it was rather simplistic to 
dismiss such preoccupation as less “Filipino,” especially when one considers how the 
encounter with foreign ideas is always and inevitably a moment of translation, a 
process of localization.  But more importantly, my view revealed a certain blindness: 
that despite impassioned phenomenological discussions in my philosophy classes on 
facticity or one’s thrownness into the world, I perceived the “Filipino” not from where 
I stood but as a mere object of study, as something “out there.” The Filipino was, for 
all academic purposes, an exotic Other! In my search for relevant scholarship, I had 
overlooked my own earnest and sustained engagement, and later, my disgruntlements, 
with academic philosophy as a crucial part, if not a starting point, for a meaningful 
exploration.   
 My engagement with Southeast Asian studies, which I had initially intended 
as a way to break free from the limits of philosophy, had turned out to be a return—not 
only as a research topic, but to the roots of my phenomenological training. And yet, it 
was not simply a return to a phenomenology that I already knew, but what gave the 
latter a whole new meaning. The maxim “To the things themselves!”—which the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger beautifully explains as “to let what shows itself 
be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself”1—could no longer be simply 
uttered in disinterestedness.  In the field, as I was interviewing people and sifting 
through what was said and implied, this phenomenological maxim was always being 
dragged into the mud—tested, translated, re-interpreted, even doubted for what it 
meant. Nevertheless, it was a simple belief which was impressed on me early in my 
philosophical studies as supposedly the bedrock of philosophical inquiry, and which, 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers,1996), 30.   
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owing to my teacher, the fiery Filipino Jesuit philosopher, Fr. Roque Ferriols, was 
translated into a powerful injunction. It was, however, not Heidegger's legein ta 
phainomena, which expresses a gentle laying, a “letting-lie-before,”2 but the Greek 
dictum, Sozein ta phainomena which Ferriols invoked, and which meant, in all its vigor 
and passion, to SAVE the phenomenon at the fleeting moment of its appearance:  
Sozein ta phainomena. It means “To save those that appear.” Or, because those 
that appear seek to be observed: “To redeem those that seek to be observed.” 
Do not form theories that are not based on all the appearances that have been 
observed. Furthermore, do not invent appearances that never occurred.  But 
also, never suppose that appearances never assumed appearances.3  [1.1]  
For me, these were sacred words that constituted the philosopher's code. And 
yet, in those years I was a student and an instructor at the university, philosophy was 
more commonly an exercise in exposition. And thus, if vigilance was observed, it was 
primarily with regard not to life itself but to the text, to obtain a meticulous 
understanding of a philosopher's writing.  
Afraid that I was judging academic philosophy too harshly, I asked a former 
colleague, a veteran in his field, for his opinion. He confirmed that exposition generally 
constituted a crucial part in one's philosophical studies, even in writing a dissertation, 
which he warranted was a useful form of an “apprenticeship with the masters.” 
Classical texts are used as  “training ground,” where one learns, by example, how to 
present sound ideas. But he assured me that it was something one just had to go through 
“in order to do real scholarship,” and that at the end of one's philosophical education, 
                                                 
2 See Martin Heidegger, “Logos: Heraclitus, Fragment B 50,” in Early Greek Thinking: 
The Dawn of Western Philosophy, trans. David Farrell Krel and Frank A. Capuzzi (New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984). 
3 Roque Ferriols, S.J. Pambungad sa Metapisika (Quezon City: Office of Research and 
Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 1997), 16. For the original, Filipino text, 
quoted in this and in the succeeding footnotes, see Appendix 1. 
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one could hopefully offer new ways of seeing as one “engages the contemporary 
world.”4  
 The idea of “real scholarship” as what only comes at the end suggests a division 
of a “before and after.” “Real scholarship” implies a clear sight of a goal, and at the 
same time, renders everything before it as mere preparation. But if “real scholarship” 
constitutes a kind of thinking that “freely” engages the world (which is implied in one's 
liberation from any obligations of homage to the “masters”), then an apprenticeship 
implies, demands even, a deference to the master, and would therefore have very little 
room for criticism or subversion, if at all. What puzzles me in all this is that, despite 
knowing what scholarship could and should be, why insist on a kind of apprenticeship 
that falls short of scholarly aspirations?  Why can't the preparation be as “real” as the 
goal?  
 Despite my willingness to hear a different opinion, I was not anywhere close 
to a sympathetic understanding, but this was because I was judging from a particular 
set of values.  I, too, was playing the role of a good disciple, but my allegiance was to 
one of the well-known Masters of Suspicion, and to the legion of followers that came 
after him. For Karl Marx, the world was in a constant flux of power struggle, and 
history repeatedly played out the Hegelian dialectic. But his most important 
contribution was in showing that things were not what they seemed; that the danger lay 
not so much in the tireless attempts of hegemonies to justify and maintain their control 
as in the manner they hold sway in concealing their devious intentions through 
platitudes;5 and then, they convince us, as though through hypnosis, that the conditions 
of the present life are natural, objective, and inescapable, rubbing off from our 
memories that these realities, insofar as they are human inventions and interpretations, 
are always historical and transient. It is the existence of such hypocrisy that a return to 
                                                 
4 Dr. Rainier Ibana, personal correspondence, 2012 
5  See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” in Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, ed. James Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1998), 273.   
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the phenomenon can no longer simply be a “letting-lie-before,” especially when the 
sign that lies before us malevolently conceals, not just by saying something different 
from what it actually means, but by appearing other than the interpretation that it 
always already is.6   
 Of course, Marxism has changed a lot since the time of Marx. The malevolent 
sign which spun a cocoon of false consciousness and thus needed to be exposed, turned 
out not as completely subservient to the hegemonic powers as it was thought to be. The 
sign also carried interpretations people had of the life they desired, so that if they were 
bewitched by the promises of capitalist society, it was not because they were dull-
witted, but because they found in these phantasmagoria images of a dream that was 
otherwise forbidden in the waking life. But Marx's greatest influence remains in 
instructing us in a particular way of seeing, of interpreting, and in giving moral purpose 
to our intellectual tasks: that phenomenon, which is convoluted with contradictions and 
thus what could no longer be taken for what it shows, will always be in need of a careful 
examination through critique, and that the goal in all this (lest we forget and become 
like the philosophers who he reproached) is not to interpret the world but to change it.  
 It is, however, the fortune (and equally the ill-fortune) of the apprentice of the 
philosophies of suspicion to (eventually) know no master.  Doubt slithers into the 
hollow spaces of our convictions, to a point that we question even our own teachers, 
especially ourselves. But this self-doubt, clearly goes back before Marx, back to where 
philosophy supposedly began. The philosopher Socrates, who himself doubted the 
words of the gods delivered by the oracle of Delphi, was prompted to embark on a 
journey, initially with the intention of proving the gods wrong.  Only much later, as he 
approached the well-known “erudite” of society, did he realize that what was really in 
question was the correctness of his interpretation of the message. Nevertheless, 
Socrates makes it clear that it is only in knowing oneself, in realizing that it is 
                                                 
6 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” 277. 
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appropriate for every mortal to know that he knows nothing, that one is always in doubt 
of what one thinks he knows. In this case, the philosopher necessarily becomes an 
iconoclast, as his journey in the search for understanding becomes (and because it can 
only be) a constant attempt at disturbing the certainty and hubris of knowledge, either 
in the form of unexamined assumptions within oneself or in the form of knowledge 
“peddled” by the established authority of the “learned.”   
 If iconoclasm is the legacy of philosophy, and the birthright of the philosopher, 
why has our “apprenticeship with the masters” led us only to become the proud 
“experts” of a very limited and well-chosen turf? This “expertise” that we hold so dear, 
having been proclaimed and “titled” by our own academic community as the Heidegger 
expert or the authority on Marx – does this not haunt us, disturb us that our identity as 
a thinker could be nothing more than that of an epigone, one that leeches off the 
thoughts of a moustached or heavily bearded German? Or notice how we jealously 
guard the title of philosopher, carefully distinguishing the wise man from the non-
philosophers and especially from his age-old adversary, the sophist; so cautious are we 
that we, apprentices of the master-philosophers, would deny it to ourselves, even proud 
to remain an apprentice forever. I wonder though if we have not simply muddled up 
the idea of philosophy with that of the philosopher. Heidegger does mention that, in 
rescuing Being from the sophists who always had a comprehensible and easily 
marketable answer to everything, the philosopher intentionally and perpetually 
deferred its attainment. By inculcating a disposition of yearning and a condition of 
perpetual astonishment, the quest for Being would always be on its way but never quite 
reaching its goal.7 Perhaps in our love for philosophy, we have idealized the lover, so 
that he, too, becomes the goal of an infinite task; idealized, so much so that we never 
tire of listening to his voice and, in the meantime, have lost our own ability to speak. 
And so maybe, without knowing it, Philosophy, which has never failed to inspire us to 
                                                 
7  Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy? trans. Jean Wilde and William Kluback 
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 49-85. 
 8 
think in the most radical ways, has itself paradoxically become that established 
authority of the “learned” which we must dare to defy.  
 
Philosophy as “Enshrined Heritage” 
 In history, philosophy has exercised its most cruel authority in producing 
writings that have affirmed, if not provoked, racist and imperialist conceptions.  Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, in The Philosophy of History, describes Africa as “the land 
of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the 
dark mantle of Night.” The African, unable to transcend his individuality and recognize 
the category of Universality, or a “substantial objective existence” (such as, according 
to Hegel, God or Law), remains unenlightened and, having no regard for a Higher 
Being, has consequently “no respect for himself.”  This leads him to indulge, Hegel 
concludes, in “that perfect contempt for humanity, which in its bearing on Justice and 
Morality is the fundamental characteristic of the race.”8 Immanuel Kant, on the other 
hand, in his essay “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime,” 
identifies the French and Italians as people with proclivities towards a feeling for the 
beautiful, while the Germans, English, and Spanish are distinguished by the feeling for 
the sublime. In contrast, the Indians “have a dominating taste of the grotesque, of the 
sort that falls into the adventurous.”  And Kant sees this “hideous excess” not only in 
Indian “Idols of monstrous form,” or in “despotic sacrifices of wives” thrown into the 
funeral pyre that consume their husbands' corpse, but also in Chinese paintings, which 
portrayed “strange and unnatural figures such as are encountered nowhere in the 
world.”  While he praises the European for alone having found the secret of making 
the relation of the sexes “decorous,” he notes that the people of the Orient have “no 
concept of the morally beautiful” and “thrives on all sorts of amorous grotesqueries.”9  
                                                 
8 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 
2001), 111-114.   
9 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. 
Johann Jakob Kanter, ed. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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 In these examples, what is claimed to be absent in those “Others” is a 
disposition toward that “finer” existence—a sense of “humanity,” a taste for the 
“morally beautiful”—attributes that make the “civilized” recognizable. Civilization, 
that malevolent signifier, was none other than the reflection of the West gazing 
admiringly at itself, conjuring (eternal and universal) value in what it perceived to be 
the “civilized way.”10 And if it was convinced that it had a mission to civilize, it was 
because it “exemplified the desire not (simply) to conquer the Other, but to be desired 
by the Other.”11 
 Part of this self-conscious self-admiration of the West, however, was also a 
critical self-reflection. The idea of Kultur, for example, arising from the ranks of the 
German bourgeoisie who were critical of the superficiality and hypocrisy of the courtly 
nobles, provided an antithesis to the Zivilisation of the “Frenchified” aristocrats, by 
espousing the “'natural' life—'natural' as opposed to the 'unnatural' life of court 
society.”12 Later, Kultur, which initially was meant by the bourgeoisie merely as a 
social alternative, became a “national antithesis.” Kultur no longer merely referred to 
the artistic and intellectual accomplishments of certain great individuals, but to the 
“language, religion, law, custom, poetry, art” of a people, to the “natural products of 
collective human life,” which consequently distinguished a nation from the others.13 
                                                 
University Press, 2011), 58-60.  Of course, the discourse about the “Other” was in no 
way unanimous.  Western philosophers who had respect and even admiration for the  
“savage” should not be overlooked, regardless of the fact that their loving gaze perhaps 
only affirmed even more the chasm between the “modern civilized man” and his 
“primitive” counterpart. See, for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality, trans. Donald Cress (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1992), 
23. 
10 Norbert Elias, “Sociogenesis of the Antithesis Between Kultur and Zivilisation in 
German Usage,” in The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic 
Investigations, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Eric Dunning, et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 5.   
11 Prasenjit Duara, “Discourse of Civilization and Pan Asianism,” 106. 
12  Elias, “Sociogenesis of the Antithesis Between Kultur and Zivilisation,” 17-18. 
Elias's explanation is insightful because it reminds us that civilization and Kultur are 
words that, despite having caused such great and far-reaching tremors in world history 
by transfiguring-transmogrifying into Imperialism and Nationalism, grew out of a 
“specific set of historical situations.”   
13 See Royal J. Schmidt, “Cultural Nationalism in Herder,” Journal of the History of 
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Culture, understood as such clearly projected a people's specific throwness in the 
world, bringing forth a particular conception of life that came to be known in 
Philosophy as Weltanschauung, or worldview.14 But if the idea of Weltanschauung 
represented the culture of a people, it captured the latter not in the emanations of itself 
into various forms, but at that point of “distillation,” as it were, which occurs at the 
moment when culture becomes conscious of itself. It is that moment when culture 
                                                 
Ideas 17, no. 3 (1956): 407-417. Among the German Romanticists who critiqued 
Enlightenment and the primacy of Reason over creativity, Johann Gottfried Herder is 
recognized as the “father of cultural nationalism.”  He was a proponent of a united 
Germany which freely expressed its national character through its “vernacular writing 
and expressions.”  It was, however, a freedom that was never meant to be exclusive to 
the Germans. See Peter Viereck, Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German 
Romantics to Hitler, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2004) on how Herder's idea 
of nationalism as the organic unfolding of “Volk-souls” was corrupted and made 
exclusive to the Germans in the form of Nazism.] Herder never advocated any form of 
European superiority. Rather, he encouraged the free expression of every national 
character, in order to bring out a variety of voices that would lead to a sympathetic 
union of humanity. See also Benedict Anderson, “Old Languages, New Models,” in 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991), 67-68. Here, Anderson quotes Herder, emphasizing specifically on the 
special relationship between a nation and the language of its people. The vernacular, 
and the important role it plays in a philosophy that is entangled in nationalist discourse, 
will be a recurring theme in the coming chapters. 
14 Philosophy and worldview have always been a topic of debate for their ambiguous 
relationship. See Albert Wolters's “On the Idea of Worldview and Its Relation to 
Philosophy,” in Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science, ed. P. Marshall, et al. 
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989), 14-25. While some philosophers 
distinguish the two terms, others assert that the two “equal” each other.  Wolters 
explains that the term Weltanschauung “was coined and popularized in the context of 
German Idealism and Romanticism.” What was important at that time was the “rise of 
historical consciousness”: “In reaction against the Enlightenment—indeed, against the 
whole millennial tradition of Greek intellectualism—a great reversal of values occurred 
wherein the universal was depreciated in favor of the particular, the abstract in favor of 
the concrete, the eternal in favor of the temporal, the identical in favor of the unique. 
Whereas previously the Western intellectual tradition had been oriented to the enduring 
essence (ousia) of things, it now became oriented to the historical development 
(Geschichtlichkeit) of things.” Thus, while “Philosophia and Weltanschauung both 
share a cognitive orientation to the whole, and both are associated with the optic 
metaphor of viewing,” Weltanschauung, either belonging to an individual or a 
collective, specifically “represents a point of view on the world…, a way of looking at 
the cosmos from a particular vantage point which cannot transcend its own historicity.”  
For that, it cannot transcend its particularity, and thus “forfeits all claim to universal 
validity, and becomes enmeshed in the problems of historical relativism.” See David 
Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 2002) for an explanation not only of the term's philosophical history, 
but also its associations with Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.  
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recognizes itself not merely as scattered and arbitrary expressions, but on the level of 
the philosophical, a particular way of organizing and understanding experiences, a 
distinct way of acting and being in the world. 
 
On the Idea of Weltanschauung 
 These days, with globalization becoming the new buzzword in academic 
circles, the idea of Weltanschauung is not as audible as it used to be. Aside from its 
infamous entanglement and complicity with ethnocentricism during the Holocaust (the 
memory of which has always made people wary of nationalist sentiments going a bit 
too far), the concept of worldview has lost much of its popularity in the age of 
postnationalism, where national identities are perceived to be too viscous to retain their 
delimited and discernible form. Philosophically, the concept has sustained severe blows 
to its tenability, which Heidegger sums up in a compelling statement: that precisely in 
its “unphilosophical character,” the “worldview represents a phenomenon foreign to 
philosophy.”15 In a 1938 lecture, Heidegger explains how the worldview, though it may 
appear harmless as a “passive contemplation of the world” or a certain view of life, is 
in fact part of the aggressive technology of the modern age, which seeks to represent 
(vorstellen), thus, to objectify and reduce the world into a picture that can easily be 
mastered and manipulated. 16  Philosophically, the idea of worldview, which is 
“freezing, finality, end, system,” and therefore what brings life to a standstill, is 
                                                 
15 Martin Heidegger, “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview,” in 
Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (New York: Continuum, 2002), 
14.  
16 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland Publishing, 
Inc., 1977), 134. Here, Heidegger also explains that the idea of worldview is the 
consequence of “the increasingly exclusive rooting of the interpretation of the world in 
anthropology,” since the end of the eighteenth century, where there is much emphasis 
on man as the subiectum, which places him at a position where everything is related, 
explained and evaluated from his standpoint. What this means practically is explained 
in Heidegger's idea of Enframing, which is an ordering of the world that makes 
everything a “standing reserve.”  
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precisely what philosophy must avoid.17 But if Heidegger has a bone to pick, it is not 
simply because the idea of Weltanschauung assaults life, but that it hijacks philosophy 
and makes it an accomplice to its projects. This was why Heidegger was keen to expose 
the progenitor, tracing the idea of worldview to an historical origin, to the “conceptual 
domination of the concept of culture at the end of the nineteenth century.”18 This was 
a time when culture was referred to as “achievement,” an idea which consequently 
encouraged a bias for evolutionary development. In relativizing its claims and 
identifying its progenitor, Heidegger reveals how the idea of Weltanschauung is no 
longer simply an ahistorical term, but rather a particular form of “philosophy,” a genre 
if you will, that made its grand appearance in history at a particular age. And only in 
showing how worldview philosophy consecrates itself not to thinking but to the 
subservient role of accumulating “cultural treasures” do we come to understand why it 
is, as Heidegger claims, both unphilosophical and anomalous. 
 Heidegger's critique of Weltanschauung, however, was not simply a theoretical 
observation; it was a critical response to the political crisis that the idea itself spawned. 
As early as 1919, the 29-year old privatdocent gave a course on the problem of 
worldview, in place of a two-hour lecture on Kant which he had initially announced as 
the topic for the war emergency semester taken by war veterans. Clearly, he recognized 
the problematic nature of this concept, which had become “a spiritual concern of 
everyone,” and the reason why “one hears nowadays the antagonism between the 
                                                 
17 Heidegger, “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview (transcript from 
Brecht),” in Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (New York: 
Continuum, 2002), 187-188. Here, Heidegger also says: “But philosophy can progress 
only through an absolute sinking into life as such, for phenomenology is never 
concluded, only preliminary, it always sinks itself into the preliminary.”  Philosophy, 
which is this perpetual striving, is here shown as a clear contrast to the task of 
worldview.   
18  Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value 
(transcript of Summer Semester course lecture, 1919),” in Towards the Definition of 
Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (New York: Continuum, 2002), 111. Simply put, “all 
philosophy of culture is worldview philosophy.” Heidegger, “Transcript from 
Brecht,”187. 
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Anglo-American and German worldviews.”19 Almost twenty years later, just before the 
beginning of the Second World War, he would return to this matter, reaffirming how 
the concept of worldview encourages and justifies the task of producing a picture of 
the world, prompting every man to contend “for the position in which he can be that 
particular being which gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything 
that is.”20 With every man or nation channeling all his or its power to ordering and 
manipulating, and asserting a worldview, the stage had become increasingly prepared 
for an antagonistic confrontation.  
 Today, we see how governments, with their ideologies and propaganda for 
national unity, have silenced opposing voices, or how the “civilizing mission,” long 
after the imperialism of the nineteenth century, has continued to torment us with their 
liberal, democratic, and humanist platitudes. And from these we know that Heidegger's 
critique of worldview was not unfounded.  But before we throw the baby out with the 
bathwater, perhaps we could realize that Heidegger, like any thinker engaged in the 
most speculative or theoretical reflection, was reacting to situations specific to a time 
and place. Despite all its conceptual flaws and its eventual complicity with imperialist 
and racist tendencies in the name of Civilization, the idea of Weltanschauung is 
paradoxically also the conceptual tool that bears the memory of Kultur, as that moment 
of radical self-critique in European history; more importantly, a conceptual tool that 
helped and continues to help restore the dignity and self-respect of colonized and 
formerly colonized nations, making possible a nationalist resistance against the 
aggressions of the Western “civilizing mission.”  
 If, then, I have taken this tedious task of retrieving an old concept, which for 
most people may be perceived as passé (despite it perhaps continuing to surreptitiously 
inhabit our discourse), it is because I see significant confluences in the historic journey 
of that idea we call Weltanschauung. This philosophical concept, borne from the bosom 
                                                 
19 Heidegger, “The Problem of Worldview,” 6. 
20 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 134-135. 
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of “civilized” Europe and later sown in the rich soils of the colonial regions, has not 
only cleverly played out the philosophical antinomies that have made it at one moment 
the rebel that loves all forms of the human race, and at other times, what appears as the 
hegemonic villain who  silences the weaker voices. More importantly, embedded in its 
memory are moments in history where Philosophy is and has been more than a diligent 
study of disembodied ideas, moments when it engaged the world and has had a 
particularly tumultuous effect on Southeast Asia. In this concept of worldview, 
Philosophy immerses itself in the world, appearing most visibly (which is not to say 
the only way) in its entanglement with nationalism.   
 
Philosophy and Nationalism  
 Historically, the idea of worldview has always been crucial to how a nation 
could be imagined.21 In looking closely at how it is fashioned, we are reminded of how 
rocks are formed, and how this solid formation is continuously exposed of its rough 
edges, eroded, and polished by wind and the ebb and flow of the tide.  A worldview 
can be as ossified, delimiting and discriminative as it can be volatile, vulnerable, and 
embracing. And as much as it tends to manipulate and dominate, it is equally a force 
that resists domination.  
 Former Indonesian president Soekarno could not have been more explicit 
when, in a speech delivered on June 1st, 1945 entitled Lahirnja Pantja Sila (The Birth 
of Pancasila), he proclaimed that the philosophical basis (summoning the Dutch, 
Philosofische grondslag) of a Free Indonesia was established on a Weltanschauung 
that had been “perfected in our hearts and in our minds,” long before Indonésia 
Merdéka itself could arrive.22 He was speaking to the Indonesian people, reminding 
                                                 
21 In fact, if we understand the nation as the self-consciousness of a people, then one 
can say that the process of unraveling the people's worldview is not merely a tool but 
precisely the way by which the nation is continually imagined. But here, I would like 
to argue that the worldview is not a fixed conception of life, as it is usually perceived, 
but what is historical through and through, what is always changing, shifting, adapting. 
22 Soekarno, Lahirnja Pantja Sila (Panitia Nasional Peringatan Pancasila), 16. “Tuan-
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them of their ancient heritage, evoking a proud civilization that bears what the 
nationalist Ki Hadjar Dewantara describes as the “the nobility and refinement of the 
human character” (keluhuran dan kehalusan budi manusia).23 Delivered months before 
his declaration of Indonesian Independence on August 17, 1945, it was equally a 
rhetoric that addressed the outside world, especially those observers who had the fate 
of Indonesia's political independence in their hands.24 His argument was simple: like 
Lenin who established his new “Soviet nation” in 1917 in a matter of ten days, which 
would not have been possible if the Weltanschauung on which it stood had not been 
long prepared since 1895, or like Hitler's Nazism which rose to power in 1933 but was 
made possible by an ideological foundation that had been set much earlier, Indonesia, 
with its own enduring worldview, has sufficient preparation and therefore every right 
and capability to assert its political independence.  Clearly, Soekarno was aware that 
this claim to a heritage and a philosophical foundation was important enough to 
legitimize Indonesian independence in the eyes of the powers-that-be. But what is 
interesting is that in summoning these grandiose, albeit alien, words, he places Soviet 
Russia, Japan, Germany, England and America on equal footing, as exemplars of a free 
nation, completely ignoring the political and ideological divisions during and after the 
World War. On the one hand, one could argue that Soekarno saw the political 
advantage in not taking sides. After all, the Japanese administration, through the Badan 
Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for Preparatory 
Work for Indonesian Independence) and to which Soekarno's Lahirnja Pantja Sila was 
addressed, was genuinely supportive; and yet, at the same time, in those fateful years, 
Soekarno was still desperately trying to gain British and Dutch approval of being 
worthy of independence.25 Many years later, however, after the independence had long 
                                                 
tuan sekalian, 'Weltanschauung' ini sudah lama harus kita bulatkan didalam hati kita 
dan didalam pikiran kita, sebelum Indoneésia Merdéka datang.”  
23  Ki Hadjar Dewantara, Pantjasila (Jogjakarta: N.V. Usaha Penerbitan Indonesia, 
1950), 10.  
24 Soekarno, Lahirnja Pantja Sila, 16-17. 
25 Despite having been stigmatized as a collaborator, and perhaps precisely because of 
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been won, Soekarno, who was fully informed of the atrocities of the Nazi regime, 
would again praise the infamous Adolf Hitler, for his cleverness and skillfulness 
(pandai) at “conjuring up a happy future for the German people.”26 Because of this, we 
can be sure that his admiration for the Führer expressed in his 1945 oration was nothing 
but sincere. It was this enthusiasm, Benedict Anderson narrates, that had offended the 
sensibilities of an elderly European diplomat, who left agitated and convinced that 
Soekarno was a demented fool. Anderson himself confesses how he was shaken by the 
occasion, feeling as though he “had been invited to see [his] Europe as through an 
inverted telescope,” and how he would never be able to look at his Hitler in the same 
way.27 Of course, one could just imagine the chagrin of the diplomat upon hearing how 
the legacy of his Europe was being remembered in what he obviously perceived as the 
most immoral and inhuman moment, the darkest hour of their civilization. But 
Soekarno was no fool. He genuinely respected Hitler for being a real nationalist, and 
correctly saw that such concepts as heritage and civilization (for the Führer himself 
spoke unreservedly of the German Weltanschauung in his Mein Kampf) were as 
essential to his discourse as it is part of any free nation's self-construction. And though 
strange and darkly comic it may have seemed, the irony in Soekarno's words, which 
came out more powerful precisely because it was not meant to be ironic at all, did not 
only strip Europe naked of its high moral garb, making all free nations somewhat equal 
(in their desires and in their barbarism), but today makes us ponder on how these 
                                                 
this, Soekarno sent out invitations on radio to Indian nationalist, Jawaharlal Nehur, 
Australian politician, Herbert Evatt, and Filipino Resident Commissioner to United 
States Congress, Carlos Romulo, to come and see for themselves Indonesia's Republic. 
He, along with Mohammad Hatta, also tried to keep under control the escalating 
pemuda (youth) violence by issuing a joint proclamation of warning against those who, 
having declared Holy War, have kidnapped and have set up their own courts to punish 
the Dutch or anyone they disliked. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of 
Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1972), 179-180.  
26 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, “Further Adventures of Charisma,” in Language and 
Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990), 87.   
27 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast 
Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998), 2. 
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(borrowed) philosophical terms germinate quite differently when sown in foreign 
lands.   
The Filipinos, too, found the construction of a worldview crucial to imagining 
the nation, but had a slightly different story to tell. In a similar yet different vein, the 
Filipino intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, the Ilustrados, were indefatigable in 
their own determination to show the world the greatness of the Philippine nation. But 
while Soekarno and his predecessors could speak confidently of a heritage that had 
long been “perfected,” the Filipino propagandists felt that what lay before them was 
the tedious task of recovering and constructing a “greatness” that had somehow been 
suppressed or lost. True to their reputation as the “enlightened ones,” they struggled to 
expose and rectify the unjust accusations brought against their people by casting light 
(the light of reason) on the obscurantism that depicted the Filipinos as intellectually 
inept, indolent, and the ungrateful children of Mother Spain, and at the same time, 
sought to rehabilitate the people's self-respect by illuminating the shadowy traces of a 
forgotten past.   
 Today, we are warned about the dangers of nationalist sentiments and 
constructions, which are now often perceived, before they even become excessive, as 
already “potentially ethnocentric.” And yet, when we look closely at how our early 
nationalists conceived the nation, one can see that they took interest in studying the 
psychology and practices of their people not simply to present a panegyric. One 
appreciates, for example, Jose Rizal’s honesty, when in good faith he disputes his 
fellow Ilustrado Doctor Sancianco who, in his Progreso de Filipinas argues 
categorically and defensively that indolence “does not exist,” and that the allegation 
“does not deserve reply or even passing notice.”28 But being the excellent doctor that 
he was, Rizal knew that in order to cure a sick nation, a truthful diagnosis was 
necessary, one that willingly sacrificed everything for truth, “even [one’s] own self-
                                                 
28  Jose Rizal, The Indolence of the Filipinos, trans. Charles Derbyshire. (Manila: 
Publisher unknown, 1913), 2. 
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respect.”  It was, therefore, only in opening one's eyes to the existing indolence that 
one could begin to study it, to understand how this behavior had been maliciously 
“fostered and magnified,” depicted as though the most natural and inherent of habits of 
an inferior race and the cause of the nation's misery and backwardness, while in fact, it 
had been the effect of a long history of lamentable abuse.  
 Secondly, in constructing the nation, the Ilustrados were far from merely 
looking inwards or fostering intolerance for the other. In fact, they found it almost 
impossible to look beyond themselves, curious about what lay beyond the borders that 
the imperial nations were trying so hard to enforce in their attempt to isolate the 
colonies from their neighboring countries. We are told, for example, that “the Borneans, 
Siamese, Cambodians, and the Japanese” were much feared for being “free and 
independent,” that communication and trade between them and the Filipinos were 
prematurely severed.29 Aside from being anxious towards foreign-inspired ideas of 
rebellion, the colonial empires also coveted an economic monopoly on their “claimed 
lands,” thus imposing “blockade, fortified footholds and patrol fleets.”30 But such 
attempts, of course, could never really prevail, especially when ideas were naturally as 
fluid as the ocean waters that perpetually spilled beyond and washed away those man-
made, artificial borders, nurturing, perforce, “a tradition of hospitality” that stubbornly 
persists in maritime Asia.31 
                                                 
29 Rizal, Indolence, 33. Rizal notes in particular how Borneans were suspected of  
planning an uprising, and that, though there was no proof of even an attempt, the 
suspicions resulted to numerous executions. 
30  Donald Lach and Edwin Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965-1993), 141. A good example were the Portuguese, 
who in the beginning of the sixteenth century fiercely imposed full control of the spice 
trade of eastern Indonesia. See O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast 
Asian Perspectives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2004), 
39. 
31 Wolters, History, Culture, and Region, 40. Wolters's description of Southeast Asia as 
a “single ocean,” as (what was once) “a vast zone of neutral water,” is ingenious. From 
a simple yet truthful statement about the geographical characteristic of the region, he 
draws an understanding of confluences based on a tradition of hospitality, a relation 
which he elaborately unpacks in his idea of localization.  This hospitality, and its 
resilience against forces that threat the “freedom of the seas” and its inherent openness 
to the foreign is demonstrated in the aberrant behavior we call piracy, which appeared 
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 With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, people and ideas flowed more 
fluidly between the Southeast Asian colonies and their metropoles. Traveling made 
easier by the latest accomplishments in transport technology suddenly made it 
impossible not to look at the affairs of others, especially those who shared the same 
colonial plight. And in that fateful age of print capitalism,  where news always traveled 
faster and wider than what could be humanly achieved in distance and speed, the world 
began to grow infinitely smaller.  “Is Cuba for Sale?” was the title of an article that 
appeared in La Solidaridad, the fortnightly paper of the Filipino “Propaganda 
Movement” in Spain. One could hear from this rhetorical question (asked “a thousand 
and one times”) not just a tone of indignation and disbelief over such news of a 
“sacrilegious sale,” but a resounding demand to the Peninsular government to clean up 
their act.32 But the Ilustrados were not just looking at their neighbors to expose the 
alarming conditions that were similarly happening in their native land or what they 
imagined could yet happen to their own people.  Sometimes, gazing at the other was 
about seeking out older and deeper connections that could tell them who they were.  
 
Gazing at Java 
 An interesting example of this curious gaze is seen in the Ilustrados's high 
regard for Java. While they professed their love for Spain, recognizing the virtue behind 
the “civilizing mission,”33 the Ilustrados were not oblivious to the destruction that was 
                                                 
at the moment when “Europeans forced local rulers to conclude restrictive trading 
treaties” that once offered fair trading practices to all.  I see here, though, that the 
“commercial exchanges” did not merely “[encourage] cultural communications,” but 
were metaphors or, better yet, the corporeal impressions of the encounters and 
confluences that were equally reproducing themselves on the level of culture and ideas.  
32  Juan, “Is Cuba for Sale? March 31, 1889, in La Solidaridad, Volume 1, trans. 
Guadalupe Forés-Ganzon (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1967), 
115-117.    
33  Such sentiment was reflected in a claim by Bohemian Professor and Filipinist, 
Ferdinand Blumentritt saying that while the Dutch in the East Indies “occupied their 
'possessions' not for religious or civilizing or humanitarian ends, but purely as objects 
of merchandise,” “the Spanish occupation in the Philippines [was] an act of 
Christianization, of civilization,” which for him was undoubtedly “for the noblest, most 
humanitarian and philanthropic ends.” Ferdinand Blumentritt, “A Letter from Austria-
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unleashed in its name. As one reads, for example, in Pedro Paterno's El Cristianismo 
en la Antigua Civilización Tagálog, one could see profound expressions of grief over 
the loss of our indigenous culture, how one could never find statues and books in the 
Philippines “because of religious fervor, the irrepressible exuberance of absolutism, the 
closed-minded intolerance, engendering a kind of healthy bloodthirsty intellectual”;34 
so bloodthirsty, that “the missionary fathers themselves, with burning boastful pride 
and vanity, have recorded that they have tried to destroy all memories of the past.”35  
 Precisely because of the same grievance, Pardo de Tavera embarked on a study 
of Sanskrit-derived words in the Tagalog language. The introduction to his El Sanscrito 
en la lengua tagalog is unabashedly an encomium of Hindu and Javanese civilizations.  
Unlike the Chinese who had sent adventurers from the lower class, with the sole 
purpose of making a fortune, the Hindu colonies came to Java, bringing their literature 
and legends, and effectively changing the habits and customs of the people.  What was 
perhaps most admirable for de Tavera—though he quickly clarified this to be nothing 
more than conjecture—was that, judging from the legacy of material culture left in 
Java, the Hindus seemed to have ruled their subjects quite peacefully; and because the 
Hindus “found a race of a quiet and gentle character, had easily planted in a soil so well 
prepared the maxims of their religion that served for the time being, to increase that 
tinge of melancholic character of the Javanese.” And the “temples, images, 
inscriptions, [that] cover the soil of that fertile island,” serve as proof of the 
achievements of their civilization.36 In saying all this, was Pardo perhaps making a 
silent comparison to the violence of Spanish rule? Furthermore, he praises the Javanese 
who, upon receiving the beliefs and literature of the Hindus, did not content themselves 
                                                 
Hungary: Quioquiap Judged by a Professor from Bohemia” (March 31, 1889), in La 
Solidaridad, Volume 1, 119-121. 
34  Pedro Paterno, El Cristianismo en la Antigua Civilización Tagálog (Madrid: 
Imprenta Moderna, 1892), 11.   
35 Paterno, El Cristianismo, 11. 
36 Pardo de Tavera, El Sanscrito en la lengua tagalog (Paris: Imprimerie de la Faculté 
de Médicine, 1887), 7. 
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with a slavish copy (una copia servil) or a mere pastiche of Hindu literature (un plagio 
de la literatura), but created for themselves a genre combining Hindu legends with 
their own, blending the latter with the poetry inspired by the beauty of their homeland 
and their own sentiments.37 And finally, an ode to Cawi—“the religious language, the 
language of poetry, the language in which Java conserves the most beautiful 
monuments of [its] national literature.”38 While the Javanese have all these that reveal 
the extent of Hindu influences in their land, in the Philippines, there are no monuments, 
statues, or literature that tell the story, except perhaps in the Tagalog language, where 
we find Sanskrit traces. Precisely for this reason, this study, according to de Tavera, 
becomes very important “not only as an interest for linguistics but also for the history 
of this beautiful archipelago.”39  
 In this regard, I can only sympathize with the Ilustrados. If they gazed at others, 
and lamented the rubble of what was left of our culture, it was because they were 
yearning for home.  And in exploring the intellectual landscape of academic philosophy 
in the Philippines, one realizes that it is the same yearning that lies at the core. The 
search for Filipino philosophy—which as we shall see is the recurring theme around 
which all frustrations, desires, and squabbles revolve—is a pining to return to one’s 
“self,” whether it be a willfulness that seeks out/constructs the “indigenous,” an attempt 
to localize the foreign, or a retrieval of the vernacular which is always at the brink (i.e., 
always “almost but not quite”) of disappearing.  
 Like the Ilustrados, I, too, sought to look beyond the nation, ironically in search 
for a way home. And as I gazed at Java, I, too, was drawn to the magnificence of its 
ancient culture. Thus, as part of my journey, I fumbled over old philosophical Javanese 
texts and acquainted myself with aksara jawa, the Javanese indigenous script—tasks 
that normally take years to prepare for and more years to accomplish. In trying to do 
                                                 
37 De Tavera, El Sanscrito, 8. 
38 De Tavera, El Sanscrito, 8. 
39 De Tavera, El Sanscrito, 9.   
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all this in my eight-month excursion to Java, it was understandable that people thought 
I was crazy or wasting my time. But while the journey did not yield a full-fledged 
comparison as I had initially intended (due to practical limitations of time, effort, 
courage and words), I would be untruthful if I completely swept it under the rug. For 
the truth is that I had learned to see what I would not have been able to if I had not 
taken that journey: that more than similarities, one realizes the specificity of the 
confluences of religion, history, and culture that have shaped and influenced 
philosophical practices in the Philippines and in Indonesia. And apart from realizing 
the enormity of such a comparative study, it is also important to note that, given the 
scattered and minor efforts that have been made in broaching this particular topic, this 
research is, in a way, a beginning, an attempt to present a more comprehensive picture. 
In this case, it would be prudent to take not big leaps but small steps.   
 One of the major realizations came as I was sharing with a stranger my 
excitement over aksara jawa, while lamenting the near absence of indigenous writing 
in our country. I had just returned to Manila from my Java trip and was unusually 
chatty. Knowing that this stranger was studying old languages himself, I expected him 
to share my sentiment. Instead, he looked at me intently, and gave an unusually 
perceptive remark: Tinitikbalang ka. Nakukutuban mo kung saan ka dapat tumungo, 
pero kahit anong pilit, hindi ka makarating sa gusto mong puntahan (“A tikbalang is 
playing tricks on you. You intuit where you're supposed to be headed, but no matter 
how hard you try, you can't reach the destination you desire”). The tikbalang is a 
mischievous mythical creature that lives deep in the forests and plays tricks on travelers 
so that they lose their way and are unable to return home.  With a torso and hands of a 
human and unusually elongated thighs and legs of a horse, the tikbalang is said to be 
the soul of an aborted fetus, who due to his misfortune hates children the most, deprived 
and envious of their happy innocence.40 
                                                 
40 Isabelo de los Reyes, El Folklore Filipino (Manila: Imprenta de Santa Cruz, 1890), 
66-67. It is said that the tikbalang (or tigbalang), as the soul of an aborted child, is 
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It was then that I realized that I was, more than I was conscious, part of an 
intellectual tradition where scholarship has often been a reflection or expression of 
exile. Being tikbalang-ed is our curse, the sorrowful consequence of a “collective 
lobotomy” that two great Empires (Spain and America) have performed on us, and 
which has caused the malediction of forgetfulness, of not knowing who we are or even 
where to find this place we call home. Furthermore, I realized that instead of 
understanding the specific character or problem of philosophical practice in Indonesia, 
I had unwittingly appropriated the latter in the search for Filipino philosophy. In 
retrospect, this was probably the reason why, as soon as I heard the German Jesuit 
philosopher, Franz Magnis-Suseno say that philosophy students at the Driyarkara 
Institute were keener to learn about Western philosophy than indigenous thought, I 
decided to immediately leave Jakarta to return to my exotic Java.  
 
Exile: Remembering Filipino Filibusteros 
 One of the ironies in life is that the more one dwells on the thought of home, 
the more one feels a melancholic sense of exile; but there is also that nagging thought 
that perhaps being in exile is the closest we can ever get to home. Pondering the 
character of Jose Rizal, Filipino historian Vicente Rafael depicts the Filipino national 
hero in an intriguing and unusual light: contrary to what may be expected from a 
nationalist, he is imbued by the foreign, someone who is, in a sense, not one of “us,” 
and therefore one who is “exiled” to the realm of the unfamiliar.  
 Curiously, it is Rizal's foreignness that is remembered and committed to a 
monument, where he is poised wearing a winter coat, and holding a copy of his Noli 
me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, the two novels he had written in Castilian, ironically 
a language “that less than 1% of the [Filipino] population can read much less write 
                                                 
banished from limbo and sent to earth to live a life in the worst imaginable way. He 
feels hunger and thirst, but can neither eat nor drink.   
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in.”41 The novels were, however, not just speaking in a foreign tongue; written and 
published in Europe, they had sprung from “foreign origins.” And as if being born into 
exile were not painful enough, they were alleged by the Spanish authorities to be 
subversive and criminal, and were consequently banished from returning home. It is in 
relation to the connection between foreignness and criminality that Rafael reflects on 
the filibustero, that shameful title and allegation inflicted by Spanish authorities on 
Filipino nationalists who sought liberal reforms, including Rizal who was banished into 
exile and eventually executed.  What is emphasized here is the crucial role of language: 
how the nationalists passionately urged for the compulsory teaching of Castilian, which 
they saw, despite and because of its foreignness, not merely as the medium by which 
their appeals for economic and social reforms could be heard, but a (new) way of being, 
or at least the promise of a way of being that would make them equals of the 
Spaniards.42 But it was precisely the (mis)appropriation of  this language (as a way of 
being), which the Spanish friars believed was never the native's right to own, that the 
nationalists were misrecognized by authority as filibusteros, subversives who were 
“speaking out of place.”43  
 Curiously, in Pramoedya Ananta Toer's novel, Child of All Nations, we learn 
that the natives of the East Indies were mutually gazing at their Filipino neighbors. 
                                                 
41  Vicente L. Rafael, “Foreignness and Vengeance: On Rizal's El Filibusterismo,” 
UCLA Center for Southeast Asian Studies, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4j11p6c1. This 
monument, which is located in Manila, was erected in 1912 during the American 
colonial regime.  Emphasizing its foreignness, Rafael reports that the monument was 
not just built by the Swiss sculptor Richard Kissling, but that its pieces were formed 
abroad and only later shipped and assembled in the Philippines. 
42 See Vicente Rafael, The Promise of the Foreign: Nationalism and the Technics of 
Translation in the Spanish Philippines (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 
43 The filibustero, according to Rafael, was either defined as a pirate or thief, or one 
“who interrupts parliamentary proceedings, smuggling his or her own discourse into 
those of others.” In both cases, the filibustero is a “disruptive presence,” “breaking and 
entering into where s/he does not properly belong.”  But aside from being a 
troublemaker, one who disrupts the social order, the filibustero has the malevolent 
power to surreptitiously “infect” others, by being able to persuade people to think and 
act in ways contrary to one's intentions. For this reason, the filibustero “is a kind of 
foreign presence who exercises an alienating effect on all those it comes in contact 
with.” Rafael, “Foreignness and Vengeance,” 7-8. 
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While onboard the ship Oosthoek (Eastern Corner), sailing “calmly to the west” from 
Tanjung Perak to Batavia, the well-educated Javanese journalist, Minke, has a 
fortuitous encounter with the European extreme liberalist and former sub-editor of 
Soerabaiaasch Nieuws, Ter Haar. In the course of their conversation, Ter Haar asks 
Minke if he knows anything about the Philippines. Despite the news blackout, Minke 
had heard about the rebellion of the Filipino natives against their Spanish and American 
colonizers, from the young Chinese activist Khouw Ah Soe who, in an earlier part of 
the story, had shared with him his admiration for the Filipinos: 
“They [Filipinos] studied well from the Spanish, from Europe, even before the 
Japanese. Even before the Chinese. It is a pity they were a colonized people, 
unlike Japan. The Filipinos could not develop because they were colonized. 
The Japanese have developed—developed too well. The Filipinos were good 
pupils of the Spanish. And the Spanish were bad teachers, rotten and 
corrupting. But the Filipinos didn't just accept their teachings uncritically. The 
Filipinos are also great teachers for the other conquered peoples of Asia. They 
were the founders of the first Asian republic. And it collapsed. A great 
historical experiment.”44  
Ter Haar would later speak of the Filipinos with similar regard:  
“Such progress. The Filipino natives were closer to European science and 
learning, closer to understanding the power that rested with the European 
peoples, to knowing how to use that power, and so they rebelled. They had 
changed as human beings because of European education. They could never 
return to being the Natives of earlier times.45 
Here, Pramoedya gives a different meaning to the experience of exile. It is no 
longer merely a “curse” imposed on us as the historical outcome of the “civilizing 
                                                 
44 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Child of All Nations, trans. Max Lane (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1996), 88. 
45 Pramoedya, Child of All Nations, 263.  
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mission” that has effectively banished us from who we are, or even the punishment for 
speaking out of place; more profoundly, exile is our human condition, as our existential 
quandary of never staying where we are, of always traveling in time, across metropole 
and colonies, and to other foreign lands.  
 At one point, Ter Haar acknowledges that the rebellion of the Filipinos “rocked 
all of Europe, including Holland,” but he seems unaware that it also inspired Khouw 
Ah Soe and his friends. For Ter Haar, these Chinese “trouble-makers” “were only trying 
to copy” America and France. While the Dutch were trying so hard to prevent news of 
the rebellion from spreading in their colony, the Filipino filibustero had already 
successfully found a way into the Indies, through the guise of Chinese filibusteros who, 
as it appeared in a newspaper report, were equally misrecognized as a “group of illegal 
immigrants,”  “anarchists, nihilists, good-for-nothing agitators,” whose “intention was 
to create trouble in the Netherlands Indies by inciting the young people to defy their 
ancestors and their own parents.”46 Ironically, in the last words that transpired between 
Minke and Khouw Ah Soe, the latter makes it clear that his commitment to the struggle 
is one of remembering, but curiously, one that remembers a foreign “ancestry.”  
Before the guava-faced youth left our house, I felt I had to ask one more 
question: Was Nijman's report true, that he had been beaten up in the Kong 
Koan building? He confirmed it. 
“Dangerous work,” I commented. 
“There may be worse yet to come.” 
“You are not afraid?” 
    “The Philippines cannot be forgotten, can they? Even if they were deceived 
by Spain and America? It is inevitable that other conquered peoples will follow 
in their footsteps. Yes, even in the Indies. If not now, then later, when people 
know how to handle their teachers.”47 
                                                 
46 Pramoedya, Child of All Nations, 90-91. 
47 Pramoedya, Child of All Nations, 89. 
 27 
Of Teachers and Students 
 In exploring academic philosophy in the Philippines, one realizes that one 
crucial theme throughout its history is, contrary to what Heidegger would have liked, 
the need and search for a Weltanschaaung. But in the same spirit that animated the 
work of Ilustrados and Filipino filibusteros, this desire for a worldview has not 
necessarily been a form of ethnocentricism that merely accumulates cultural treasures 
and is closed into itself. Instead, the search for Filipino philosophy, as we shall see in 
the coming chapters, can be understood as a profound expression of exile, and a longing 
for home, but that which concomitantly opens itself to the foreign.  Here, exile is not 
just the negative consequence of one’s banishment from home, as we often understand 
it, but a vital part of the human existential condition, as Pramoedya implies in his 
encomium to the Filipinos. Thus, exile is not merely the loss of self resulting to a 
yearning for home, but the journey of one who is constantly imbued by the foreign, and 
consequently becomes foreign to himself.  And it is this foreigness, as we shall also 
see, that sometimes has led to speaking out of place. From this place of exile, Filipino 
philosophy becomes a venue of the encounter between master and apprentice, not one 
of subservience but of critique and iconoclasm.  
 It was some time after taking a module called SE5151 (Approaches to the 
Study of Southeast Asia) with Professor Ileto that I began to ponder on the encounter 
between the teacher and the student as what lay at the core of our philosophical 
endeavors.  The module, which I had assumed was a theoretical course, surprisingly 
turned out to be a biographical introduction of the people behind the creation and 
historical transformation of Southeast Asian Studies. And because Ileto presented 
himself not merely as the narrator but a character in his story, his approach to teaching 
was autobiographical as well.  
 Part of what Ileto had taught in that class can be gleaned from an 
autobiographical essay he had written about his formative experiences as a doctoral 
student at Cornell University, reminiscing his memorable encounter with two 
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supervisors, D.G.E. Hall and Oliver Wolters. While grateful to his teachers for initiating 
him into the discipline and rigor of scholarship and to the critical importance of 
languages, Ileto was equally aware that, being one of Wolters's first three Southeast 
Asian doctoral students, he was part of an agenda to “sow the seeds” of “autonomous 
history” in the region, a scholarship that provided a “third way” aimed at dispelling 
both Euro-centric and anticolonial or nationalist historiography.  
  To appreciate these biographical notes, it was necessary to understand them in 
conjunction with the works authored by Hall and Wolters themselves, excerpts of which 
were assigned readings for the SE 5151 module. And it was precisely in the “dialogue” 
between these texts that one discovers the antinomies that constituted the lives and 
ideas of these pioneering thinkers. As Ileto points out, both Hall and Wolters started 
out as colonial scholars-officials for the British Empire, careers that would clearly 
shape and influence their thinking. While Hall was assigned to Rangoon in 1921 to 
teach history to a newly-formed Burmese elite groomed to be the country's future 
leaders, Wolters served the Malayan Civil Service in 1955 as the director of 
Psychological Warfare, pacifying and campaigning against “what he himself termed 
the Communist terrorists.”48 With a clear political affiliation to the Empire, it was 
therefore no surprise that they would warn Ileto not to write like the Filipino nationalist 
historian, Teodoro Agoncillo, whose work was blatantly anticolonial, and instead, urge 
him to do research which was more in line with an autonomous history that looked 
beyond the colonial tensions.  
 Despite their conservative position, there were, however, discernible traces of 
self-criticism and progressive thinking that earned Hall and Wolters the reputation they 
have today as the pioneers of Southeast Asian studies. As the putative father of 
                                                 
48 Reynaldo C. Ileto, “On the Historiography of Southeast Asia and the Philippines: 
The 'Golden Age' of Southeast Asian Studies—Experiences and Reflections” (paper 
presented at the Workshop for the Academic Frontier Project: “Social Change in Asia 
and the Pacific,” Meiji Gakuin University, March 2002), 18, 
http://www.meijigakuin.ac.jp/~iism/frontier/Proceedings/08%20Ileto%20Speech.pdf. 
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Southeast Asian history, Hall was not just fiercely critical of Eurocentric 
historiography; rather, in asserting the need “to present South-East Asia historically as 
an area worthy of consideration in its own right, and not merely when brought into 
contact with China, India or the West,”49  he actively sought elements that would 
provide the integrity or a certain wholeness unique to the region. Furthermore, his 
advocacy for regional awareness as a potential “machinery for common action,” was 
clearly a subversive act toward the imperial powers who had been known to employ 
isolationism, i.e., keeping their colony practically incommunicado, as one of the 
political tactics to perpetuate their rule.50 As for Wolters, one can glean form his ideas 
of “local genius” and “localization” a strong belief in the resilience and uniqueness of 
a region where people have both enjoyed and suffered the influx of foreign elements. 
It was precisely this way of thinking that Hall himself, Wolters's own mentor, would 
take up as an alternative model to Brian Harrison's understanding of a Southeast Asia 
that merely served as “a passive arena for alien influences to work their way.”51 This 
idea of acculturation is also, in fact, one of the major arguments behind John Smail's 
idea of autonomous history, which he elaborates through the particular example of 
Indonesia; that in emphasizing “on the great bulk of [Indonesian] society, absolutely 
and relatively to the minute Dutch elite,” “we must reject the notion that [colonial] 
control as such logically implies the insignificance or feebleness of the controlled 
except in a purely political military sense,” but instead find in the “social structure and 
culture,” again, not the powerlessness of a subjugated people and the “collapse of 
[their] cultural values,” but the strength and persistence of their identity transformed 
through “creative adaptation.”  In highlighting this aspect, Smail aims “to awaken the 
thought that there is an authentic Indonesian body beneath the clothes we call the 
                                                 
49 D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan Limited, 1955), vii. 
Quoted in John Smail, “On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern 
Southeast Asia,” in Journal of Southeast Asian History 2, no. 2 (1961): 7.  
50 D.G.E. Hall, “The Integrity of Southeast Asian History,” in Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 4, no.2 (1973): 167-168. 
51 Ileto, “The 'Golden Age' of Southeast Asian Studies,” 12. 
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Netherlands Indies, that this body has its own history, autonomous in the fundamental 
sense.”52   
 From the danger that forces intellectual life into complicity with the imperialist 
project, a saving power arises: that because of the knowledge, sympathy, and idealistic 
commitment of some of these colonial scholars, they became “too relevant,” “too 
involved in the questions of the day,” so much so that they began to deviate from the 
objectives that their imperial sponsors had set;53 so much so that Southeast Asian 
studies began recruiting Southeast Asian scholars, clearly a commitment not only in 
acknowledging the importance of vernaculars and an analysis that came from within, 
but in allowing Southeast Asians to be actively involved in the production of 
knowledge about themselves. It was then that Southeast Asian studies, at the height of 
the Vietnam war in the late 1960s, ironically became the fiercest critique of American 
foreign policy.    
 It is, however, in the context of this “golden age” of Southeast Asian studies 
that Ileto situates his autobiographical essay, (re)inserting the memory of a lingering 
colonial perception, which for the sake of keeping a self-image of valiant and radical 
scholarship, could have easily been erased. Here, he inserts his own voice, as a refusal 
to follow his teacher, as a disturbance in the calm confidence of the Cornell mandala. 
If he stubbornly refused the idea of autonomous history that his mentors were 
espousing, it was not so much because he did not believe in the resilience of his own 
people.54 Rather, his contention lies in the urge of its proponents to “look beyond the 
                                                 
52 Smail, “Autonomous History,” 89 – 92. 
53 Ruth McVey, “Globalization, Marginalization and the Study of Southeast Asia,” in 
Southeast Asian Studies: Reorientations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program 
Publications, 1998), 39. 
54  In fact, Ileto’s dissertation, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the 
Philippines, 1840-1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003) was 
in many ways aligned to the values that autonomous historiography was advocating. In 
studying the millenarian peasant movements, he was not just exposing an instance of 
cultural adaptation, where the Church-approved Pasyon during the Spanish colonial 
regime provided the inspiration for a collective struggle; in redeeming popular Tagalog 
texts from obscurity, he also uncovered “a profound ethical and cultural abyss between 
the peasantry and the mestizo national elite” (Benedict Anderson, “Politics and Their 
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colonial relationship,” to see the latter as a barrier to historical understanding and to 
perceive it as “only part of an even larger one, the theme of the meeting of West and 
East, the spreading of Western culture to every part of the world and its incipient 
metamorphosis into a single world culture or civilization.” 55  It is with the same 
unperturbed tone that Wolters, thirty years later, would urge a reflection of 
globalization not in terms of a threat but as the process by which we find the resilience 
of local cultures in concepts like hybridity or local adaptability.56 Ileto, on his part, 
asks: can we really dismiss the colonial relationship in the case of the Philippines, “with 
its 350 years of direct Spanish rule and 50 years (some say ongoing) of American 
colonialism?”57 Clearly, in the light of the anticolonial sentiments and the Filipinization 
movement in the late 60's, Ileto could not deny the lingering presence of the colonial 
encounter, much less be oblivious to its existence as a persistent danger.  Hearing the 
echoes of an “unfinished revolution,” he denies time of its untroubled flow. 
 It is quite understandable how this perceived “thoughtless hatred” in 
anticolonial writings, which is seen to persist in postcolonial discourse, has caused 
anxiety among scholars who have been the target of such critique. A clear example is 
Ileto's controversial essay on the “Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics,” 
which has been perceived as an “attack,” causing much resentment among American 
scholars and their followers.58 Although this is not the place to get entangled in the 
details of the debate, suffice it to say that the essay tried to expose a lurking danger that 
threatens every scholar—the danger of essentializing the “object” of one’s study. But 
                                                 
Study in Southeast Asia,” in Ronald A. Morse, ed. Southeast Asian Studies: Options 
for the Future [Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1984], 48), which was clearly 
the kind of “internal history” that Smail advocated in the hope “to fit the great bulk of 
the people into the historical  picture.” Smail, “Autonomous History,” 99. 
55 Smail, “Autonomous History,” 94. 
56 O.W. Wolters, “History, Culture, and Region,” 207.   
57 Ileto, “The 'Golden Age' of Southeast Asian Studies,” 8. 
58  See Reynaldo C. Ileto, “Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics,” in 
Knowing America's Colony: A Hundred Years From the Philippine War, Philippine 
Studies Occasional Paper Series No. 13 (Hawai'i: University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 
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Politics,” Philippine Political Science Journal 23, no. 46 (2002): 119-174. 
 32 
for Ileto, the problem lies not just in describing the Filipinos as the “negative others” 
of the Americans, of how their nature of being “ruled by their passions, kinship ties, 
debts of gratitude and personal loyalties”59 has inevitably led to what is viewed as the 
“tradition” of clientelist politics, pitting the Filipino as “Factional man” against the 
“Enlightenment man” of Western democracies, and thus seeing the former as “the 
negative opposite of, or at least the precursor to” the latter.60 Rather, what seems to be 
for him more alarming is how a group of texts have produced “discursive formations,” 
that by character are performative, circulating certain words, images and ideas (such as 
the “pecularities” or “quirks, oddities, and . . . abnormalities” and the “fluidity” of 
moody and “unpredictable” Philippine politics) that assert an authority over minds, a 
power immeasurable in depth and reach, and what only keeps emerging in the 
generations of texts it breeds. This is why Ileto begins his essay by identifying the 
danger as nothing more than a book (Stanley Karnow's In Our Image: America's 
Empire in the Philippines), but what asserts its authority, its entitlement as a “must-
read,” and even a Pulitzer Prize winner (!).61And as the essay unfolds, we learn that 
this book is none other than the offspring of an earlier discourse, with every page 
bearing the haunting of an older authority, of “those 'five young scholars from the 
University of Michigan,'62 who sought to strike out a new course in 1971”; and who in 
turn were themselves haunted by the question of America's self-definition, and which 
itself haunted representations of the Philippines as “its colonial ‘other.’”63 
 If, then, we are to identify the power of discursive formations, it is their 
capacity to surreptitiously inhabit our thinking, furtively reproducing themselves in our 
                                                 
59 Ileto, “Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics,”44. 
60 Ileto, “Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics,” 50. 
61 Ileto, “Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics,” 42. 
62 This refers to the book Norman Owen, ed., Compadre Colonialism: Philippine-
American Relations:1898-1946 (Ann Arbor, Mich: Center for South and Southeast 
Asian Studies, The University of Michigan, 1971), whose authors were all students of 
David J. Steinberg. Furthermore, it was this collected work, according to Ileto, that 
“'enabled' Karnow's book.”   
63 Ileto, “Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics,” 64-65. 
 33 
discourse. These are the ghosts that haunt us, the filibusteros that hijack our mind. But 
it is perhaps not so much about chasing them away as identifying who they are, and 
being alert to their coming and going. In the course of the essay, Ileto expresses his 
own dismay, of how the discursive formations of the 1960s persist in the 1990s, 
continuing to haunt present-day scholarship, and what therefore have yet to be 
surmounted. It is this calm and self-confident passage of essentialized and 
essentializing “tradition,” passing from generation to generation, that Ileto seeks to 
interrupt and disturb.   
 In the same spirit, Ileto tries to free himself from the ghosts of his own mentors. 
In receiving a warning not to write like Agoncillo, he recognizes yet another instance 
of how authority exercises itself in full force, through a discursive formation that 
identifies and condemns nationalist historiography as “bad scholarship.” This is, 
indeed, another feature of hegemonic discourse, that is, the tendency to banish all 
opposing views. In some ways, this is what happens when some scholars insist on 
moving “forward” and letting go of colonialism as a thing of the past. And it seems, in 
relation to the colonial problem, there are at least two ways by which it is “spirited 
away.” There are those who believe, that while it is an important part of history, the 
danger it poses today is largely unreal.64 And there is the other idea, as we have seen in 
Smail, that the attacks against colonialism have only spawned “a thoughtless hatred” 
which is mainly divisive and therefore what we must try to avoid.  But is it not possible 
                                                 
64 This argument, which is found in Smail's essay in the 1960s, continues on with 
scholars such as Craig Reynolds. He believes that postcolonial theory, which “arises 
from an abiding concern for the residual effects of colonization caused by economic 
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Reynolds, “Self-Cultivation and Self-Determination in Postcolonial Southeast Asia,” 
in Southeast Asian Studies: Reorientations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia 
Program Publications, 1998), 16-18. 
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that a critique against the “residual effects” of colonization could be thoughtful and 
well intended?  
 Clearly, when Ileto critiqued his mentors and exposed the ghosts of their 
colonial past, there was not even the slightest tone of resentment. In fact, with his 
biographical notes, he portrays them as persons with their own passions and 
disappointments (Hall singing merrily in class the songs of the Empire, and his difficult 
relations with some rivals and students in Burma), as well as in their complexities 
(Wolters, the disciplinarian, who in the end did not resist when Ileto included ideas 
from scholars of the opposing camp). Indeed, what can be gleaned from this 
autobiographical essay, which presents an encounter with the master that goes beyond 
the usual dynamics between mentor and mentee, is perhaps also a way to understand 
our postcolonial condition: not an abandonment of our colonial past and a denial of 
how it lingers in our present, nor a criticism that generates hatred; rather, in pondering 
the inescapable inheritance that we are, to situate ourselves between two extremes: on 
the one hand, the panegyric of a blind follower, and on the other, an iconoclastic and 
oedipal relation to the teacher.  
 If I sympathize with those who refuse to let go of colonialism as a thing of the 
past, it is because I, myself, identify the colonial encounter as my point of departure. 
In the beginning of this chapter, I spoke of my own orientalism, of how I sought to 
exorcise and push away from my own biases. But the problem was not so much that I 
had never thought of looking into local scholarship nor felt the same excitement as 
when I read the works of Western philosophers, as I had assumptions that prevented 
me from asking certain basic questions. 
 There is, according to Derrida, a French idiom: “il y a lieu de poser cette 
question.”65 There is a place where one poses this question. To say this, however, does 
not only mean that one is given a proper venue to ask, but rather, it is to consecrate a 
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(UNESCO, 1997), 10. 
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particular place that would allow such question to arise and be raised. This is why when 
Ileto critiqued the idea of autonomous history, it was not merely casting doubt to the 
discourse of a “golden age” that had happened in the 1960s, but it was equally putting 
to question the place from where its splendor arose. By inserting the voices of 
opposition, which came from “elsewhere,” it is not only time that is disjointed (that 
from within this “golden age,” we discover the decaying remnants of a colonial 
perspective) but the place is also dis-located (that another “golden age” of Southeast 
Asian studies had occurred in the peripheries of the Cornell mandala).66 This is also 
why, in pondering the importance of place and how it gives rise to specific concerns, 
Ileto had in 1994 organized a colloquium on “indigenous historiography.” Here, he 
gathered historians from all over the region in an attempt not to systematically map out 
advances in Southeast Asian historiography, but simply to provide a place where they 
could share their experiences as scholars “who write for a domestic audience, [and] 
who are enmeshed in local debates and institutional struggles.”67 Anticipating criticism, 
Ileto reassures that this reflection on indigenous historiography is not an assertion of 
neo-nativism, nor is it even “a question of East versus West.” It does not seek to 
preclude a non-native to engage and contribute to the discourse, but it will not deny the 
unique position that local scholars hold: that precisely in being located, specific 
questions emerge.  Indeed, if we are to take seriously the idea that area studies is and 
was  “never a 'neutral' expression of knowledge about Southeast Asia,”68 it is to realize 
                                                 
66 See Ileto “The 'Golden Age' of Southeast Asian Studies,” where he mentions the 
Burmese scholar, Maung Htin Aung, and the Armenian-Jewish, Russian- and German- 
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68  Carlo Bonura and Laurie J. Sears, “Introduction: Knowledge That Travels in 
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that, for better or for worse, the production of knowledge of any shape or form is 
inescapably imbued by our fears and predilections, by our hopes and burning questions. 
Unfortunately, there is the danger that one forgets her inescapable groundedness to a 
location, becoming dangerously hypocritical while professing disembodied ideas as 
universal “truths,” while discrediting others as inconsequential or the product of “bad 
scholarship.”  
 As someone reflecting on the problem of philosophy in the context of 
Southeast Asia and Southeast Asian studies, it becomes inevitable to ponder on the 
importance of place, or the lack of importance given to it. On the one hand, 
philosophy's preoccupation with concepts, that is, the entitlement it is given to devote 
itself to “truths” that cut across the entire spectrum of humanity, has been well 
simulated and replicated by local philosophers, so much so that the problem of 
indigenization is rendered irrelevant. And yet, at the same time, in precisely making 
themselves relevant, philosophers have involved themselves in the debates of their day, 
as we shall see unfolding in the next chapters.  
 In the same spirit that Ileto had brought fellow historians at a colloquium, so is 
my writing an attempt at gathering the voices that have pondered on the problem of 
philosophy and have given its character and role. But while I consecrate my 
understanding largely to the past of questions that arose, my reflection also hopes to be 
a point of departure, of further raising questions (and hopefully new questions) that can 
lead to a reflexive turn.  
 It is indeed a curious thing that the problem of philosophy in the region has 
been raised only now. Countless efforts have clearly been made within Southeast Asian 
studies not only in deploying philosophical concepts for analysis and critique but more 
importantly, in using the “pecularities” of the region to disrupt and throw doubt to the 
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calm confidence of “truths” that insist on their universal relevance.69 Furthermore, with 
its obviously “Greek name and European memory,” one would think that philosophy 
and its practice would have been much earlier discovered as an exciting object of 
inquiry for Southeast Asianists who are specially involved in reflections on the 
postcolonial condition. On the other hand, it is not surprising that this matter has been 
neglected all these years.  A lack in interest in knowing what preoccupies our local 
philosophers may be a combination of two things: on the one hand, a lack of interest in 
and resignation toward academic philosophy itself, as one finds more exciting ways of 
dealing with philosophical problems in other fields of study, and on the other, Southeast 
Asian studies' perception of its goals as perhaps different from those proper to a 
philosophical inquiry.  It is interesting, for example, how Ruth McVey urges to make 
Southeast Asian studies “more user-friendly to outsiders,” particularly in providing the 
“background relevant to their own fields of interest, whether that is philosophy or urban 
planning.”70 But Southeast Asian studies can do much more. Its immersion in the field 
and its demand for proficiency in vernaculars, as well as its emphasis on an 
interdisciplinary approach, make it a space for a phenomenological study that, I dare 
say despite the risk of Husserl and the great masters turning in their graves, has never 
itself been realized in the field of philosophy. The Southeast Asianist's love for the 
minutest detail may very well be the pebble in philosophy's shoes, or the Socratic pesky 
fly that constantly buzzes in philosophy's ear when it starts preaching, feeling high and 
mighty, about the “Great Family of Man.”71 
 In daring to raise or be touched by the philosophical questions, and claiming its 
“right to philosophy” (that is, as Derrida says, to give legitimacy to the unlegitimated, to 
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give right to those peripheral voices that philosophy as an institution and academic field 
of study has banished to the realm of the non-philosophical),72 Southeast Asian Studies 
could easily be a place where Southeast Asian voices could gather to dialogue with voices 
from other foreign lands. And such work can be important for a philosophizing that on the 
one hand, refuses to essentialize, but on the other, shows how we are, beyond the walls of 
our contained spaces, all caught in the same web of time.  
 In this context, my writing is as much a gathering of the voices of local 
philosophers as it is a personal attempt at learning to finally speak. To this day, I remember 
how my former colleague and mentor John Giordano, at a conference in Bandung in 2006, 
urged his fellow philosophers to have the courage to make space for their own thinking, 
to examine “the place where their thinking emerges, their own assumptions and 
mythologies.” The well-known literary critic and theorist Gayatri Spivak was there too, 
and having sensed the same problem of meekness and muteness, could only reiterate what 
John had already asserted. It is indeed ironic that within philosophy, whose main legacy 
is the critical and iconoclastic power of thinking, one finds a serious difficulty in speaking. 
It is, for me, clearly, none other than the problem that commonly arises among students in 
relation to their teachers. On the one hand, the student is beholden to the master, and for 
that, is at the same time always at the risk of never finding his own voice and becoming 
nothing more than an epigone. The danger exists with regard to every teacher, but more 
so, with philosophers, who we have come to recognize as the masters par excellance. To 
this day, when we speak of philosophy in the Philippines, what clearly stands out is the 
study of ethnophilosophy, of Weltanschauung, which on the one hand was important for 
nation building, but on the other, has severely restricted the limits of our dialogue with the 
masters. Is it possible to finally get beyond this, and raise the question of how a true 
dialogue among philosophers (not with philosophers) can occur?  
 There is a tradition in Thailand called the Wai Khru ritual, where the student pays 
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heed to the “need to repay and acknowledge.”  “Designed to honor the spirits invoked in 
performance or art, the chain of teachers who have passed on this knowledge, and finally 
the gods who created these artistic forms,”73 the ritual is a constant effacement of the 
student's ego, a remembering of the lineage of authority while at the same time reaffirming 
the student's status as a receptacle of the wisdom that flows from his teachers. Often, this 
is seen as the perfect explanation for why Southeast Asians “tend to be passive and 
reluctant to challenge their teachers.”74 Such explanation, however, runs the risk of being 
too simplistic. On the one hand, we easily assume that thinkers in the West have an easier 
time at challenging their teachers, given their tradition of critique. And yet, we find that 
Derrida himself was tormented by the need to speak, in relation to his mentor Michel 
Foucault, with whom he “retains the consciousness of an admiring and grateful disciple:” 
Starting to enter into dialogue in the world, that is, starting to answer back, 
[the disciple] always feels 'caught in the act,' like the 'infant' who, by definition 
and as his name indicates, cannot speak and above all must not answer back. 
And when, as in the case here, the dialogue is in danger of being taken—
incorrectly--as a challenge, the disciple knows that he alone finds himself 
already challenged by the master's voice within him that precedes his own. He 
feels himself indefinitely challenged, or rejected or accused; as a disciple, he 
is challenged by the master who speaks within him and before him, to reproach 
him for making this challenge and to reject it in advance, having elaborated it 
before him; and having interiorized the master, he is also challenged by the 
disciple that he himself is. This interminable unhappiness of the disciple 
perhaps stems from the fact that he does not yet know—or is still concealing 
from himself—that the master, like real life, may always be absent. The 
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disciple must break the glass, or better the mirror, the reflection, his infinite 
speculation on the master. And start to speak.75  
It is the same psychological struggle, the attempt to break one's silence in order 
to discover one's own voice that we have seen in the relation between Ilustrados and 
their Mother Spain. “Il n'y a pas plus d'enfants,” as Blumentritt would say of “the native 
who had been asleep, [but] stunned by the distance to which he was relegated by the 
paternal government, abandons his sleep and rises to salute his Mother Spain….” 
Indeed, it is precisely this courage to speak that Pramoedya admires, and for this reason, 
regards the Filipinos as themselves great teachers who can instruct Indonesians how to 
handle their own masters.   
 In listening to the voices of Filipino philosophers (both legitimate and 
unlegitimated ones), this study hopes to ponder on the antinomies that arise in this place 
we call philosophy—the tensions between heritage and critique, between the nation and 
the foreign, between teacher and student.    
*** 
 In exploring the intellectual landscape of academic philosophy in the 
Philippines, I examine the tensions between the desire for universal truths and the 
engagement in globally dominant philosophical traditions and the search for self, local 
relevance, and national identity. Entangled in issues of politics and religion are 
recurring themes of language, translation, and the localization of philosophical ideas. 
Chapter One, as we have seen, is a preparatory reflection on how the philosophical 
preoccupation in the Philippines has been, in the context of nationalism, one of a search 
for roots, revealing a feeling of exile, which is here not merely the unhappy 
consequence of colonial experience, but the existential human condition of always 
having to move between the self and the foreign. As I have argued, only from this 
understanding can we fully appreciate the complexities of our philosophers’ nationalist 
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fervor: that along with their love for their people and their language is a generosity and 
openness to the other, to the foreign, a relationship which is best elucidated by the bond 
and tensions between the teacher and he student. 
In Chapter Two, the journey through the landscape of Filipino philosophy 
begins with my own teacher, Father Ferriols, S.J. The chapter discusses his 
involvement in the 1960s Filipinization movement in the Ateneo de Manila University, 
situating the event in a broader historical context. While many have interpreted his 
pioneering effort to write and teach philosophy in Filipino as no more than a radical 
opposition against American cultural imperialism, Ferriols calls for a more nuanced 
understanding: that while he asserts a return to one’s language and culture, it is also a 
rejection of an ethnocentric position that forgets the goodness of the other.  
As an interesting contrast to Ferriols, Chapter Three introduces the work and 
thought of the logical positivist Ricardo Pascual, whose atheism had stirred a 
controversy that escalated to a charge of national treason. Unlike Ferriols who found 
inspiration in Catholic ideas, Pascual, as both his life and work would prove, would 
clearly demonstrate the difficult relationship between religion and intellectual 
autonomy, underlining the tensions between liberalism and the conservative forces of 
Catholicism. But despite their differences in passions and style of thinking, Ferriols 
and Pascual, inspired by their teachers, painstakingly sought to give their people a 
voice, even if it meant speaking out of place and defying the people from whom they 
had learned.  
While Chapters Two and Three are focused explorations, primarily on events 
that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, Chapter Four takes a broader view, exploring 
the desires and frustrations of philosophers in their search for Filipino philosophy, a 
long-standing preoccupation which began in the 1970s and has persisted to the present. 
In analyzing their philosophical discourse, I unravel the hopes and fetishes that have 
led many of these scholars to embrace the Western philosophical tradition, projecting 
an ideal that has caused an undervaluation of the work and efforts of fellow 
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philosophers.  Here, I interject my voice, in the hope of rehabilitating our understanding 
of their work, and contextualizing their efforts as responses to socio-political issues of 
their time.   
Chapter Five continues along this exploration and analysis of philosophical 
discourse, but now focusing on the work of philosophers who have sought to challenge 
and overcome the limits of the Western philosophical tradition.  Here, I return to the 
works of Ferriols, exploring his idea of meron and his ingenious practice of translation, 
and discuss the significant philosophical contributions of Albert Alejo S.J.’s analysis 
of loob. Despite their wisdom and openness, however, I also argue how a certain idea 
of humanism (pagpapakatao) has caused in them an intolerance for anything that 
transgresses what they believe is properly philosophical. Here, I bring in the voices of 
social scientists who have equally concerned themselves with the fate of the 
philosophical discipline in the country, and, in their emphasis on the importance of 
history and context, have critiqued the essentializing and universalizing tendencies of 
philosophical concepts. In exploring the ideas behind Vicente Rafael’s semiotic 
analysis of loob, Virgilio Enriquez’s critique of the token of use of language, and Zeus 
Salazar’s practice of  translation and pantayong pananaw, I hope to show how the 
contributions of the social sciences can offer a veritable critique of the philosophical 
discipline.   
Finaly, the Epilogue ventures (further) beyond academic philosophy, its 
distinctions, assumptions, and desires, not only to suggest possibilities for further 
research into Filipino thought and ways of going beyond its limits and prejudices, but 
also to remind ourselves of a larger world of thought, within which (Filipino) 









Father Ferriols and the Filipinization Movement in the Ateneo 
 
In exploring the intellectual landscape of academic philosophy in the 
Philippines, within the context of nationalism, I begin by telling the story of the struggle 
of a philosopher who became one of the most influential and inspiring teachers I had 
ever known.  Father Roque Jamias Ferriols, S.J., born August 16, 1924, became a 
pioneering force in the Filipinization movement that radically transformed the Jesuit 
University, Ateneo de Manila in the 1960s. In his struggles we find an expression not 
only of the nationalist fervor of a people seeking self-knowledge and self-governance 
but also a philosophical yearning for the universal, and an embracing openness towards 
the other. It is from the tension between these two desires that the postcolonial 
encounter becomes not so much an outright rejection of the foreign as the painful and 
awkward process when the disciple, learning well from his master, awakens from his 
intellectual slumber and begins to find his own voice.  It is the same awakening that 
stirred in the heart of this Filipino Jesuit philosopher, who in his teachings provided the 
space that urged students to have the courage to think for themselves.   
 
A Personal Encounter with Father Ferriols 
 
The first time I met Father Ferriols, or Padre Roque (or simply “Padre,” as his 
students like to call him), I was a sophomore majoring in Political Science, and had 
gone to the Philosophy department to submit my shifting application. As I handed my 
form to the secretary, Padre was standing nearby, and being a curious fellow, asked me 
who I was. At that time, I had not known that this unassuming professor in folded jeans 
and slippers was an “institution,” one of the pillars of Ateneo education, and therefore, 
though he himself would never admit, was one of those so-called “big shots” (which 
Padre, giggling naughtily in class, literally translated in Filipino as “malaking 
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putok”)..76 Giving my name, he asked if I was related to the late Antonio de Joya who 
had made a name in the advertising business. My father had once mentioned him, but 
other than sharing the same apelyido or surname, there was no relation whatsoever. 
Until perhaps that moment when Padre told me that my command of Filipino was much 
better than my late grand uncle’s. At the end of that brief, albeit auspicious, 
conversation, the course of which was spoken entirely in Filipino, this eccentric guru 
reassured me with words so calm and certain that they weighed prophetic, saying, 
bagay ka rito (“you fit in here”). 
In retrospect, that first encounter had already been an initiation. In the Jesuit 
university called Ateneo, Ferriols was our Socrates and much more; and he was 
completely in character when he gave me, in his usual prophetic tone, a glimpse of my 
past and future. But in that brief episode, he was also teaching me the importance of 
language, an exercise in assuming the quiet and unpretentious disposition of speaking 
in one’s mother tongue—bringing the conversation beyond titles and status, to its barest 
essence: a meeting of persons, of tao sa tao.     
If Ferriols remains indefatigable in his commitment to philosophize in Filipino, 
it is precisely to help his students become open to the gift of encounter that only until 
recently, at the age of eighty-nine and struggling with Parkinson’s disease, he 
continued to inch his way to the classroom, resolved in his commitment to teach.  In 
all the six modules I had taken with him, I came to observe how he persevered in 
nurturing the vernacular, harnessing its philosophical potential, and demanded from his 
students no less.   
In Junior year, philosophy majors are often asked to choose to take their first 
course subjects either in Filipino or in English. While it was not made explicit, it was 
not just a choice of subject or teacher, but a choice of a path altogether. Not that it 
meant that one was forever fixed to a particular language of philosophizing; most of us 
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would remain bilingual. But it was most often the case that the readings would be 
different for the English and Filipino classes, that the latter would often use translations 
of Western philosophical texts or use Ferriols’s work as textbooks. Philosophizing in 
Filipino meant deliberately acquainting and immersing oneself in a heritage that was 
not just Greek but characteristically Filipino. Unfortunately, though Ferriols’s legacy 
continues to be undeniably vital to Ateneo’s philosophical culture, it is rarely seen as 
philosophy’s place to probe or inquire into the social and historical context in which 
his ideas arose.  
 
Filipinization Movement in the Ateneo 
 
To better understand Ferriols’s desire to filipinize philosophy, it is necessary 
to step out of the parameters that are deemed proper to the philosophical. His struggle 
was very much a part of a larger socio-political discourse. The 1960s and ‘70s were a 
time in the history of Philippine politics when a number of student movements had 
erupted. Although inspired by the international student activism against America’s war 
in Vietnam, there were also “homegrown causes” behind the student unrest, such as the 
tuition increases that were felt to be unwarranted, as well as the pervading presence of 
American influence in political affairs. The first student movements were clearly 
communist in their ideological leanings, and their demonstrations were mainly an 
attempt to preserve the national identity against what was perceived to be the “powerful 
onslaughts of American cultural imperialism,” which exercised a significant influence 
on the education system.77    
 In response to the growing political awareness, five Ateneans published an 
article on November 27, 1968, in the university newspaper, The Guidon.78 Entitled 
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“Down from the Hill,” the paper cleverly invoked a line from the school hymn, which 
sang into the heart and mind of every Atenean the noble task that comes with the 
privilege of receiving a Jesuit education. “Down from the hill, down to the world I 
go”—rung those solemn words that reminded every Atenean of the altruistic descent 
from his lofty abode. And to seal his fate, while beating his fist in the air to the cadence 
of words, he declares emphatically that “this is the A-teneo way.”  
The five young provocateurs, dubbed “The Big Five,” were, however, far from 
convinced that the song was more than just a catchy tune. To them, the Philippine 
Province of the Society of Jesus, as well as the Ateneo de Manila University, the 
bastion of Jesuit education, were as complicit as the Philippine Church they served, in 
allowing “American political patterns. . .to reinforce and legitimize in a modern 
democratic framework the hierarchical power structure created under the aegis of 
Spain.” There was that proud claim that Ateneo was a “training ground for true Filipino 
leaders,” but for this five young men, this statement was nothing but a “preposterous 
myth.”  For what Ateneo was in fact producing were graduates who, having been 
indoctrinated in a Western type of education and a “luxury-kind of living found in 
Makati or Forbes Park,” were only keen to perpetuate the status quo and safeguard the 
interests of the “moneyed elite class.”79 Jesuits were thus deemed to exacerbate, instead 
of giving resolution to, the socio-economic injustices that have escalated to a 
“revolutionary situation.”  
 It was, however, precisely because these Ateneans recognized the importance 
of the Jesuits’ “educational apostolate,” and the latter’s potential to steer the course of 
the university towards revolutionary change, that they strongly felt that a critique was 
in order.  
                                                 
Alcuaz, Gerardo Esguerra, Emmanuel Lacaba, Alfredo Salanga, and Leonardo 
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79 Leonardo Q. Montemayor, “Essence of Filipinization--Respond to People’s Needs,” 
The Guidon, January 24, 1975, 2. 
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We find the Philippine province of the Society of Jesus existing under 
privileged conditions in our society. The Jesuits’ way of life, organizational 
structure, and the institutions that they maintain are totally dependent on the 
power elite, so much so that their orientation and services appear to be directed 
mainly toward the power elite.  The Society of Jesus, then, must, like the 
Philippine Church, identify herself with the oppressed masses. The Society 
cannot maintain its privileged position in society if it must be truly Filipino, 
and Christian, and therefore relevant to the Philippine situation. And its 
institution can only be as relevant as the Society is relevant.80 
 But how was this relevance going to be achieved? For these five young men, 
Filipinization was the key, the banner under which everything would be made relevant 
to the Philippine situation. Clearly, it was an assertion that unabashedly pointed the 
blame of self-alienation to a pervasive intrusion of foreign elements; for in promoting 
an education with a Western orientation, and maintaining a university guided by 
standards of Western universities, the Ateneo was deemed isolated in its ivory tower, 
irrelevant to the needs of the people, unable to even awaken in its own students the 
desire to nurture a shared identity with their fellow Filipinos.  And so, while cautiously 
still “acknowledging the unimpeachable character of [the American Jesuits’] good 
intentions,” the manifesto pointed out unequivocally that the root cause of the problem 
lay in “the preponderant American presence in the Society and in the University.”81  
The revolutionary situation thus called for a “spirit of renewal,” a return to 
things “Filipino,” which meant weaning the Society and the university off “their 
overdependence on the neo-colonial elite and from the irrelevant heritage of colonial, 
Western education.” To ensure this, structural changes needed to be put in place. The 
Atenean had to be more in tune with the Philippine situation by ensuring the relevance 
of academic subjects to the “revolutionary situation.” Consequently, students began to 
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question why eighteen units of English were required in the core curriculum while a 
single unit in Filipino was not even being offered; or why the Ateneans were taking a 
six-unit course in Western history but only one Philippine history course (“Rizal and 
the Emergence of the Filipino Nation”) which was a meager three units.82 In light of 
such queries, a “drastic reorientation of the present curriculum” was recommended: not 
only that Theology be taught in the light of Vatican II83 teachings and its emphasis on 
addressing the Philippine situation, but that courses such as the Introduction to the 
Social Sciences be changed into a module on Philippine Social Problems, and English 
Literature be replaced by a course on Philippine Literature in English and Tagalog.84 
Also, with regard to teaching crucial subjects such as economics, history, and political 
science, it was suggested that these courses be taught “entirely by Filipinos.” 85 
Leonardo Montemayor, one of the authors of “Down From the Hill,” expresses his 
uneasiness with regard to a Rizal course taught by American professors. He explains 
that while his objection does not imply “that foreign historians cannot be fair and 
objective in their treatment of Philippine history,” one cannot deny that “the teaching 
of Philippine history, and the histories of all nations for that matter, is not a mere 
judgment of the past from a detached, high-altitude seat.” This is why “we Filipinos 
must learn to view our history from our own point of view.”86  
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Recommendations stated in the manifesto also included 1) that the American 
Jesuits currently occupying administrative positions be replaced by Filipino 
counterparts; while there were claims that a “shortage of manpower resources” existed 
within the Society, the authors of the manifesto insisted on the presence of qualified 
Filipino Jesuits, and regarded it as a necessary “symbolical gesture of the university’s 
commitment to Filipinization”; and 2) that physical infrastructures be reevaluated, to 
keep them modest, arguing that the point is not further expansion but “to use existing 
facilities available to redirect the student to a proper social orientation.”87   
Interestingly, towards the end of the manifesto, the authors appealed to the 
“right to make [one’s] own mistakes.” It was a statement that clearly betrayed a sense 
of awareness that the process of Filipinization, although necessary, was not without 
serious risks. Under the auspices of the American Jesuits, the Atenean had always been 
privileged with an education that secured him a comfortable position in the economic 
ladder. But in a revolutionary situation, was this what mattered?  Committed as they 
were to bring the Atenean from his ivory tower to the masses, they wrote with poignant, 
youthful idealism: 
It may be good to restate that we are not seeking to develop the Ateneo on a 
level with Western universities. Nor are we primarily seeking graduates 
capable of being accepted in the best graduate schools abroad but instead 
graduates who are capable of solving Philippine problems based on Philippine 
standards and conditions.88   
 
Skeptical Voices  
 
Not everyone was sympathetic to the cause of Filipinization. Although the 
“Down From the Hill” article was applauded for its excellent analysis of the Philippine 
situation, some felt that in presenting concrete acts, “it fell flat,” and worse, devolved 
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into a “‘Yankee Go Home’ movement” 89  despite the authors’ avowal that their 
recommendations were “not evocative of a racist mentality.” The proposals that were 
laid out in the article were described as “extreme suggestions,” expressions of an 
“extreme position,” that a certain editor made clear were of course ideas that the 
majority of students did not subscribe to; for this great majority knew only “too well 
that such a cure can well turn out to be worse than the disease.” Others, still, were 
shocked, even appalled, by the lack of gratitude (utang na loob) to “the immeasurable 
good that American educators have done” for the country.90  
There were professors who freely expressed their skepticism, suggesting that 
such recommendations were naive (for indeed, how can we be sure that the Filipinos 
who would serve as replacements are not “foreigners in kayumangging kaligatan 
clothing?”),91 and that at best, Filipinization would lead to a provincial way of thinking. 
Not just because it fails to realize that “some of the best nationalists…are foreign-
educated and are foreigners,” but because this nationalist fervor has made us blind to 
the need for internationalism, that is, a vision of greatness that envisages the country’s 
future “from the perspective of the international world.”92 For Political Scientist, Maria 
Montelibano, the real issue was that “Ateneans [felt] guilty over their inability to 
communicate with the ‘madlang people [masses],’” and foolishly believed that their 
image problem could be solved by simply replacing the American head with a Filipino.  
Another concern was raised by the American Jesuit philosophy professor, 
Father Joseph O’Hare, S.J., who argued that the demand that only Filipinos “be allowed 
to teach value subjects” had led to a policy based on racial criterion instead of 
professional competence. He cites the unfortunate example of Father Nicholas Cushner 
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and Father John Schumacher, two excellent American Jesuit History professors, who 
would no longer be teaching as the result of complaints that began some years ago. It 
appeared that some were displeased about Americans teaching Philippine history, 
deeming it “a violation to the spirit of Filipinization.”  Although O’Hare makes it clear 
that he “appreciates the objective” behind Filipinization, recognizing that the “large 
number of foreign faculty members does represent the colonial and missionary past of 
the Ateneo,” and that Filipinization is an indispensable task that only Filipinos can 
accomplish, he is wary of how this racially exclusive policy poses a serious threat to 
academic freedom.  On the one hand, he acknowledges that foreigners, no matter how 
much they are endeared to the Philippines, will always and must remain outsiders; but 
on the other, he is critical of a Filipinization that impatiently expedites instead of 
allowing a “natural process” to take course. For O’Hare, what was perhaps most 
disappointing was that among the people who were so keen on purging the Americans, 
were academics who seem to have lost sight of an important aspect of the University; 
who, in their impatience—which O’Hare critically observes as characteristic of the 
“lifestyle of student activists,” have forgotten that the University should be “a place 
where ideas can be exchanged freely, where different viewpoints can clash.” And it is 
in this regard that the foreigner becomes vital in providing a different perspective.93  
 In response to this statement, however, English Professor Emmanuel Torres 
argues that given the long-standing “colonial hang-up” that has forged the Ateneo 
curriculum into “concepts and realities of the West [rather] than to those of Asia and 
the Philippines,” and the irrelevant education that has ensued, there is among students, 
quite understandably, an impatience, a feeling that “Filipinization is not happening fast 
enough.” Thus, the real issue becomes one of time: that is, “how soon can the Ateneo 
act in accordance with its express[ed] belief in the need to filipinize itself as completely 
as possible?”  And while it is true that a foreigner, with “a certain detachment and 
                                                 
93 Joseph O’Hare, S.J., “A Racially Exclusive Policy Threat to Academic Freedom, The 
Guidon, August 4, 1970, 5. 
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wonder,” can provide “value courses” with perspectives that could well complement 
the Filipino view, what in this particular case presents a real hindrance to the 
cosmopolitanism that is much desired as the goal and raison d’être of the university is 
a “predominantly, if not exclusively, American” point of view.  So ingrained in 
students are certain Western habits of thinking that the first step to Filipinization is to 
unlearn them, that is, to de-colonize, and specifically, to de-Americanize. What 
O’Hare, therefore, does not understand is that, in a situation where the “American 
presence” itself poses a hindrance to Filipinization, his proposal for a “softer” approach 
that allows transformation to take a natural, albeit longer, course, would simply not do. 
What seemed to be the spirit of those times, what students clamored for, was an 
unequivocal and militant approach towards this foreign power. Naturally, as Torres 
adds, such urgent need to de-colonize would perhaps be “less clear to an American than 
a Filipino teacher or even administrator,” and if he does comprehend, it would only be 
“with great difficulty”; for “he cannot certainly understand the need with the same 
existential degree of percipience and passion that a Filipino would be able to bring to 




Illustration 1:  Emmanuel Lacaba’s article on Ferriols, published in The Guidon,  
on October 16 1968. 
                                                 
94  Emmanuel Torres, “The American Presence--Hindrance to Filipinization,” The 
Guidon, August 4, 1970, 6.  
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 Ferriols shared the same sentiment exactly. And as one of the more vocal 
professors who emphatically advocated the Filipinization movement, he became a 
controversial figure. Not so much because his ideas were unique to him; rather, it was 
because he dared to speak from the position of a Filipino Jesuit. Like Torres, though 
long before the dispute with O’Hare, Ferriols had already expressed his reservations 
regarding the foreigner’s ability to understand the inner workings of the Filipino soul.   
One who was born in a foreign land and grew up among foreigners cannot be 
sensitive to the nuances of our present cultural crisis. He cannot appreciate our 
rich heritage from within. This is not a stigma on the foreigner: merely a fact 
about him. He is, as a matter of fact, incapable of developing a Filipino culture. 
The Ateneo has neither faced nor acted on this fact.95  
In another article, Ferriols explains further the incomparability between 
Filipinos and Americans, and how “American Jesuits, though no fault of their own, 
have developed a set of sensitivities which are very different from that of Filipinos.” 
Living for many years in America for his graduate studies and tertianship, Ferriols 
draws from his own experience living in Harlem, observing how the black man was 
often baffled by the ways of his white brother. Or how his own Jesuit teacher, Father 
Mulry, despite his good intentions, was really never understood by his Filipino students 
when he talked about “social justice” in English. At the bottom of it all was an essential 
difference determined by the language with which one is born, a difference that comes 
out in the way that “some insights... are expressible only in a certain language.”96   
But how would these insights emerge if the Atenean were being taught to 
unlearn his own mother tongue? For Ferriols, what was most alarming was that “the 
average Atenean could speak the most fluent English; but when it came to speaking his 
                                                 
95  Ramon V. Puno and Vicente A. Cabanero, “A Call for Cultural Realism,” The 
Guidon, December 11, 1968, 3. Quoted in Leonardo Q. Montemayor, “Our Westernized 
View of Filipino Nationalism,” The Guidon, January 30, 1969.  
96 Puno, “Fruitful Dialogue on Filipinization,” 3. 
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native tongue, he was greatly wanting.” And it was precisely this (mis)education that 
trained Ateneans for a very specific sector in society, while being unattentive to less 
prestigious sectors that equally needed attention and development. Because of this 
elitist mentality, Ferriols felt that the administrative structure of the University was in 
dire need of a reorientation. 
I think [the structure] should be reoriented in the direction of more cultural 
realism because the present set-up is being used to perpetuate a cultural island 
on Philippine soil. By this I mean that the frames of reference within which the 
Ateneo operates are to a great extent bodily transplants from the United States. 
Even the way English is used is full of American meanings. It is very hard to 
express what one really wants to express. And in a discussion with American 
Jesuits, they have the advantage because they are using their own language, 
and they can always in all kinds of subtle ways misunderstand--whether 
deliberately or indeliberately I do not know--what a Filipino using English 
really wants to say.97 
  And indeed, it seemed that Ferriols himself was a victim of such 
misunderstanding.  In an interview, he recounts how troubled those times were, how 
there existed a rift even between the Americans and the Filipinos in the Society.  The 
American Jesuits had blamed him, along with Father Jose Cruz, who became the chair 
of the Philosophy department, for inciting the students to challenge the Americans.  
With regard to these accusations, Ferriols first of all denies, contrary to misconceptions, 
that Filipinization began with him. What he had then, he admits, was merely the 
intention to filipinize, “but the students, I did not need to tell them....” The desire, after 
all, was already “in the air” (nasa hangin ang pagnanais).  Furthermore, it seemed that 
some of his fellow American Jesuits simply could not or did not want to understand 
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what he was trying to do, and immediately assumed that his attempts to filipinize was 
an assault against them. 
But I was not fighting the Americans. I encouraged [students] to be Filipino. 
And if you are to be Filipino, there are American ways to which you cannot 
agree. Not because you don’t want the American, but because you want the 
Filipino.98 [2.1]  
 Regardless of Ferriols’s non-aggressive intentions, his actions and suggestions 
inevitably did cause ripples that disturbed the calm. On December 11th, 1968, two 
weeks after the controversial manifesto had appeared, The Guidon published an 
interview with Ferriols, which, judging from the editors elated tone, was a momentous 
victory for the school paper. For some time, The Guidon had been trying to establish 
itself as “an effective forum for the much-desired dialogue among students, professors, 
and administrators” regarding the matter on Filipinization. Much to their 
disappointment, however, “certain usually vocal American Jesuits” refused to be 
engaged, i.e. to be interviewed and to clarify their views in The Guidon. One Jesuit 
professor even bluntly remarked that faculty members had no business to contribute to 
the school paper.99 Ferriols’s consent to have his own words appear in print, therefore, 
provided a precedent that gave The Guidon the legitimation it needed to establish its 
                                                 
98 Roque Ferriols, S.J., interview, 2009. Magpaka- is an affix that creates a verb that 
expresses a goal, making great efforts to actualize what is conveyed by the root word. 
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(Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 
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difficult to be human.”) Ferriols then further explains that while we are already human, 
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deepen our humanity. With a similar explanation, one can understand what Ferriols 
meant by magpaka-Filipino.   
99 Antonio T. Carpio, “The Guidon: For Students Alone?” The Guidon, November 27, 
1968, 6.  
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pivotal role in campus politics, and the reputation of being more than a student tabloid. 
Consequently, beaming with pride, The Guidon announced that henceforth, it would 
“welcome future contributions from the faculty on Filipinization,” emphasizing “that 
it should serve as a forum for students, as well as faculty members.”  Furthermore, 
while others were quick to judge “Down From the Hill” as extreme and naive, and 
criticize it for not providing viable solutions, Ferriols was unabashedly supportive.  
Recognizing the manifesto as the “reasoned expression of a point of view,” Ferriols 
argued that although it did not give clear answers (perhaps it was never meant to do 
so), it did present an “exciting prospect.” He reminded people that while “we cannot 
expect every study to cover every single thing,” “what it has is worth trying to learn 
from [and] what it has left out is for us to explore into.”100 
 And indeed, Ferriols himself plunged into this “unknown” called 
Filipinization. His idea of a “massive operation” of the movement was, first and 
foremost, linguistic. He urged the use of Filipino languages as the medium for research 
on Filipino culture, and himself initiated the first attempts in the university to teach a 
course in the vernacular, clearly a departure from the proud American legacy of English 
instruction.  Unfortunately, the Americans, at least some of them, could not grasp the 
reason behind such efforts, and as Ferriols himself would later explain, were greatly 
displeased, only seeing in his actions a rejection of what they perceived as their great 
contribution to the Ateneo, which was to painstakingly mold the latter in the image and 
likeness of an American college. 
 
Americanisms 
 In the interest of fashioning the Ateneo into an “American-style college,” the 
American Jesuits decided to make the use of the English language an imperative. The 
Guidon, which, as Ferriols kept reiterating, constantly won the best journalist 
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production among all the American colleges, was proof that the Americans were quite 
effective in their scheme. But this success came with a price.  
 As a young scholastic in the 1950s, Ferriols recalls  how the language  rule did 
not only impose the use of English but also harshly forbade the use of  other 
vernaculars.In an open letter to the first Filipino rector and president of Ateneo, Fr. 
Pacifico Ortiz, an alumnus by the name of Antonio C. Abaya  reveals to us exactly how 
this rule was enforcedIn the letter, Abaya describes the Ateneo of his day (1947-1956), 
remembering how this “American university” was “bent on fostering and perpetuating 
a colonial and feudal mentality among its students.” Language was clearly at the core 
of this “process of miseducation,” alienating generations of Ateneans in being taught 
to reject their own language and being kept ignorant of Philippine literature and 
propagandist writings, while made to embrace with passion “the poetry of Horace and 
Virgil, the tragedies of Shakespeare and the epistles of St. Paul.” Abaya particularly 
remembers how during the deanship of Father Delaney, students  
were forbidden to speak any language except English. Each time anyone was 
caught uttering a word of Tagalog or Visayan or Ilocano, he was punished by 
being made to stand in the midday sun for one hour.101 
When Ferriols came back from America in the ‘60s, the rule had already been 
abolished. But Western habits of thinking lingered and Ferriols found himself wrestling 
with Americans and fellow Filipinos alike.  
 Certainly, Ferriols was not the only professor who was wary of the pervading 
Americanism in the Ateneo. In fact, a few months before the interview with Ferriols 
was published, and even before the “Down from the Hill” controversy had erupted, 
English professor Rolando S. Tinio wrote a satire chastising his Filipino colleagues for 
favoring English over the Filipino language. Whether they were aware of it or not, their 
bias was dangerouslynurturing a cultural elitism that discriminated against those who 
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spoke or sounded a bit different. Tinio narrates how Father Donelan, at a symposium, 
appealed to writers, publishers and English teachers to evaluate the fate of English as 
a medium of instruction: given the perturbing decline of English proficiency among 
Ateneans, would Ateneo not be better off  using Filipino instead, and that way, even 
boast at pioneering in such an effort? Writing in perfectly broken English, Tinio taunts 
the seriousness by which American Jesuits have fought the battle against “poor 
writing,” making deductions and failing students for grammatical mistakes, as well as 
their consternation for the bad grammar that afflicts even Theology, Economics, 
Biology and Math teachers. Tinio writes 
Once upon a time siguro [perhaps], when almost all teachers are Americans 
and almost all are from Ateneo grade school and high school and come from 
English-speaking families, Ateneans was really tops in English. Later on, when 
only few are non-Ateneans and have different backgrounds, its possible still to 
flunk students in any course just because of crooked English. But now, 
impossible already. Even many faculty members do not speak very correct. 
Many students from provinces even if they have high IQ have poor 
backgrounds in writing and literature and have difficult problems in class. How 
is it possible to flunk them just for their mistake in verb agreements and wrong 
tense. Tutál [In any case], you can surely understand them naman [anyway] 
when they write exams even if many errors. When they talk in recitation, and 
even in public speaking, you also can understand them perfectly no matter how 
many wrong pronunciations they make. Sometimes pa nga [even], they have 
more better ideas than students who speak English like Americans. Of course 
they feel diyahe [embarrassed] because their classmates laugh at their mistakes 
so many do not want to raise their hand any more. And those who mastered 
English get to be considered more brighter students.102   
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From Tinio’s comic elocution emerges the truth about a certain discrimination, 
one that ingrains the idea that if one  wishes to appear educated, “it cannot be denied,” 
one would have to “know English very much...to speak English like Americans.” And 
as English teachers themselves kept repeating, “to be good in English, you also have 
to have the English culture, which is the purpose of our education.”  And not to worry, 
“we can still have Filipino soul even in English.” The local writers, too, proposed to 
continue the use of English, not just because they express themselves more in this 
language but, for practical reasons, in order to publish abroad and have an international 
readership. And so, as Tinio narrates, the English teachers promised to “try every thing 
to improve the English of students,” clearly offended by Donelan’s suggestion which 
was quite conveniently forgotten: “Imagine, suggesting we give up English which is 
second nature to us already.” 
This elitist sensibility or “cultural island” that the American Jesuits were 
nurturing was, however, not merely linguistic.  A phrase that was commonly heard 
from critics of the Atenean’s elitist ways was “maka-Forbes” (“Forbes-like”), referring 
to the very posh gated community at the heart of the business district of Makati.  Aside 
from Forbes being literally the lavish venue of the junior-senior prom, it signified the 
kind of mentality that alienated the Atenean from the people.         
Ferriols was very good at exposing this elitism in its many forms. In class, 
lecturing on primitive religions, he would refer to phallic symbols and fertility rites, 
which all sounded in Filipino a lot more vulgar than their English names, and which, 
of course, always made students shriek and blush with embarrassment. Ferriols never 
tired of uttering these “obscenities” (T..., t...!), and it seemed like he enjoyed it too!103  
See, it’s your Forbes-Parkish mentality. To people in Tundo and in other 
corners, that’s nothing. That’s the problem with Ateneo education. You have 
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become puritanical. You have lost the down-to-earth character of your true 
language.104 [2.2]    
It is also told that once, Ferriols was asked why he chose to teach Philosophy in 
Filipino. To his interlocutor’s dismay, Ferriols angrily blurted out: PUTANG INA MO! 
(“Your mother’s a bitch!”) Then suddenly, regaining calm and composure, he asks: 
Mas effective, hindi ba? (“That was more effective, was it not?”) 
 But this elitism was not merely shaping puritanical sensibilities;105 it was also 
deemed to have an influence in the way Ateneans were perceiving people outside their 
“social club.” One of the infrastructures that became the object of scrutiny in the ‘60s 
was the university’s Physical Plant. On January 12th, 1970, The Guidon published an 
open letter addressed to the Physical Plant Administrator, Father William Hayes, S.J.  
It objected to the “strict policing” that required taxi drivers to surrender their 
identification cards at the gates upon entering the Ateneo. The policy, according to 
administration officials, was meant to reduce the number of theft cases in campus. The 
writer quickly points out that such regulation, which clearly discriminates against taxi 
drivers and profiles them as potential thieves, only amplifies the image of the Ateneo 
as an “elitist country club.” But then again, the Ateneo could be worse, the writer quips, 
since “not even Forbes does our thing.”106 
A month later, another article was published with regard to the same issue, but 
now with a less phlegmatic tone. “Discrimination Again!” the title squealed, protesting 
the memorandum sent out by Fr. Hayes to “limit the entrance of cars without stickers 
and taxis to 7:30 [a.m.?] - 8:30 p.m. at gate 2 daily.” This time, the reason given was 
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to “ease the congestion at gate 3 in the morning,” which was considered nothing but a 
lame excuse and a discrimination against those who did not own a car. Not only would 
it cause inconvenience to students who had to get off at gate 3 and walk to the college 
building in rainy weather, it was a policy that was “a step further away” from 
“bring[ing] the university down to the masses.”  
The PP [Physical Plant] administration has been handing down directive after 
directive in an effort to close the Ateneo to the less efficient. In effect, the less 
wealthy ones feel a sort of inferiority complex because each new directive 
makes them a foot smaller in the eyes of the administration.  
     Therefore, we, the students of the Ateneo, protest the action of the PP  
[Physical Plant] Administration and demand his resignation. A Filipino should 
be installed in his post, a Filipino who knows and feels what the Filipino 
students feel. We don’t want those “big white gods who destroy the little 
grumble” in our ranks. 
An Ateneo for the Filipinos!107 
The writer adds an interesting and humorous postscript, complaining about a helicopter 
that landed a couple of weeks earlier, “with no visible Ateneo sticker in its windshield.” 
Why weren’t its plate numbers taken off, he queried: aha, “discrimination again!”    
Another facility that was subjected to critical evaluation during the 
Filipinization movement in the Ateneo was the Rizal University Library. At that time, 
the library, which was under the auspices of the American Jesuit, Father Robert J. 
Suchan, S.J. and being funded largely by American aid such as the Ford Foundation 
and the United States Information Agency (USIA), was criticized for being the “Kuta 
[Fortress or Stronghold] of ‘Cultural Aggression.’” It was observed that at every corner 
of the library were books about American literature, politics, economics and science, 
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promoting a kind of intellectual elitism, where theories and “universal truths” were fine 
and dandy but completely irrelevant to what was happening outside the Ateneo.108  
The Rizal library was under scrutiny also partly because at that time, a 
controversy erupted with regard to a book entitled Invention, authored by the American 
Jesuit English professor, Father Joseph Landy, S.J., and used as a textbook in the 
Freshmen and Sophomore classes taught by the American Jesuits, Father James 
Donelan, Father Joseph Galdon, and Father Patrick Lynch.  On December 1st, 1970, 
nine professors of the English department 109  wrote a manifesto expressing their 
indignation against Landy’s book, condemning it as “anti-nationalistic” and 
“colonially-oriented.”  The manifesto, however, was merely the result of a series of 
frustrated attempts, requesting Father Galdon, then the chair of the English department, 
for a meeting to discuss the contents as well as the fate of Landy’s book. A letter was 
sent to Galdon on October 30th, and another on November 11th, but both requests were 
ignored and left unanswered. It was then on November 18th, after failed attempts of a 
respectful petition (magalang na paghihiling) that the disgruntled professors demanded 
Galdon’s resignation. Once again, Galdon turned a deaf ear, the last straw that 
compelled the professors to draft a manifesto. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., dean of the 
college, suspended the sales of the book, but a few days later, the president of the 
university, Father Francisco Araneta, S.J.  authorized its re-selling and use in class.110 
As a means of protest, a “book burning” was staged in the college quadrangle on 
December 14th, as a way to “dramatize the protest of colonial miseducation in the 
college.”111 
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It was, indeed, as Ferriols accurately perceived it, a clash of different values 
and sensitivities. Incidents, one after another, would arise, convincing the student 
activists that priests like Galdon and Landy could no longer remain in Ateneo, as they 
were clearly “obstacles to Filipinization and to the nationalism of the university.”112 It 
was, for instance, not just Landy’s book that was in question, but his perceived lack of 
sympathy for the Filipinization movement. On one occasion, Landy had accused the 
Ateneo History Club for being run by communists for organizing a Lenin exhibit on 
the 100th anniversary of the Russian leader; and on another, reprimanded a student for 
asking permission to invite his students to join a rally, lecturing the poor lad on the 
meaning of “academic freedom” and recommending that he be sanctioned by the 
Committee on Discipline.  
Galdon himself was also implicated in another incident. A year before the 
Landy controversy, in October1969, a report written by Jesuit scholastic Arsenio C. 
Jesena exposing the inhumane conditions of the sacadas in the sugar plantations in 
Negros Occidental appeared in the newspapers The Manila Times and The Manila 
Chronicle. A few days later, Galdon, then the acting academic vice-president, and Mrs. 
Mary Hollsteiner, director of the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), issued a 
“Statement of Clarification” explaining “that the Jesena report [was] not an Ateneo 
report nor [was] it connected with the IPC socio-economic research currently underway 
on 63 Negros Occidental farms.” Apparently, the statement was intended to “‘placate 
disturbed financial supporters,’” that is, sugar planters who, in light of the Jesena 
report, had threatened to cancel their grant to the IPC Negros Occidental study. Aside 
from causing serious damage to the integrity of the IPC, the statement it had issued had 
been exploited by the sugar group “to discredit the clearly valid findings of sacada 
exploitation in Negros.”113  
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These were only some of the instances that made apparent a conflict in values.  
But the students somehow knew that beneath the sensational politics, what was really 
at the heart of the dispute was something more “human,” more fragile than the 
overbearing concepts of Filipinization and academic freedom. In an article, 
Montemayor expresses his disbelief upon hearing an American Jesuit say that in his 
ten years in the Philippines, he had only learned three words in Pilipino: Psst, Pheew, 
Para! “Was he not kidding?” But how come in China, foreign missionaries made the 
effort to learn Mandarin?  “Here in the Ateneo and in the Philippines, in general, it is 
the host who does the switching to the guest’s language.” For Montemayor,   the 
foreigner’s attitude towards a country’s language was an important gauge of his 
profound respect for its people and their culture, or lack thereof.  But he equally asserts 
that the foreigner, “by reason of his historicity,” will always be a stranger to the ways 
of the people, and that though he may try to understand, he will never “know our 
problems as we know them and feel the urgency of resolving them as we do. It is not 
his which is, as the Americans put it, on the chopping block; he is not the person who 
is nakataya [at stake].”114 And because of this, as it has been pointed out “ages ago,” 
the American Jesuits “are apt to misunderstand the spirit behind the Filipinization 
movement and brand it as chauvinistic and regressive.”115 And they can try, as Landy 
did, to stifle protests, in the same manner that one “[locks] up a child inside his room 
because he may say ‘embarrassing’ things before the guests.” But such efforts prove to 
be futile, because “these ‘children’ have things to say and they will not be stopped from 
being seen or heard.” Precisely for these reasons, “those American administrators at 
the Ateneo who have not even bothered to learn Pilipino (or one of our more common 
dialects) cannot really presume to direct or teach us in the related tasks of running this 
school and developing our country.” And the same goes, unfortunately, for “those 
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Filipino teachers who still have not shaken off the shackles of a colonial education 
which has taught them to be shadows and apers of their colonial masters.”116   
It was, therefore, no surprise that the disgruntlements led to a demand for a 
change in leadership.117 And it appears that Ferriols himself recommended that “the 
Ateneo run on a skeletal staff of Filipino Jesuits,” a suggestion which, in effect, 
endorsed the replacement of American Jesuits in administration. 
Like any historical-political movement, it is difficult to determine the 
“success” of the Filipinization movement in the Ateneo. If one were to simply list its 
achievements, one could say that the results were indeed commendable. It was the time 
when the Ateneo’s first Filipino rector and first Filipino dean were appointed, and when 
both the Pilipino Department and the Philippine Studies program were established. It 
was also during these radical years that  courses in Philosophy, Theology, History, and 
even Economics were first taught in Pilipino. In 1975, the Ateneo Scholarship 
Foundation enrolled its first scholars, which was deemed as “the first solid step toward 
the democratization of Ateneo education.”118 Finally, Alay Kapwa was established, an 
orientation work that provided the venue for implementing and realizing the values of 
Filipinization as well as the revisions in the curriculum, integrating and directing these 
efforts towards a concrete “service to the other.”119  
Despite these accomplishments, however, there was always that lingering 
doubt that Filipinization was just a fad, or mere rhetoric, and that it would be forgotten 
by the next generation of Ateneans. Filipinization was very much an “unfinished task,” 
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express and represent the Ateneo’s views on national issues.   Incidentally, Fr. Galdon 
was the College Dean at that time. “Editorial: Why We Need A Filipino Dean,” The 
Guidon, November 24, 1969, 1.  
118 Tony M. Ollero, “Toward a Filipinized Education,” The Guidon, June 16 1975, 2. 
119 Tony Ollero, “Notes on Curriculum Revision, Filipinization and Alay Kapwa, The 
Guidon, March 4, 1975, 2.  
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and therefore, it was crucial to sustain the nationalist fervor that would ensure further 
implementations to come to pass. Thus, in 1975, as part of celebrating Filipinization 
Week, The Guidon featured two articles written by two of the authors of the “Down 
From the Hill” manifesto: a reprint of Montemayor’s article on the “essence of 
Filipinization,” and Alcuaz’s critical examination of the movement’s historical roots 
and its relevance to the present day. While providing an excellent historical account, 
Alcuaz laments the way the controversies overshadowed the “real meaning” of 
Filipinization. Quoting Paul Dumol’s Ang Kilusang Pilipinisasyon sa Kolehiyo ng 
Ateneo, Isang Dulang Dokumentaryo, Alcuaz points out how the dispute with the 
American Jesuits, being understandably the more sensational issue, attracted more 
attention than the real, pressing issues such as the irrelevance and impotence of Ateneo 
education to provide the Atenean the awareness and skill to respond to the 
revolutionary situation.120 In light of Alcuaz’s critique, one immediately realizes the 
significance of Montemayor’s words:  
More than just being anti-American or hyper-patriotic, Filipinization is 
essentially pro-Filipino, that is, its chief interest lies in being responsive to the 
problems and needs of the broad masses of the Filipino people. Accordingly, 
the success of Filipinization is to be measured not as much by the number of 
buildings we name after Filipino heroes as to the extent we identify ourselves 
with and involve ourselves in the lives and aspirations of our people. 
Filipinization will be successful if we are able to inculcate in ourselves the 
desire and willingness to learn from our people. This means going directly to 
them and addressing ourselves to their questions and their problems in a spirit 
of humility and public service.121    
                                                 
120 Linggoy Alcuaz, “Filipinization Move Critically Examined,” The Guidon, January 
24, 1975, 2. 
121 Montemayor, “Essence of Filipinization,” 2.  
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A week later, in the unprecedented Guidon interview, Ferriols emphasizes this 
very task for which Ateneans must strive, clarifying more concretely, more 
philosophically, what it entails: 
The Atenean has to begin from the bottom. When [Luis]Taruc122 came to speak 
here, one of the students asked him what the Atenean could do for the peasants 
and workmen. Taruc did not answer by suggesting projects but by beginning 
at the rock bottom. Go to the barrios and the poor sections of the city and make 
friends with the people. We like to make plans for the poor. We forget that to 
make an effective plan we should be only one of the makers of the plan. We 
should cooperate with other people. This means to know them as human 
beings, appreciate them as human beings, to such an extent that we learn from 
them, and together with them we plan and execute.123 
 
Padre Ferriols 
 Ferriols was, indeed, a pivotal force in the Filipinization movement in the 
Ateneo. Not only did he pave the way towards concretizing its vision, but was also 
instrumental in disclosing its philosophical raison d’être. But while he was recognized 
and celebrated for his contributions, his views have also been oversimplified, as people 
have failed to see how he differed with the movement’s politicized agenda.    
 To understand better the nuances of his position, Ferriols revealed that his 
Filipinization, contrary to what people might have assumed, did not begin with “Down 
From the Hill.” He recalls expressing this quite emphatically during the  The Guidon 
interview   in 1968,but this view was never included in the article.One could only 
surmise that this minor case on censorship was committed, unwittingly or not, in order 
                                                 
122 On September 20, 1968, months before the explosive “Down From the Hill,” former 
Hukbalahap leader Luis Taruc was invited to deliver a speech at the Ateneo. This was 
his first public appearance after his release from prison. The Guidon published his 
speech in its October 2, 1968th issue.  
123 Ferriols, “Cultural Realism,” 3.  
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to present a consolidated movement.  That is how it often is in the world of politics. 
Perhaps the editors felt that there was not much point in showing the subtle differences 
in opinion and ideas, that what mattered in presenting a political movement such as 
Filipinization was showing a clear demarcation between for and against. But as one 
listens to Ferriols, one realizes the existence of multiple origins, of possibly an entire 
spectrum that reveals the many different hues of Filipinization as an idea. In returning 
to the beginnings of Ferriols’s conception of Filipinization, one realizes that his 
initiative to teach Philosophy in Filipino was not merely a response in support of 
student movements, but borne out of a personal and persistent desire for and vision of 
something he had long felt wanting.   
I’ve been thinking about it [Filipinization] for a long time, ever since I had 
been reading. Because when I was in High School, I was always reading, the 
novels of Dickens, for example, and I thought, why is it that there are no 
Filipino novels as great as Dickens? Because the Filipino life is as rich as the 
English life, but there were no novels that expressed the richness of Filipino 
life.  And I thought that it was an imperative to have, to create in the language 
used in the Philippines. Because if…for example you wrote about the Filipino 
life in the English language, it would come out differently, it would have a 
different flavor.124 [2.3]  
His experience studying and living in America was another milestone that 
urged him further towards the path to language. He admits that, at the beginning, he 
felt the victim of discrimination for being sent to America for his graduate studies. For 
he had observed that only his fellow American scholastics were sent to Europe, while 
it was somehow believed that for Filipinos like him, studying in Fordham University 
was more than enough.   But Ferriols explains that he was never embittered by such 
discrimination, for what “really happened” (ang talagang nangyari)  was that it was all 
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good (maganda, which literally means “beautiful”). Aside from having met great 
teachers, studying in Fordham gave him an opportunity to live in New York which in 
itself offered him an invaluable education. In meeting all kinds of people, from many 
different countries, Ferriols learned the meaning of diversity. And it was this 
experience that made him swear that, as soon as he came back to his country, he would 
learn the languages of his people. Of course it would be impossible to learn all the 
Philippine languages, but at least he could strive to speak the vernacular spoken in 
every place to which he would be assigned.  
While in America, he met people who shared with him their realities back 
home, giving Ferriols a picture of how things could be different.  He remembers 
particularly the Brazilian Jesuits from whom he learned that, in their country, it was 
common for one to learn German in order to study Biology. Or the Belgian Jesuit from 
Belgian Congo, who once asked him in what language he would teach Philosophy 
when he returned back home. Latin, of course, Ferriols readily replied, if he were to 
teach at the Scholasticate, and English, if he were to be assigned in the Ateneo. But 
Ferriols admits that he was already secretly planning to change things, even if he did 
not know exactly how, and the question that the Belgian Jesuit posed seemed to have 
only resonated with the desire that was already in his heart.  
Ferriols tells us how he is often told that, in searching for truth, the language 
that one uses is no longer consequential.  But this, he cautions, is a dangerous assertion 
(isang delikadong puna), for “if one were to philosophize in English—and Philosophy 
is a reflection of the self of the person, and if he were to reflect from the self in a foreign 
language, he divorces reflection from the ordinary person.”125 [2.4] Explaining his 
point further, Ferriols argues 
If a person whose knowledge comes largely from books, and attempts to 
philosophize in the language that is different from that spoken by jeepney 
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drivers, street-sweepers, or street food vendors—can it still be said that that 
person is moving within the ambit of truth? Because it cannot be denied that, 
whether it is claimed by man or deliberately forgotten, it would always remain 
true that all people, including those who philosophize, are surrounded by 
fellow men who speak and use language. And if one who philosophizes 
chooses the language he uses, his choice is the outcome of his attitude towards 
the words/language of those around him. And his attitude can either be 
truth[ful], or a lie.126 [2.5] 
Ferriols’s point is deceptively simple: in the search for truth, the choice of 
language  is inevitably a choice of a particular disposition towards the people around 
him. In assuming a particular attitude, one chooses to dwell either in truth or in a lie. 
But this begs the question: in what way is philosophizing in the language used by 
ordinary people more truthful? Inversely, how is a person philosophizing from the 
knowledge of books, using a language so foreign to people around him, a lie?”   
Behind Ferriols’s cryptic statement was the belief that every language has the 
potential to enable us to see. And to immerse ourselves in its richness and be part of its 
usage and growth would be a way of interacting, of “being together with” 
(pakikisalamuha) those who use this language, with “the crowds of anonymous people” 
who have shared an abundance of experiences and insights encoded in the words that 
they have left for us. It is through this fellowship that one dwells in truth, insofar as 
one recognizes and helps reveal the wisdom and the way of seeing inherent in a 
particular language.  On the contrary, one who insists on speaking a language foreign 
to the people around him, risks living a lie, because he refuses to see the truth emergent 
in a living language, and denies the possibility of engaging with and learning from the 
people he encounters.   
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To illustrate his point further, Ferriols tells the story of how he was once 
assigned for three weeks to a parish church in a village far in the mountains. People 
were coaxing him to speak to them in English—to “practice”for Manila (magpraktis 
para sa Maynila), they said, and because they found his Cebuano not good enough. 
But Ferriols stubbornly refused, insisting that in three weeks, he would be fluent in the 
language. One day, he recounts, they organized a program, and while someone was 
singing in English, he noticed faults in her pronunciation. 
And it struck me. If in those three weeks we were conversing in English or 
Tagalog, I would have been correcting their speaking and pronunciation. I 
would have been so haughty. I would probably be thinking by now: Only I am 
educated, all of them are from the boondocks.127 [2.6] 
Furthermore, Ferriols writes: 
What happened was exceptional. Three weeks they were correcting my 
speaking and pronunciation, but they did not become arrogant. They were very 
patient.  Three weeks they shared their language with me: a special kind of 
seeing, of feeling, of wisdom. They were sharing their whole civilization. In 
the voice, in the movement of hands, of the body, they taught me how to speak. 
Because one who is learning a new language is like a child who is speaking for 
the first time…. The time of farewell came and I felt that I was saying goodbye 
to my teachers. And when I gazed at the surrounding mountains, I was 
overjoyed by the richness of the mountains.128 [2.7] 
 
The Struggle to Teach Philosophy in Filipino  
 It was only upon coming back from his graduate studies that Ferriols finally 
knew what he would and could do to filipinize. In 1969, in his commitment to establish 
solidarity with the ordinary folk, Ferriols decided to teach philosophy in Filipino. His 
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aim was to encourage students not only to harness the wisdom latent in their vernacular 
but to establish a philosophical tradition and dialogue among Filipinos, regardless of 
education or social status. Like all things groundbreaking, however, there were 
difficulties at the beginning. In his memoir, he recounts: 
After the lord highs had allowed the experimental [sic] classes (I tried to 
explain: my classes are not experiments, they are for real, my students are 
usually human beings, never laboratory rats; but the classes were still called 
experimental) the scheduler failed to schedule them. “To give you a chance to 
pick the best times,” with a sinister twitch of the eyelids. As a result we had 
classes during meal times: 7:00 to 8:00 a.m., 12:00 – 1:30 p.m., 6:00 to 7:30 
p.m. We were tolerated in private, boasted of in public, while we made such 
rules as: one may eat and drink during class, just so he does it quietly—no 
chicharon or popcorn, no breaking of bottles—for as the soul regales itself it is 
not just that the body be left out in the cold.129  
The administrators were clearly not too keen on allowing him to teach in Filipino, but 
as Ferriols would later explain, they also could not deny him, for fear of  provoking the 
students’ disapproval and the activists’ ire.  
 There were also certain colleagues at the Philosophy department who were not 
as supportive as he had hoped, who opposed through their silence, believing that it was 
unnecessary to teach Philosophy in Filipino, and skeptical that his efforts would 
succeed. And as Americanism continued to linger, even after the lessons of 
Filipinization in the ‘70s, Ferriols would here and there find traces of quiet assaults to 
things “Filipino.”  
Because even during the 1990s…it was stated [on the list] the courses and the 
teachers, and if [the class] was in Filipino, it was in parenthesis: “Filipino.” 
But I said, first of all, if it is in English, then it should be in parenthesis: 
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“English,” but if it’sin Filipino, why must we put “Filipino,” we’re in the 
Philippines anyway. But no, they didn’t like [the idea]. And even my books, 
my books in Filipino, in my opinion they should be placed under Philosophy 
in the library, shouldn’t they? But in the library, they are under Filipiniana. So 
it seemed as though they were saying, this is not Philosophy, we are just 
indulging him, if he wants to write in Filipino, yes sure, but we will not call it 
Philosophy, we will call it Filipiniana.130 [2.8] 
 
A Vision’s Limited Success 
 Ferriols remembers a time when Americans (and perhaps foreigners in general) 
teaching in the Philippines were required to study Filipino. For him, this indicated that 
Filipinization achieved some success. But he  qualifies that the success was rather 
“limited,” since today, that rule seems to be no longer even imposed, and even at that 
time, one only had to take and complete a required Filipino course for a year or two. It 
did not matter if one forgot what he had learned.  As a result, the effort to use and 
immerse onself in Filipino was hardly sustained.   
 Furthermore, Ferriols reveals that his decision to teach Philosophy in Filipino, 
to offer one section for each of the four courses in the core curriculum (Philosophy of 
Human Person 101 and 102, Philosophy of Religion, and Ethics), was the result of a 
conscious decision to assume a “realistic position.” But he had initially envisioned 
something larger—an Ateneo that would become a Filipino university. It was a vision 
of a university that would be open to learning foreign languages; if one were studying 
French literature, for example, one would learn French, or in studying Biology, one 
would learn German, since there would certainly be German experiments (like in 
Brazil). But in presenting one’s findings, and in all the meetings and discussions, 
everyone, including foreigners, would use Filipino, and everyone would therefore be 
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forced to learn the language. Filipino would therefore be the “language of meeting,” 
the language of encounter (wikang pagsasalubungan).  And it would be Filipino used 
in Manila, in the same way that Shakespearean English was—a mixture of many other 
languages, but creatively brought together and not merely the product of a kind of 
laziness, where one chose and used words haphazardly and unreflectively. Alas, 
Ferriols saw that his vision would never prevail. If perhaps, he says, people understood 
that he wanted this for cultural reasons, they would initially complain how difficult it 
was but would eventually work with him towards realizing it; but they thought his 
intentions were   political, and this, Ferriols believed, was the reason why he was 
strongly opposed.   
 
A Theological Standpoint 
To understand the true beginnings of his Filipinization, Ferriols urged me to 
read an essay he wrote in 1955, entitled “Theological Aspects of Cultural Adaptation.”  
This essay, he says, which was written when he was studying Theology as a seminarian, 
contains the theological background, the real force behind his vision of Filipinization.  
Like any priest who was devoted to the Catholic doctrine and his vocation, his main 
concern was to spread the Gospel of Christ, and to evangelize in a way that adapts to 
the culture of the people. Ferriols saw this encounter between the Gospel and a culture 
as the necessary process by which both reveal their richness: for precisely because of 
that fortuitous encounter, certain aspects of the Gospel and the culture are allowed to 
emerge.131  
In this essay, Ferriols defines cultural adaptation as a missionary approach 
guided by the belief that every culture, prior to Catholic conversion, contains a certain 
goodness and truth, which naturally makes it predisposed to being transfigured by 
supernatural values. All non-Christian cultures, though they may be “imperfect images 
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of the eternal Word,” are to be respected and corrected, but never destroyed. The 
premise behind this idea lies in the belief in the “exigency for cultural pluralism” as the 
only possible expression and realization of the perfection of Christ. Using the example 
of the human genius whose potentials can never be exhausted by a single culture, 
Ferriols argues: 
If, then, the full expression of the human genius already requires cultural 
pluralism, a much greater exigency for cultural pluralism must exist where 
there is question of expressing the perfection of Christ. For Christ is the 
concrete embodiment of the human genius hypostatically united with the 
Word. A single culture can express Him only in a limited and fragmentary way, 
but various cultures together will image Him much more perfectly because 
what one culture lacks will be made up by another.132 
It seemed that, for Ferriols, the Americans could not see that, while they were teaching 
Catholic values, they were also inculcating American habits and ways of thinking. In 
doing so, they had forgotten that one could be Catholic and need not be 
American.  
 There were Americans who understood his real intention: kaya tingnan mo 
yung mga hindi umalis, naintindihan nila ako (“look at those who did not leave [the 
Philippines], they understood me.”) O’Hare, for instance, expressed his appreciation 
for a Filipinization that was driven by this evangelical intention, mentioning how one 
of his colleagues described the cause as “the long, painful and fumbling struggle to 
uncover and release the potential riches of the Filipino consciousness, to disclose that 
special genius that will in theological terms define the features of the Filipino face of 
Christ.”133  And then, there were some who  did not understand, but seemed to Ferriols 
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to have had at least an “inkling” [kutob] that his position was more profound than what 
they could grasp.  But there were also those who perhaps understood but simply 
disagreed. And again, the main reason for the disagreement, Ferriols believes, was the 
misconception that his position was political, embittering American Jesuits who felt 
that all their sacrifices for the country were unappreciated. 
But my atittude was that I had an appreciation for what they’ve done, but what 
they’ve done would be complete, would be more complete, as what I have said 
in one of our meetings. I said, the Americans have done a great deal for the 
Philippines, but they have to do something harder. To let the Filipinos become 
really Filipinos. To do that, the Americans have to give up some of their 
American ways. The Americans can do it because… see, the Americans had a 
slogan during the war: the difficult we do at once, the impossible takes a little 
longer. That was one of the slogans of the Americans. SEACBEES—an 
engineering department of the US Navy, I think it was.134[2.9] 
Unfortunately, the students were equally insensitive to the theological and 
philosophical underpinnings of Ferriols’s intentions, which he emphasizes were very 
different from the political attitude that seemed to have been more prevalent at that 
time. And so when he refused to join or endorse their communist positions, he was 
readily seen as a traitor.  
What did Ferriols mean when he said that his Filipinization was not political? 
For surely, his actions and words were so influential that they helped give life and 
direction to the movement as a whole. To this query, however, he leaves us  no answer, 
and we are left to our conjectures. But this philosopher was never too keen on giving 
exhaustive explanations, which was in a way reflective of his particular attitude 
towards words. In class, he taught us the value of words, while reminding us of their 
limits; that while words help us express and share our thoughts, understanding comes 
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not through the force of the clearest and most logical explanation but through our own 
effort and willingness to see. He would always say: after one has expressed everything 
that can be said, what remains is that which cannot be said.  From this, one can easily 
understand why Ferriols was never primarily concerned about explaining things away. 
And his words were indeed most effective in their enigmatic style, which were meant 
not so much to dazzle with an eloquent exposition of truth as to allow his listeners to 
grapple with the obscure, forcing their minds to wander in search for their own answers.    
 
Tingnan ang Talagang Nangyari  (“Look at What is Really Happening”) 
As I myself try to understand why Ferriols claimed that his filipinization was 
not political, I grapple with clues that more or less point to certain directions and 
sentiments.  One of the most important observations Ferriols had during the time of 
Filipinization in the Ateneo was that, while the movement ushered a period of great 
change, it was also a time of confusion, wrought with misunderstandings and feelings 
of resentment.  And it was not merely a case of Americans misrepresenting Filipino 
intentions. Those troubled times were equally marked by contradicting views among 
Filipinos themselves who were genuinely trying to define what nationalism meant.  
For former Hukbalahap leader Luis Taruc, for instance, nationalism had to be, 
quite understandably, an anti-Americanism (“or anti-Chinese for that matter”), the 
latter merely being the expression that ensures keeping foreign domination in check.135 
Without doubt, Taruc was an influential figure in the Filipinization movement in the 
Ateneo, as he was regarded as a kind of hero.136 Months before “Down From the Hill” 
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was published, Taruc had been invited to deliver a speech to the Ateneo student body, 
his “first public appearance” since his release from prison. It was on this occasion that 
he revealed that workers and peasants perceived Ateneo, and colleges and universities 
alike, as schools of the future generation of elites, educating for the sole purpose of 
perpetuating the systems and habits of accumulating wealth and oppressing the poor. 
It was an image that Ateneans found troubling, and Taruc’s words, which hurled a 
challenge to prove this reputation wrong, prompted a critical self-reflection.  
While many shared Taruc’s desire for social justice, there were quite a few 
who were equally wary of anti-American sentiments, warning people that such 
“excesses of this type of nationalism” could lead the Filipinos to commit “the same 
mistakes that Europe had made.”  Thus, there was, amidst the anti-American 
expressions, a call to reflect on the meaning of “authentic nationalism.” Philosophy 
professor Jose Cruz, S.J. was outspokenly critical of the “demagoguery against the 
‘Western Imperialism,’” describing it as nothing but “venomous hatred of America, of 
anything which is foreign.”  He argued that such demonstrations of nationalism were 
“blatantly inauthentic,” and that genuine nationalism, if it were truly grounded on the 
love of one’s nation, would strive to grasp the good and value not only within one’s 
self, country, and people, but in all.  Drawing inspiration from the philosopher Max 
Scheler, Cruz quotes:  “I love all men because they are bearers of value, and I have 
more loving concern for the wicked because it is in them that that value, goodness, is 
under the constant threat of degeneration.”  Thus, within this wide scope of love that 
characterizes authentic nationalism, “hatred for another nation finds no place.”137 
There was, however, not merely an animosity towards Western imperialism; 
divisiveness grew within the very ranks of student activists, and it seemed that 
                                                 
demands of his peasant followers.... Here before us now was the charismatic Luis 
Taruc, former Huk supremo, urging strict adherence to Christian principles and 
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nationalism was not going to be more authentic than this. On January 26th, 1970, and 
then again, on January 30th, days that would be remembered as the beginning of the 
First Quarter Storm, the students staged mass rallies that both ended in a brutal 
dispersal and the death of several young protestors. These events, however, did not 
only reveal the youth’s profound disenchantment with the state of things; for the 
student activists who had, until then, presented a united front, these fateful days had 
revealed an unsurmountable rift: on the one hand, there were the moderates, who were 
composed of the “exclusive school kids of the NUSP (National Union of Students of 
the Philippines), bred in comfort, decent, respectable and timorous,” working for a 
peaceful change through a non-partisan Constitutional Convention, and on the other, 
“the public school firebrands of groups like KM (Kabataang Makabayan) and the SDK 
(Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan) familiar with privation, rowdy, irreverent, 
troublesome,” seeking “the violent overthrow of the existing political order.”138 The 
faction was clearly, as Free Press journalist Jose Lacaba described it, one of “class 
distinction.” While the moderates regarded the radicals, in derogatory fashion, as 
“unreasonable elements,” the radicals criticized the moderates for being a bunch of 
“clerico-fascists,” lackeys of the Catholic Church.  
Amidst the squabbles, however, some critically minded Ateneans and Jesuits 
were perceptive enough to draw lessons from the unfortunate fall out. It had long been 
felt that the Atenean, though he was increasingly becoming politically and socially 
conscious was, unfortunately, given his “elite position,” still largely unable “to grasp 
the reality of the situation.” 139   While the NUSP appealed earnestly for non-
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partisanship, believing it to be the path towards a real and effective representation of 
the needs of the people, the radicals were profoundly skeptical, contending that the 
constitutional convention would again only be ruled by “‘delegates of hacenderos and 
the power class which have alliances with US economic interests.’”140 It was, however, 
only upon witnessing the bloody aftermath of the January riots that people began to 
reflect what these ideological differences really meant.  
Fr. Edmundo Garcia, S.J., who himself witnessed the “Battle of Mendiola,” 
and testified in Congress concerning the January demonstrations, wrote an open letter 
addressed “To [the] Militant Young Christians” of the Ateneo, in an attempt to awaken 
the Ateneans to “the real state of the nation.”  In this letter, he recounts the story of 
meeting Bulakeño Gerry Encarnacion, “a member of the nationalist core from Araneta 
University” and a “demonstration drop-out” who was badly bludgeoned by the police 
and was then being treated at PGH (Philippine General Hospital), along with over thirty 
other students and policemen.  Garcia writes,  
For Gerry Encarnacion and his bloodied companions, there will be a next time 
around. Probably, more violent and more disastrous; but “things are just so 
bad, we have nothing to lose anyway.”141  
It was precisely this sense of desperation that struck Garcia, urging him to 
reevaluate his perception of the radical activists; that perhaps they were not simply 
“unreasonable elements,” but young people who, feeling in their wretched state they 
have nothing more to lose, were quite reasonable in their determination to survive. And 
it seemed that the moderates were unable to intuit the desperation that was in the hearts 
of their fellow-students, causing both camps to lead divergent paths. For Garcia, this 
failure to empathize and grasp the real condition of things only revealed that the 
estrangement of the Atenean ran deeper than what one had imagined:  
                                                 
Democracy,” The Guidon, February 17, 1970, 6. 
140 Tiglao, “Radical Youth Split,” 3.   
141 Fr. Edmundo Garcia, S.J. “To Militant Young Christians,” The Guidon, February 17, 
1970, 8.   
 81 
Too often, we have found ourselves abnormally ill at ease with our very own 
people, either because of our misconceptions of them or of their 
misconceptions of us. We cannot feel with our people, we cannot think with 
them because we have separated ourselves from them for so long.142 
The rift between moderates and radicals also revealed the tension between the 
activists and certain constituents of the Catholic Church. An interesting study of the 
term “clerico-fascist,” which the radicals used to call the moderates, divulges certain 
prejudices that helped deepen political divisions. While the term clearly disregards the 
existence of open-minded clerics and “rebel priests,” the concept does accurately reveal 
a particular experience of a reactionary Church.  
It seems that whereas before, the Church persecuted alleged witches, in the 
modern era when witches are not so believable anymore, the Church has 
substituted Satan for Marx and channeled its persecuting tendencies on people 
who show the slightest sign of anti-Americanism or socialist tendencies.143   
Interestingly, one of the moments the force of Catholic reactionary strongly asserted 
itself was at the beginning of the nationalist movement in the University of the 
Philippines (U.P.) The article particularly mentions a certain chaplain of the U.P. 
Student Catholic Action (UPSCA) who, “after a futile attempt to abolish the Greek-
letter societies in the campus, turned his energies into waging a one-man crusade in 
flushing out the vocal nationalists in the campus as ‘communists.’”144  
 It was amidst this messy affair of ideological disputes and political alignments, 
which sometimes plummeted into petty name-callings and at times caught glimpses of 
compassion and genuine understanding, that Ferriols decided to remain calmly “non-
aligned.”  Not that he was neutral; he certainly had a clear vision and a strong position 
with regard to certain things. But he saw the narrow-mindedness encouraged by 
                                                 
142 Garcia, ““To Militant Young Christians,” 8. 
143 Rigoberto Tiglao, “Clerico-Fascist: What Does It Mean,” The Guidon, March 12, 
1970, 3.  
144 Ibid.  
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politics, which inevitably forced everyone to take sides. Despite the social pressure and 
criticism from activists and American sympathizers alike, Ferriols remained steadfast 
in his own beliefs, that is, to the truth he saw—which, before its reduction and 
simplification to suit a specific political agenda, was far more complex and beautiful. 
Thus, even when he was fervently supportive of the Filipinization movement and 
allowing his students to attend demonstrations, he was also silently opposing it by 
religiously taking attendance in class and noting down all the cuts; 145  and more 
importantly, even when he became extremely critical of the Americans, he never forgot 
that one of the teachers who  taught him to be Filipino, to be open to all the many ways 
of being Filipino, to whom he says he still owes so much (malaki ang utang ko sa 
kanya), was, rather ironically,an American Jesuit named Father Joseph Mulry.  
 
Malagipko 
 Only a few months ago, in March, 2012, Ferriols started his own blog, in 
response to the Provincial Superior’s request to write about his experiences as a Jesuit 
during the Second World War.  The title of the blog is Malagipko (Ilokano, for “I 
remember”), under the user name Lilipad (Tagalog, for “will fly”).  Who or what “will 
fly,” one wonders. Malagipko, on the other hand, is also an intriguing choice of word.  
Any native Ilokano will tell you that used in its proper context, it does not simply mean 
that one remembers; for the word itself reveals that particular moment while one talks 
to a friend, when something suddenly comes to mind, and immediately must be said 
before it takes wing and vanishes to never be seen again.  Malagipko, more accurately, 
“before I forget,” means to save what unexpectedly “appears” (iligtas ang mga 
[biglang] nagpapamasid) from the threat of one’s own forgetfulness.  
 At times, however, one forgets deliberately. To save oneself, either from the 
pain of a memory or from the pressures of being excluded or ostracized by the general 
                                                 
145 In the Ateneo, every student is given a number of allowable “cuts,” or absences. To 
go beyond this number would automatically merit a failing grade in the course.   
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crowd. In the essay he wrote as an introduction to Philosophy, he tells a story about a 
friend.  Once, they were swimming in the river, and Ferriols was carried away by the 
strong current. His friend swam after him, and brought him to shore, saving his life.  In 
the years that passed, “X” did some distasteful things, and people gossiped about him. 
Ferriols knew that the rumors were true, but he kept silent, deciding to remain faithful 
to the memory, recounting the story, whenever there was a chance, of how this friend 
had saved his life. For indeed, part of “what really happened” was the kindness that his 
friend had shown him once upon a time.146    
 Similarly, despite his criticisms, what really happened was that Ferriols learned 
so much from the Americans.  And he tries to preserve this memory in a blog entry 
about his beloved Literature teacher, Father Mulry. It was Mulry, Ferriols says, who 
made him realize that he could think, and that he, too, could help others see their own 
potential for thinking. He also found in Mulry a kind of persistence that never gave up 
when faced with something baffling, and when the old priest shared his thoughts, one 
had the feeling that he was always divulging exactly what he had seen and everything 
that he was continuing to discover. It was from him that Ferriols understood that the 
world where thinking properly dwells is not the world of competition (daigdig ng 
paligsahan), where one seeks the person with the sharpest mind. Rather, 
What true thinking searches for is truth. The world of thinking is a vast and 
unfathomable field through which people who seek travel. These people seek 
because they have already found; and they know that they have already found 
because they continue to seek.147 [2.10] 
 In politics, one is often forced to take sides. And it becomes extremely difficult 
to look at what’s around when one’s aim is limited to proving a point. That was why 
to advance the cause of Filipinization, it was important to show as many examples as 
one could of how the American Jesuits were bungling along the way. And on the other 
                                                 
146 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 237-238. 
147 See http://lilipad-malagipko.blogspot.sg. 
 84 
side, it was necessary to ward off the menacing threat of anti-Americanism by 
dismissing all nationalists as godless communists. It was the kind of limitation to 
thinking that Ferriols was always trying to avoid. But in politics, it becomes almost 
unavoidable to argue and see one’s adversary in a limited and specific way.   
 Thus, despite the fact that Ferriols was caught in the intrigue and ideological 
battle of his time, he maintains that the aim of his Filipinization was never political.  
And if one listens carefully to the words he often repeats, one realizes that what really 
concerned him was to be constantly faithful to what was really happening.  
And that’s why my class always begins, you begin with the thought of a pure 
concept, and then you will ask, Meron ba?148 And then, you will be surprised 
that what really exists can never be made into a concept.149  [2.11] 
 And indeed, if one were to look closely at what was happening, one would realize, as 
Political Science Professor, Dante Simbulan had once argued, that student activism was 
not merely “illogical” or communist-inspired, and that to dismiss it as such would be 
“‘a grave insult to the intelligence and patriotism of our students;’” or that in saying 
that the radical activists, having read the writings of revolutionaries such as Mao Tse 
Tung and Che Guevarra, were merely brainwashed is to suggest that they have no 
capacity of their own to be “impressed by the work and successes of people who fought 
against oppression and social injustices and did achieve results.”150 And indeed, in 
carefully examining what was really taking place during those confusing times, one 
must never forget that there were American Jesuits like the Physics professor Father 
Francisco Glover, whose memory had been “trampled on by the tempest of 
Filipinization,” and who, in a dramatic, “final act of lamentation,” writes an entire letter 
in Filipino. It is through him that we learn more about Father Campbell, the priest who 
                                                 
148 The word meron is crucial to understanding the philosophy of Ferriols. The idea will 
be further discussed in later chapters, but suffice to say, Ferriols used the word to 
indicate what exists, what is “there.” 
149 Ferriols, interview, 2009. 
150 Tiglao, “A United Front,” 5.  
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in his twelve years, had only learned three words, “and everything starting with the 
letter P.”  Talagang bobo siya…. (“He’s really stupid”); incidentally, it was also 
Campbell who established the Math department and the entire Management 
Engineering program, and became the first Prefect of Boarders in Bellarmine Hall who 
defended the rights of boarders against the administration.151  
And if you happen to get stuck in a concept, use Meron to get out of that 
concept.  The concept is still necessary to point to meron, but meron itself, that 
can never be a concept…. That is where you must always act.152 [2.12]  
 To move within the ambit of truth is to be constantly vigilant to what is really 
happening: that sometimes, what happens is what we had least expected (pero ang 
talagang nangyari ay...); or that the unexpected turns out to be a beautiful and 
extraordinary event (ang nangyari ay kakaiba). And there are times, too, when one 
comes to the darkest moments of his life, which unfortunately, is also part of one’s 
truth.   
  
Truth at High Noon 
A few years ago, when I came to interview Ferriols, I asked him to share with 
me his experiences of the Japanese occupation. At that time, he refused, saying that he 
did not want to remember, that the memories were too painful for him to bear.  And so 
when I unexpectedly found the blog he started many months ago, I was overjoyed; it 
felt as if Padre finally granted my request. But upon reading his entries, slowly I 
understood what he was trying to tell me then, why some people never want to talk 
about their experiences of the war.   
  In his stories, one realizes that Ferriols was constantly surrounded by the sight 
and smell of death. In one of his entries, he narrates that morning when he and a fellow 
                                                 
151  Padre Francisco Glover, S.J., “Liham ng Isang Banyaga: Huling Hikbi,” The 
Guidon, February 17, 1970, 9.  
152 Ferriols, interview, 2009. 
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Jesuit, Bro. Araneta, came to the street of San Marcelino where a fierce battle had just 
transpired, leaving everything in ruins.  When they arrived, they saw some people who 
were doing a “clean-up” of a building full of dead Japanese soldiers, and these people 
were throwing the corpses one after another out the window, all mangled and disfigured 
as the bodies fell smack on the pavement. People around stood watching, and there 
were American soldiers who ordered them to stand back, warning them that some of 
these corpses might have grenades in their pockets which could go off anytime. They 
continued to walk through San Marcelino, and stopped in front of a canal. Ferriols 
remembers how he could smell the pungent odor of death; and how he saw something 
at the canal, but couldn’t tell what it was that lay there. Soon enough, Bro. Araneta told 
him that it was a priest. And then, there was another corpse, and then another, until 
Ferriols realized that there were ten of them, all Vincentian brothers, who were made 
to stand, massacred with a machine gun. Their lifeless bodies then had fallen into the 
canal. One by one, they carried the corpses on a wheelbarrow and buried them behind 
a church in San Marcelino.   
 Ferriols writes in graphic detail what happened during those horrifying times, 
and one realizes that remembering is not always an easy task.  But there is something 
in his accounts, that one can clearly discern, a strong will to survive; as though he was 
saying that even in the darkest and saddest moments of death, life, somehow, pierces 
through.   
 When they had finished burying the bodies, it was already high noon. Ferriols 
recounts how they had to walk back to La Ignaciana under the blistering sun.  Along 
the way, they saw an American soldier with a big canteen, and because they were so 
thirsty, they boldly approached him, asking if they could each have one gulp of water 
from his flask. The American agreed; and because it was scorching that day, the water, 
too, was hot inside the canteen. Pero sa aming matinding uhaw ang tubig na galing sa 
mainit na canteen ay kay sarap! (“But in our extreme thirst, the water that came from 
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the hot canteen was so good!”) Finally, they arrived in La Ignancia, and had gone to 
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Chapter Three 
Ricardo Pascual and the Struggle for Academic Freedom 
 
Whereas the American Jesuits were mourning the loss of “academic freedom” 
due to the onslaught of the Filipinization movement in the late 1960s, less than a decade 
earlier, professors from the University of the Philippines (U.P.), inspired by a 
libertarian and secular tradition, had a similar grievance—only this time, the threat to 
intellectual autonomy was seen, rather ironically, as the result of “clerical aggressions.” 
One of the main targets of the assaults was the U.P. philosopher Ricardo Roque 
Pascual, who, along with his colleagues from the Philosophy department, found 
himself caught in academic politics, which would later escalate into a charge of national 
treason. These events afford us another glimpse into the ways in which philosophy in 
the Philippines has been interwoven with religion and politics, and how such personal 
struggles are inspired by local and foreign heroes and teachers.  However, unlike the 
Jesuit philosopher Ferriols, who drew inspiration from Christian values to elicit change, 
Pascual, a self-proclaimed agnostic, brought into sharp view the difficult and 
antagonistic relationship between religion and intellectual freedom.  
 
The Witchhunts of 1961 
The year nineteen sixty-one was, as Professor Leopoldo Yabes described it, a 
time when the University of the Philippines was rocked to its foundation. Inspired by 
the “witch hunts” led by American Senator Joseph McCarthy during the Red Scare in 
the U.S. in the early 1950s, Congressman Leonardo Perez, chairman of The House 
Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities (CAFA), decided to stage his own “Loyalty” 
checks on professors and students allegedly charged for harboring pinkish leanings.  
What prompted the inquiry was a complaint filed by Quezon City councilor 
and former intelligence officer Carlos Albert, accusing certain published articles for 
inciting sedition. One of these articles, entitled “The Peasant War in the Philippines,” 
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appeared in the 1958 Golden Jubilee issue of the Philippine Social Sciences and 
Humanities Review, which according to Albert’s “expert testimony,” was highly 
critical of U.S. foreign policy and “therefore communistic.” Consequently, these 
allegations led to the subpoena of the nine professors in the journal’s editorial board.154  
With its critical portrayal of a reactionary government that serves the “landed 
and moneyed aristocracy,” and its exaltation of the National Peasants’ Union, the 
monograph was easily accused of provoking peasants against the Government, and 
inciting them to join the movement. Of course no one really bothered to explain how a 
sixty-four-page document, filled with academic jargon and written in English, could 
produce such an effect on a group of people that were mostly illiterate. Furthermore, 
the prosecuters seemed to have overlooked the fact that the article, rather than 
provoking conflict, was trying to rectify a gross misunderstanding: that the aim of the 
peasant movement was never to overthrow the government but to demand civil 
liberties, as part of the people’s struggle to survive.  
In their defense, Editor Tomas Fonacier and Assistant Managing Editor 
Leopoldo Yabes would raise this crucial point.155 But the issue was never really up for 
                                                 
154 This included Onofre D. Corpuz, Cesar Majul, Ricardo Pascual, and Leopoldo 
Yabes, to name a few. Other articles accused of sedition were the following: a feature 
article entitled “Requiem for Lumumba,” written by Jose Maria Sison under the 
pseudonym Andres Gregorio, published in the Philippine Collegian, in March 1, 1961, 
and the editorial “The Tower of Babel and the Tower of Ivory,” written by Petronilo 
Daroy, and which appeared in the 1959 Phiippinensian, the yearbook of the U.P. 
graduating students.   
155 In arguing their case, Fonacier and Yabes cites a passage from the article, which 
clearly expresses a sincere plea that it be understood not simplistically as an apology 
for Communism but in its own terms: “Many of us Filipinos reject Communism as a 
way of life. But many will be driven to it by the failure of our government to take 
cognizance of the plight of our people. The Filipino is now awakened; we reject lip 
service to democracy, and while we may not be communists, we reject red scaring 
tactics and the force of arms as solution to our ills. The whole world is between 
Communism and Capitalism, and it is likely that we may be attracted more to the 
former if our Government does not revise its policies. John Dulles may tell us that the 
Communist tactic is to make freedom and liberty their political fronts. It may be true. 
But it is a fact too, that the fighter for freedom is not necessarily a Communist.” Quoted 
from “The Peasant War in the Philippine—A Study of the Causes of Social Unrest in 
the Philippines,” Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, XXIII, No.2-4 
(June-December, 1958), 432.  
 90 
debate, as the prosecutors were convinced beyond doubt that the text was nothing more 
than an apology for Communism. There was, however, nothing unusual about this. In 
fact, the article itself asserts that the reactionary class has always used this “red scaring 
tactic” to conveniently dismiss democratic elements as “bandits and communists.”  In 
this light, the article’s epigraph, which bore the words of the Irish socialist George 
Bernard Shaw was a clear foreshadowing of its persecution: that like “the instruments 
of progress... who are usually put to death by the rational people who want law and 
order,” the monograph, was equally fated to be condemned for instigating “rebellious 
conspiracies and riots,” and therefore posing a threat to “the peace of the community, 
and safety and order of the government.”156  
As the CAFA trial unfolded, more anomalies emerged, gradually revealing the 
farcical nature of the entire inquiry. It was reported, for instance, that during the 
opening session, members of the CAFA themselves were somewhat confused, 
admitting that they had “not yet agreed on a clear-cut definition of what communism 
[was].” This prompted the committee to ask the “feature witness,” former U.P. English 
Professor Josefina Constantino, to define the term.157 But what perhaps made people 
seriously doubt the basis and exigency of the CAFA hearings was when Constantino 
failed to substantiate her allegations that the Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Ricardo Pascual, was a ‘commie’. In fact, she 
admitted that her only basis was a claim made by a former student and former employee 
of the President’s office, Amelita Reysio-Cruz, who said that Pascual had led her, along 
with other students, to buklod meetings where communist doctrines were discussed. In 
his defense, Pascual explained that the term buklod, which the National Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency (NICA) claimed as a communist front, was merely a “‘figment 
                                                 
156 People v Yabes, Fonacier, and John Doe, Q-4624 Phil (1962), in The Ordeal of A 
Man of Academe, Special issue of the Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities 
Review XXIX (1964), ed. Leopoldo Y. Yabes (Quezon City: n.p., 1967), 248-249.  
157  “UP Professors Testify Today; Pascual Berates Constantino,” The Philippine 
Collegian, March 14, 1961, 1.  
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of the imagination’ of those who were maliciously imputing to him and the 
philosophical group a communist leaning.” This group, for which he was an adviser 
and lecturer, could be no other than the Philosophical Association of the Philippines 
(PAP),158 an organization registered with an address in Tondo, where meetings were 
open to public “and were closed to no one because he was experimenting, he explained, 
on the use of the national language in philosophical discussions.”159  
Amidst the circus and labyrinthine exchange of arguments and rebuttals, 
Professor O.D. Corpuz brings the real issue into focus:  that in light of the allegedly 
seditious publications, and rumors of secret gatherings of a subversive nature, the state 
university was being accused of “preparing the minds of its students” to make them 
“receptive to the Communist ideology.” However, when time came to closely examine 
“the sweeping character of the charge,” Corpuz observes that only the Philosophy 
department was suggested to be involved in this “ideological preparation”—a 
department which he points out, in satiric tone, “has about five to seven major students 
in the year on the average, and whose courses are required only for a relatively few 
students in the University.” And what indeed made it more ridiculous was that no other 
instructor in the Philosophy department’s academic staff was being accused other than 
Pascual.160  
Stranger still, in the course of his testimony, Pascual was asked whether he 
believed in God. For the inquisitors, it seemed that the professor’s teaching methods 
were not as important as his religious beliefs.  Suddenly, the investigation turned into 
a theological discussion, which people believed could have only been prompted by 
Constantino’s testimony. Failing to provide proof of Pascual’s communist leanings, 
                                                 
158 In Constantino’s testimony, however, Pascual’s group was called the Philippine 
Philosophical Society. See Josefina Constantino, “Reply to the U.P. Alumni,” 
Philippine Collegian, July 28, 1955, 13.  
159 “UP Professors Testify,” 3. According to O.D. Corpuz, however, this group called 
PAP was discussing the matter on Jose Rizal’s retraction, “based primarily on 
[Pascual’s] book Rizal Beyond the Grave. O.D. Corpuz, “The University and 
Congress,” Philippine Collegian, Commencement Issue, April 16, 1961, 14.   
160 O.D. Corpuz, “The University and Congress,” 14.  
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Constantino spoke instead of the latter’s alleged “godlessness,” claiming that his 
philosophy of Logical Positivism was “creating an atmosphere of ‘receptivity’ to 
communist indoctrination.” It remained unclear, however, how communism was 
related to or born out of atheism or agnosticism.161 Nevertheless, it was believed that 
they were all synonymous, in the same way that anti-Americanism in those days (and 
perhaps even now), or any critical attack on America for that matter, was always 
assumed to be “communist-inspired.” And so, when during the course of the 
investigation a legislator was reported to have posed the possibility of introducing a 
bill that would penalize professors who did not believe in the existence of God, it 
became clear that the trial was not so much about the alleged communism of the 
accused, but about certain beliefs to which professors adhered that were not in 
conformity with the majority.162  
The real issue, therefore, as some observers believed, was not at all the problem 
of communist infiltration but the alarming threat to academic freedom, which, for those 
who were around long before the CAFA “witch hunts,” began not in 1961 but in the 
1950s. Strangely enough, at both times, the main target had been the Department of 
Philosophy, with an unusual, obsessive interest in Pascual.  
                                                 
161 At the height of the controversy, a leaflet was circulated in the university campus, 
containing an essay written by a certain Conrado Pascual, Jr. of the Democratic Youth 
Forum. Here, he attempts to explain how atheism, “abetted by positivism,” could lead 
to the spread of communism. Quoting the American philosopher, Mortimer Adler, he 
explains how the positivist, for whom only those that remain within science can be 
demonstrated, poses a grave threat to democracy. For if democracy lies outside the 
realm of science, as well as the moral principles on which it stands, then democracy 
for the positivist could never be a self-evident truth, which universally applies to the 
entire humanity.  The positivists “‘can be for democracy only because they like it, not 
because they know it is right.’” From this line of argument, one can understand why 
the positivist was feared; for in lacking an ideological commitment to democracy, he 
was someone who could easily turn against it.  It was therefore concluded that the more 
serious threat to democracy were not dictators but professors who indoctrinate their 
students in Positivism.  Conrado Pascual, Jr. “Sense and Sensibility,” in The Ordeal of 
A Man of Academe, 169-170.  
162 Cesar Adib Majul, “The Assault on the Academic Freedom of the University of the 
Philippines,” in The Ordeal of A Man of Academe, 194.  
 93 
In the course of the CAFA investigation, not only was the Philosophy 
department singled out; through Pascual’s own testimony, we learn that Constantino’s 
allegations against him were in fact old charges, which she, then as the secretary of the 
former U.P. President, Vidal Tan, had raised years ago but which the Board of Regents 
had found too flimsy to honor.  
 
The Religious Wars 
According to the reports, Constantino in 1955 was, in fact, the one facing 
charges of intrigue, particularly for the “unscrupulous practice” of submitting to the 
Military Intelligence Service (MIS) names of professors whom she suspected of 
harboring subversive ideas.163 These charges were filed by none other than Reysio-
Cruz herself, whom Constantino had invited to a meeting with an MIS officer to submit 
Pascual’s name. When interrogated by the Regents, however, Constantino admitted 
that she herself was not sure of Pascual’s communist leanings, but that she was 
convinced that the Philosophy professor was exerting a kind of “tyranny over the mind 
of his students,” perhaps not in content but definitely through his methodology.164 With 
such conviction, Constantino felt justified in her actions, arguing that her goal was 
merely to “awaken in university professors a certain sense of moral reponsibility to 
their students.”  
However, in a letter to the chairman of the Board of Regents, dated February 
21, 1955, Reysio-Cruz accused not just Constantino but U.P. President Vidal Tan as 
well, particularly of favoritism and of using his position to promote sectarian interests. 
Reysio-Cruz claimed that Tan was intentionally replacing Philosophy faculty 
members, sending Santos Cuyugan and Cesar Majul to American universities in 1953, 
                                                 
163 The other names submitted to the MIS were Agustino Rodolfo of Zoology, SV 
Epistola and Elmer Ordoñez of English. See Elmer A. Ordoñez, “Memoirs of Diliman 
Country: On the Occasion of the Centenary of the U.P. English Department,” Manila 
Times, August 29, 2010. From http://www.josemariasison.org/?p=3970. 
164 Regents Carmen Dinglan-Consing and Vicente Lontok, “Minority Report of the 
Five-Man Board of Regents Special Committee to Investigate The Charges Against 
President Vidal A. Tan,” The Philippine Collegian, July 28, 1955,15. 
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as fellows in Sociology and Political Science respectively, in order to ensure the 
appointment of his own recruit, Dr. Jose Ma. Eleazar, a graduate of the Pontifical 
University of Santo Tomas and the American Jesuit University of Fordham.165  Reports 
revealed that Tan had gone straight to the Dean, asking that Eleazar be assured a 
teaching appointment, despite the University Code rule that “recommendations for 
appointment in the academic staff shall ordinarily originate with the Department.”  In 
his defense, Tan argues that Eleazar’s appointment, as well as Cuyugan and Majul’s 
scholarship, were not without the Philosophy chair’s, i.e., Pascual’s, endorsement. He 
further argued that his effort to hire someone who belonged to “a different persuasion” 
was merely intended to enrich the Philosophy department.  
Another controversial issue that was raised was the module Mathematics O, 
which Tan was offering to students as a substitute to Logic (Philosopy 1) that Pascual 
and his staff were teaching. To justify his actions, Tan explained that, while having 
always been supportive of the teaching of Logic to all students, he was also critical of 
the way it was being taught. He claimed that students were complaining that Pascual’s 
Symbolic Logic, which was a deviation from the “old classical presentation,” was too 
difficult, and this urged Tan to provide students the choice of Math O, “which is really 
applied logic as designed.”166   
Indeed, it appears that Pascual endorsed Eleazar’s application, upon receiving 
it from the Dean, who made it clear that the President was “very much interested in Dr. 
                                                 
165 According to U.P. Professor of Psychology and founder of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, 
Virgilio Enriquez, sending the philosophy faculty members on Ford and Rockefeller 
scholarships to study social sciences instead of philosophy was a deliberate attempt to 
“weaken” and “neutralize” the department. He mentions not only Majul and Cuyugan, 
but also Alfredo Lagmay, his own mentor, who studied psychology, and Jose 
Encarnacion, Jr., who studied economics. In the Board of Regents reports, however, 
Lagmay’s scholarship was argued to have been granted in 1950, during the time of U.P. 
President Gonzalez, who, unlike President Tan, was more sympathetic to the 
philosophy department. Also, in the reports, there is no mention of Encarnacion. See 
Virgilio Enriquez, preface to From Colonial to Liberation Psychology: The Philippine 
Experience (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1992). 
166 Vidal A. Tan, “Memorandum of Pres. Tan to the Board of Regents,” The Philippine 
Collegian, July 28, 1955, 18.  
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Eleazar joining the Department of Philosophy.”167 It is also true that Pascual had given 
his consent to Majul and Cuyugan to pursue their studies in the social sciences, and 
was even reportedly heard to have said that he was “enlarging [his] department if [his] 
men go out.”168  But if one were to look closely at the endorsement letter Pascual wrote 
to the Dean on February 28, 1955, one would see in his subtle remarks a more complex 
picture behind the half-truths.  Pascual writes: 
In subsequent years you have often repeated that President Tan was not 
contemplating to send abroad for study in the field of Philosophy anyone from 
the Department of Philosophy, for whatever reason he has, which I did not 
personally inquire into. Subsequently, Mr. Majul and Mr. Cuyugan were made 
to understand that they could go to the United States if they could major in any 
field but philosophy. Later on they specified the field in which Mr. Majul was 
to study abroad. The field chosen was Political Science. Mr. Cuyugan was sent 
to study in the field of Sociology. Both of these parties left in 1953. Wishing 
to be no obstacle to the personal growth and development of the members of 
my department, I did not interpose any objection to the sending of these 
persons abroad, even if they were to take courses outside their own line of 
specialty up till then.  
In consequence…, the Dept. of Philosophy had to struggle within its limited 
means which was reduced to a full professor assigned administrative work as 
secretary of the College and head of the Department of two instructors.  
When the above situation became an accomplished fact through the policy 
of sending instructions from the Dept. of Philosophy to study abroad in any 
field but philosophy, and now comes an attempt to put in a new applicant from 
Fordham University, I am afraid that people who would know the facts will 
                                                 
167 Hermogenes Concepcion, Jovito Salonga, and Jose Africa, “Report of the U.P. 
Alumni Association Committee Assigned to Investigate the Charges Against President 
Vidal A. Tan,” The Philippine Collegian, July 28, 1955, 8.  
168 Regents Carmen Dinglan-Consing and Vicente Lontok, “Minority Report,” 12.  
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make unfavorable comment against those who are responsible for bringing 
about such a situation—in other words the university administration would be 
exposed to unfavorable criticism and comments on account of the above 
situation.   
Recently, your faculty approved the institution of Math. O which under the 
situation now obtaining where this Department voluntarily announced that it 
will not interpose any objection if Math. O is offered in substitution for 
Philosophy I, there will be a decrease in the enrollment of Philosophy I. 
Therefore, the need if any for an additional man to handle sections in 
Philosophy I will no longer exist.  
In view of the above statement of facts and their implications, it would be 
noted that there is no need for an additional man as a regular member of the 
Department of Philosophy but in a view of a course in Scholasticism, a lecturer 
might be needed.  
Consequently, if it is to be desired to have Dr. Eleazar serve the Department 
of Philosophy, I would recommend the position of lecturer in Scholasticism 
for him.”169  
Curiously, while Pascual and the Dean had endorsed Eleazar specifically for 
the position of a Lecturer in Scholasticism, Tan had announced to the Board of Regents 
that the latter had been assigned Professorial Lecturer of Philosophy and Logic, 
granting him the right to teach any philosophy subject. Despite the consistent and 
blatant irregularity of Eleazar’s appointment, Tan would insist that the “mistake” was 
merely the result of “a little confusion.”  
In the end, Tan was exonerated. But relieved of their respective positions were 
Constantino, as well as the Dean of Men and Head of the Student Personnel Service, 
Andres Abejo, a former Jesuit employed by Tan and charged by Reysio-Cruz with 
                                                 
169 Ricardo Pascual, quoted in “Report of the U.P. Alumni,” 8.  
 97 
incompetence. It was Abejo who later threatened to sue members of the Board of 
Regents’s investigating committee, accusing them of harboring anti-Catholic 
prejudices. In support of the aggrieved, a group of Catholic students and faculty rallied 
to Malacañang to appeal Abejo’s case to President Magsaysay. Then followed a protest 
organized by the fraternities and sororities in support of the persecuted regents against 
what they termed as “cassocked authoritarianism,” demanding the deportation of the 
university chaplain who they considered responsible for the sectarian aggressions in 
campus. The sectarians, in turn, again held their own demonstration, seeking the 
retention of the chaplain.170 It was this series of rallies and counter-rallies that ushered 
the beginning of U.P.’ss “religious war.”  
 
The Struggle for Academic Freedom in U.P.   
While the Catholic advocates felt discriminated and justified in defending 
themselves against what they called a “war against religion,” their libertarian 
adversaries could only see their increasing presence as a dangerous obsession of one 
group to gain full control of the university. The vehement attacks on Pascual and the 
deliberate measures to “emasculate” the much-feared, “godless” Philosophy 
department were clear signs of this, and were in fact perceived as part of a long standing 
assault on academic freedom.   
Inspired by the American public school system, U.P. was founded in 1908 on 
the constitutional principle of the separation of church and state. Under Spain, the 
country’s education had been severely controlled by the Catholic Church, which led 
not only to the denigration of the Filipino mind but also to a censorship that suppressed 
and punished subversive thinking. The establishment of the state university, being 
secular, non-sectarian, and non-political by character, was therefore a decisive break 
from this three hundred year old tradition. With “no prior commitment to doctrine, no 
                                                 
170 Leopoldo Yabes, “Academic Freedom in the University,” in The Filipino Struggle 
for Intellectual Freedom, and other Essays on Philippine Life and Thought (Quezon 
City: n.p.,1959), 36.  
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surrender to established or vested ideas,”171 U.P., in principle, stands as the bulwark of 
free inquiry and free orientation, an institution committed to “the freedom of the mind.”   
No one knew the fragililty of academic freedom better than U.P. President 
Rafael Palma, who was himself a leading member in the Philippine Assembly that 
created the state university.172 His disagreement with Philippine President, Manuel 
Quezon, regarding the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act led to his forced resignation. In early 
1933, the Osmeña-Roxas (OsRox) Independence Mission was finally able to secure the 
passing of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in American Congress. Everyone was happy 
and excited, that Wenceslao Vinzons, then president of the Student Council, called for 
a University convocation to discuss the independence law.  Quezon, fearing that the 
convocation was an endorsement of the bill which he knew could lead to his political 
death, complained to Palma saying that such discussion was a “partisan political 
activity,” and that it was highly improper for the University to be engaged in political 
matters. Palma, disagreeing with Quezon, explained that the discussion was “purely 
academic” and that he was prompted to comment on the bill because of “the unusual 
activity of one of the Deans of the University who had come out openly for the rejection 
of the bill before and after its approval by Congress.” 173  To get even, Quezon 
dramatically reduced the university’s budget, and encouraged Legislature to conduct a 
probe into its finances. This did not only have adverse effects on U.P.’s reputation 
before the public, but it also subjected Palma to very humiliating situations. His salary 
was reduced and was forced by the Committee on Appropriations “to describe in detail 
                                                 
171 Alfredo V. Lagmay, “The Attack on the State University,” in Academic Freedom, A 
Special Issue of The Philippine Collegian, ed. Jose Masakayan, et al. (Quezon City: 
University of the Philippines, 1957), 24.  
172 Leopoldo Yabes, “The University and the Fear of Ideas,” in The University and The 
Fear of Ideas And Other Essays on the Higher Learning (Quezon City: n.p., 1956), 12. 
173  Bernardita Reyes Churchill, “Palma’s Momentous Decade (1923-1933),” in 
University of the Philippines: The First 75 Years (1908-1983), ed. Oscar M. Alfonso 
(Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1985), 178, 181. Palma was 
referring to Jorge Bocobo, staunch supporter of Quezon, who became the successor of 
Palma, after the latter’s resignation. For a more detailed and insightful account of 
Palma’s term and his qualms with Quezon, read Churchill’s entire essay.  
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the number of positions, salaries of personnel, income, and expenditures, which he 
never had to do before.”174 Clearly, Quezon wanted to teach Palma a lesson, or any 
professor for that matter, who, to borrow the words of the pro-Quezon newspaper 
Philippine Herald, dared to step out “‘[of] his university cloister.’”175  
The assault on academic freedom during Palma’s time was clearly not sectarian 
but political in nature, and therefore was in some ways different from the crisis that 
U.P. was to confront in the 1950s. Nevertheless, Palma’s courageous stand against 
Quezon served as a shining example of a true scholar, and continued to inspire 
advocates of secular liberalism at crucial times in U.P.’s struggle for intellectual 
freedom. These advocates included not only the so-called “Palma boys,” such as 
Teodoro Agoncillo, Leopoldo Yabes, Salvador Lopez and Armando Malay, but also 
the young guns of the Philosophy department, under the guidance of Ricardo 
Pascual.176   
Believing that Legislature’s vengeful sanctions against him were beginning to 
harm the university, Palma eventually decided to step down. But not without leaving 
his legacy behind. At the height of his conflict with Quezon, Palma delivered a speech 
on academic freedom. Here, he evoked the idea of the free university, and explained 
that the right to academic freedom entitles the professor to inquire and express his 
views not only on the topic of study within the classroom, but on matters beyond those 
four walls and outside his field of expertise. More importantly, Palma passionately 
argued, in light of the controversy with Quezon, that the professor, who never ceases 
to be a citizen in spite of his academic position, must never be forbidden to speak on 
matters of politics. To do so would be destructive, and even suicidal; for it would mean 
depriving the nation of “that invigorating contact and influence upon politics of the 
                                                 
174 Churchill, “Palma’s Momentous Decade,” 186.  
175 Quoted from Philippine Herald, February 1933, in Churchill, “Palma’s Momentous 
Decade,” 180.  
176 Philosophy Professor Zosimo Lee, interview, 2010. 
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best portion of our sound citizenry which does not make of politics a profession,”177 
persons who, in supposedly being free from “political and social conventionalities,” 
could give good counsel in the midst of confusion and political discord. What was most 
inspiring, however, and clearly what captured the admiration and respect of a whole 
generation of intellectuals, was Palma’s call to exercise their right to academic 
freedom, no matter what the cost.  He says,  
If, by reasons of the exercise of a right that belongs to a professor or a citizen, 
the University is to suffer political persecution, then let it come. Persecutions 
are of transient nature but rights are permanent, and as such, those rights must 
be safeguarded to the end so that democratic principles and practices may 
endure forever in our land.178  
Futhermore, he states: 
Our academic immunity is so precious that no sacrifice is too big to preserve 
it pure and inviolate. If each professor cannot feel safe to proclaim what he 
considers the truth, because of fear of persecution or displeasure of the men in 
power, then truth would not come out from his lips or will totally be disfigured. 
And when that time comes, the University would be nothing more than a mere 
political agency of the men in power instead of becoming the citadel of 
learning, unafraid and forwardlooking in its sacred duty to reveal the naked 
truth as it is in its service to the State.179 
Palma’s speech was first published in the Philippine Social Science Review in 
1933, and more than twenty years later, at the height of U.P.‘s “religious war,” was 
reprinted in the 1957 special issue of The Philippine Collegian on Academic Freedom. 
This issue, prepared and published under the advisership of Philosophy and Psychology 
Professor, Alfredo Lagmay, gathered essays written by students, members of the 
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Collegian’s editorial staff, prominent statesmen, as well as professors who were mostly 
members of an organization called The Society for the Advancement of Academic 
Freedom.180 
 
Delaney Rules  
For many, the real perpetrator was clearly none other than the Catholic Church, 
which was known to have successfully infiltrated the university campus through the 
U.P. Student Catholic Action (UPSCA). Under the guidance of the Jesuit chaplain, 
Father John Delaney, the UPSCA, whose sole purpose was to “[propagate] Catholic 
doctrine and practice,” alarmingly grew into an extensive and highly centralized 
network.181  While Delaney was seen by some as a charismatic man who had nothing 
but selfless intentions in building a community that nurtured the religious needs of the 
Catholic faithful,182 others saw him as a “meddler” who posed a grave threat to the state 
university’s non-sectarian tradition.    
Using a hazing incident that led to the death of a fraternity neophyte as pretext, 
Delaney rallied students and faculty members to demand the abolition of fraternities 
and sororities in campus.  The real objective, however, as some critics claimed, was 
“to clean student politics” and make way for UPSCA members to wrest power from 
                                                 
180 Elmer A. Ordoñez, “Memoirs of Diliman Country.”  
181  For the history of UPSCA, and the nature and breadth of its influence as an 
organization, see Lagmay, “The Attack on the State University,”14-24. Aside from 
having its own chapter in every unit and college in the University, the UPSCA 
prompted activities on a massive scale that no organization had ever known before.  In 
addition to its unsurpassable network of influence (an influence even far greater than 
that of U.P.’s leading fraternity) it was so carefully organized that no group had ever 
been as highly prepared for instant mobilization. Given its “collective strength” and 
influence, Lagmay alarmingly points out how such an organization can easily 
“[establish] a climate of opinion that could make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
dissenting or nonconforming views to express themselves.” This also explains why 
UPSCA has been so important to the Hierarchy, so much so that the latter and the 
Archbishop of Manila “had been persistently maneuvering,” appealing to President 
Ramon Magsaysay and Secretary of Education Gregorio Hernandez, “to get a UP 
President who would be sympathetic to the gains of UPSCA in the campus.”   
182  For a more sympathetic view of Fr. Delaney, see Oscar Evangelista, “Some 
Historical Notes on Father John P. Delaney, S.J. and His Student Welfare Ideas,” in 
Icons and Institutions, Essays on the History of the University of the Philippines 1952-
2000 (Quezon City: University of the Philippine Press, 2008), 1-24.  
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the “Greek-letter societies.” 183  To further secure control, Delaney also went on a 
crusade against U.P. professors suspected of being atheists and communists, by 
exposing them and sending students to their classes to spy and report on their religious 
beliefs. While he accused those who opposed him as intellectually dishonest, he 
labelled agnostics and atheists as intellectual cowards. As a charismatic man, it was 
easy for Delaney to convince his flock that there were anti-religious sentiments that 
were forcing a war on them.   
However, some people believed that Delaney’s interventions would not have 
been so invasive if it were not for the support of President Tan. It was no secret that 
Tan was UPSCA’s first faculty adviser while he was still the Dean of the College of 
Engineering, and would remain sympathetic to the Jesuit chaplain’s sectarian goals and 
aspirations during his presidential term. When U.P. transferred from the old Padre 
Faura campus to Diliman in 1949, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and followers of 
Iglesia ni Kristo all had to share the use of an interdenominational, old bamboo chapel. 
Tan’s predecessor, President Bienvenido Gonzalez, who was known to have 
“scrupulously observed the principle of separation of church and state,” maintained this 
arrangement to ensure that sectarian activities in the university were “under bounds.” 
Delaney campaigned for the construction of a separate Catholic chapel, but being no 
match for the strong-willed Gonzalez, was forced to wait for more favorable times, 
meanwhile gaining power and influence by infiltrating every unit in the university with 
an UPSCA chapter. In 1951, Gonzalez ran into conflict with Philippine president 
Elpidio Quirino and was forced to resign. Tan stepped in and the denominational 
chapels were finally built.184  
 
                                                 
183 Ordoñez, “Crisis in Diliman,” in Academic Freedom, 36. In 1956, the UPSCA 
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Tan’s Perennial Support  
Tan’s support, however, did not end there. His criticism of Pascual’s pedagogy, 
which he claims has made Symbolic Logic unreasonably difficult, was, in fact, 
prompted by Delaney’s own attacks against the philosophy professor for supposedly 
teaching atheism in his class.185 However, the most blatant demonstration of sectarian 
support that emboldened the chaplain and his lackeys was Tan’s proposal, again taking 
the cue from Delaney, to create a Department of Religion, which he formally proposed 
at a special convocation at the U.P. College of Liberal Arts in December, 1954. In this 
speech, which Yabes describes as the president’s “last and most desperate effort to 
destroy the secular nature of the University,” Tan redefines the meaning of U.P.’s 
constitutional foundation. In disputing the libertarian idea of the separation of church 
and state, he calls to attention the invocation at the preamble of the constitution: that 
the Filipino people “[implore] the aid of Divine Providence.”  It is therefore not only 
the recognition of the sovereignty of the people but also the belief in a Supreme Being 
that serves as the true foundation of what Tan calls “Our Philosophy of Education.” 
This philosophy, which he claims to be “truly reflective of our culture, our traditions 
and Christian heritage,” defines the raison d’être of U.P. “as an institution designed to 
cultivate the intellect along Christian principles.”  While students should not be 
compelled to accept this, Tan insists that all employees of the state are required to adopt 
this philosophy and therefore “teach within a framework of Christian values.” From 
this he concludes that “no professor has a right to teach atheism, nor to teach 
communism,” although one could teach about them for as long as he instructs “without 
indoctrination.”186 Ironically, in the same breath, he preaches sanctimonously on the 
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true value of education, insisting that it must “keep alive in young men the courage to 
dare to seek the truth, to be free.” But it is quite obvious that Tan’s idea of truth and 
way of life could never be anything else but Christian.  
Throughout the speech, Tan refrains from explicitly accusing the Philosophy 
professors, or anyone for that matter, for teaching the forbidden topics. But it is no 
accident that he ascribes to his idea of a proper education the status of a philosophy, a 
word which he says up until now had not been used by U.P.‘s own policy makers, either 
“out of modesty or out of a desire not to misuse the word.” And this he cleverly and 
subtley contrasts to the not-so-modest Philosophy department which, in failing to 
introduce to students “the whole tradition of philosophy,” has grossly misrepresented 
the truth about their own discipline. Tan complains: 
I can not for instance conceive of an adequate department of philosophy that 
does not have men belonging to and teaching different schools of 
philosophies—that is, if a man has to belong exclusively to one school and thus 
make it difficult for him to give a fair and objective treatment of the other 
schools. It is imperative that students be introduced meaningfully to the whole 
tradition of philosophy, for the philosophia perennis is the history of the 
growth of men’s minds and the consequent development of ideas.  It is an 
inadequate philosophy department which seeks to develop skill in reasoning 
on only one level of concept: on logical abstractions than on problems of 
thought based on the realities of everyday life. 
In invoking the term philosophia perennis, it is curious how Tan projects an 
idea of the philosophical tradition, in its entirety, not only as the universal heritage to 
which we all belong but as an objective, indiscriminate gathering of ideas that have 
supposedly endured the test of time.  Whether unwittingly or not, Tan somehow fails 
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to mention that the idea of philosophia perennis itself emerged at a particular historical 
moment, with a very specific motive.  
The philosophical phrase, which became popular in the 20th century and is 
often attributed to the eighteenth century German rationalist philosopher, Gottfried 
Leibniz, in fact goes back to the 1500s, to the Italian Augustinian, Agostino Steuco, 
and his predecessors. Their intention was to establish a continuity in the history of 
philosophy, and to identify the underlying theme as the search for the single, universal 
knowledge (sapientia).  Vera philosophia or “true philosophy” could only be one that 
“leads to piety and the contemplation of God,” and therefore, can be achieved through 
the study of the various religions which are seen as manifestations of that one truth.187  
It is therefore not surprising that after castigating the Philosophy Department for not 
only being inadequate but irrelevant, Tan would eagerly propose the creation of a 
Department of Religion that would provide instruction on systems of faith, which he 
argues constitute “an integral part of knowledge.”  
Perhaps in a different occasion or context, Tan’s suggestion would have been 
seen as a fairly reasonable proposal. However, in the light of recent events, it was 
perceived as yet another proof of sectarian encroachment.  In fact, Yabes claims that 
in the history of U.P., it had never known a more serious threat to its freedom and 
integrity than during Tan’s “theocratic era.”188 But what was it about this time that 
inflicted the greatest harm?   
Certainly, it was not the harassment that the liberals and independents had to 
suffer in refusing to endorse the proposal for a Religion department.189 Nor was it the 
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numerous transgressions of a chaplain enabled by the university president’s 
unconditional support.190  Rather, with the vision of a Christian state university, which 
was argued to be not only constitutional but reflective of Filipino heritage, Tan 
effectively encouraged the sectarians to push aggressively for their cause. Only with a 
pristine conscience did the sectarians conduct a systematic surveillance of professors 
suspected of anti-religious sentiments, which consequently spawned a general 
atmosphere of tension and distrust in the university. 
 The feeling of anxiety became so oppressive that it was, as Corpuz puts it, 
fashionable and even respectable for academics to bemoan their precarious condition. 
In “anticipating unfavorable consequences,” they felt justified in keeping their silence 
and staying clear of ideas deemed unpopular and subversive, lest they suffer 
persecution “by social stigma, or administrative disapproval, or by the loss of 
promotional opportunities in rank or pay.”191 But clearly it was they, who quietly 
preferred to “play it safe,” who were the real victims of this so-called religious war.  
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20, 1955, 1.    
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The threat, however, was far more real than the figment of a paranoia, and it 
grew increasingly so as Delaney’s campaign escalated into the McCarthyite witchunts 
in the early ‘60s.192 The persecution was real, especially for the Junior faculty members 
whose careers in Philosophy were unceremoniously aborted by some administrative 
decision; for Pascual, whose agnosticism had prompted young Christians claiming to 
be students and alumni of U.P. to circulate leaflets “exhorting all students to spy and 
report” against him;193 and for Professor of Zoology, Agustin Rodolfo, who because of 
his studies in the Soviet Union had found himself somehow “‘frozen’ in rank.”194 These 
were only some of the cases that would effectively serve as reminders of what could 
happen to scholars who expressed unpopular views.  
There was, however, amidst the fear, a “stubborn breed” of scholars who 
refused to accept that all freedom was lost. While knowing that the oppressive 
sanctions would eventually lead to the suppression of freedom, they were also certain 
that keeping silent would only expedite the “unhappy event.” Thus, in refusing to 
remain impotent and irrelevant in their respective intellectual cloisters, this group of 
intellectuals boldly decided to go public, forming The Society for the Advancement of 
Academic Freedom. It was the Society which, immediately after its inception in 
August, 1955, came out with a manifesto signed by a hundred and fifty nine faculty 
members and administration employees, condemning UPSCA for exerting “strong 
pressure towards conformity,” and creating “an atmosphere of tension, suspicion, and 
fear.” 195  And then again, in 1961, the Society protested against the witchhunt, 
criticizing CAFA for its misplaced zeal and demanding it to end an investigation that 
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was lacking in authentic evidence and unnecessarily harming the integrity of the 
University.196  
There was also, from the ranks of the students, a consolidated protest against 
the CAFA witchhunts. The Student Cultural Association of U.P. (SCAUP), under the 
leadership of Jose Maria Sison, was organized in 1951, initially with the single purpose 
of opposing the aggressions of UPSCA.    
 
Ricardo Pascual  
While friends and colleagues expressed their indignation in support of Pascual, 
the philosopher himself “preferred to fight alone.” Ordoñez recounts Pascual’s 
fearlessness in “opposing singlehandedly” in faculty meetings President Tan’s 
proposal to dissolve Symbolic Logic. It appeared that he was someone who never 
backed out from an intellectual brawl. This also explains why, contrary to those who 
looked nostalgically to better days and lamented the present loss of academic freedom, 
Pascual would claim that the CAFA investigation was in no way an infringement on 
his rights. A rather curious statement, coming from a man whose personal beliefs had 
just been singled out and deemed a scandalous impropriety, not to mention a pretext 
that legislators would exploit in demanding an investigation and amendment of the 
University curriculum. And as though that was not violative enough, there was also the 
suggestion of his immediate expulsion.197  
But if Pascual was unperturbed by the inquisition, or at least appeared to be, it 
was because he revelled in argumentation. Maybe not entirely for the sake of polemics, 
but because he believed and perceived himself to be a rational thinker, a man of 
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Enlightenment who took extreme pride in being guided by reason. But to use one’s 
reason—that is, to liberate onself from dogma, from what Kant called one’s “self-
incurred tutelage,” is to conjure a great deal of courage, a virtue that only truly emerges 
when one acts in the public sphere. It is, therefore, necessary for reason to be exhibited 
or demonstrated, even to flaunt its superiority over the cowardice, laziness, and 
immaturity that make the human mind so flawed and abhoringly inferior.  And Pascual, 
in a sincere effort to exemplify the rational man, was never wanting in such hubris—
or self-esteem, to put it positively.   
Indeed, if Pascual remained relatively unscathed by the investigations, it was 
because, in relation to his assailants, he perceived himself to be standing on a higher 
ground. He remarked, for instance, quite matter-of-factly how the cross-examinations 
made him feel “just like a professor, answering candidly the queries of [his] students.” 
And in response to the allegation that he was a communist, he merely scoffed at the 
incompetence of his critics, not only in noting that they failed to dig into his writings, 
in effect saying that their accusations were ungrounded and hastily conceived; but also 
in implying that they were barely in a position to judge him, reminding them that they 
had not even reflected on the issue or have accomplished a tenth of what he has written 
against communism, which clearly had no other aim but to strengthen democracy.198  
 
On the Idea of “Partyless Democracy” 
If one, indeed, looked closely at Pascual’s works, one would see that he was 
deeply concerned about the fate of democracy in the country. He observed how 
disillusionment had already begun to creep into the hearts of people, and how this could 
very well lead them “to swing to the other end.” But while the worst had not yet arrived, 
Pascual urged the people to recognize that a state of emergency existed in the here and 
now. This was why, in alluding to the Tower of Pisa, whose foundations were 
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reinforced only after it had leaned where it should not, Pascual in an emotional and 
agitated tone, asked: “need we wait for the Tower of Democracy to lean [far] out where 
it should not before we exert efforts to save it?”199   
In an effort to provide a solution to the crisis, Pascual published a book in 1952, 
entitled “Partyless Democracy,” where he sought to revive an idea which President 
Quezon proposed at a U.P. convocation in July, 1940. In this address, Quezon argued 
that the existence of political parties had only led to power struggles that have caused 
disunity and harm to the public good. Would it then not be beneficial to abolish the 
party system altogether, and instead encourage information and discussion that would 
lead to cooperation and effective governance? Quezon, however, was aware that it 
would not be easy to persuade people to see his point, for they had been inculcated with 
certain “fetishes,” making them believe for instance that a sound democracy can only 
arise from the strife between the majority and opposition parties, or that individual 
liberty must never be controlled. Everyone has learned to accept these as “gospel truth.” 
But trusting that the time was nigh for the Filipinos to do their own thinking, Quezon 
at the end of his speech posed the challenge to everyone “to study and master the 
philosophy of democracy,” in the hope that the Filipinos could finally make democracy 
their own.200  
With the beginning of the Second World War, Quezon’s idea was shelved, 
leading to a disruption in the debate that would have determined its destiny. Pascual 
believed that if only the discussion were allowed to take its natural course, public 
opinion would have undoubtedly endorsed the idea. A curious optimism for someone 
who himself had witnessed the “verbal battles” where Quezon’s theory was strongly 
opposed. People were wary of the president’s authoritarian tendencies, and critics 
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cautioned that the proposal was merely an excuse to suppress the Opposition and to 
advocate a one-party system.   
Pascual, however, had a different opinion. He admired Quezon for criticizing 
the evils of the party system, despite his success in partisan politics. From Pascual’s 
standpoint, Quezon’s proposal was nothing but a selfless gesture, “with only the 
objective of making Democracy more and more of, for, and by the people.” And to 
further illustrate the President’s honorable intentions, Pascual recounts how Quezon, 
in reply to the question of how his theory would be put into practice, argued that the 
abolition of political parties, which was at the heart of the idea of a partyless 
democracy, should never be achieved “through laws, or through legislation,” but “by 
force of public opinion.”  This meant a long, tedious process of educating the people, 
towards making the average citizen politically aware and involved in public issues. 
Only when people have achieved this maturity, Quezon explains, “can you do away 
with political parties.”201  
This answer, according to Pascual, “did not quite quiet the restlessness of the 
minds of his hearers.” And so, twelve years later, believing in the merits and 
reasonableness of the proposal, Pascual himself would resurrect Quezon’s idea to 
finally give it a proper defense.  But first, he de-mystifies the fetishes of democracy by 
exposing their essentialist claims as false. In doing so, he retrieves what is here often 
forgotten—that is, the historical, which unmasks all values claiming to be universal 
and eternal as transient products of the flows of time.  Drawing mainly from Maximo 
Kalaw’s work on The Development of Philippine Politics, Pascual gives an account of 
the birth and development of political parties in the Philippines, giving special attention 
to the Federal party. This party, which was the first political group to be established, 
was born under American sovereignty, which curiously was a time when democracy 
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did not yet exist in the country.  Furthermore, Pacual explains how this party served as 
a means to subdue revolutionary elements and persuade Filipinos to recognize the 
sovereignty of the colonial power. It was therefore not exactly the “avenue of 
expression of the liberties and freedom for which democracy is famous.”  After a 
parade of neatly arranged proofs, the philosopher finally goes in for the kill. He argues:  
It is manifestly false that where there are political parties there is, at once, 
democracy. From this it follows that it is also false that where there is no 
democracy there are no political parties…. Again, where there is democracy 
there are political parties may be true. From this, it does not follow that where 
there are no political parties there is no democracy….202  
While it is true that in some cases, the absence of political parties is due to a 
denial of the bill of rights, and therefore to an absence of democracy, it does not 
necessarily follow that in all cases where political parties do not exist, freedom is 
curtailed.  For as long as the people enjoy the freedom to speak, assemble, and worship, 
then democracy exists. In other words, the condition that makes democracy possible is 
not determined by the presence of political parties but by the bill of rights. 
Unfortunately, people fail to critically examine the beliefs into which they are 
indoctrinated. This leads them to commit a gross number of non-sequiturs, which as 
we have seen, results to the unjust condemnation of Partyless democracy as a 
contradiction in terms.   
 
The Logical Postivist  
 As a graduate student in the University of Chicago in the mid-1930s, Pascual 
had the opportunity to work with the British analytic philosopher, Bertrand Russell. At 
that time, one of the latest trends in philosophical studies was Logical Positivism, a 
movement in which Russell was one of the leading proponents. It was no surprise that 
Pascual, fresh from his doctoral studies, came back to the Philippines spreading the 
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“gospel” of postivism, which in practical terms meant the application of the cold and 
scientific method of symbolic logic. For Pascual, however, it was not merely a fad. In 
analyzing socio-political issues, and observing people’s predisposition to fall into 
dogmatic slumber, Pascual earnestly believed, contrary to President Tan’s opinion, that 
Symbolic Logic was not only relevant but indispensable to solving the crises of our 
times.  
 As a logical positivist, Pascual understood philosophy as an activity whereby 
propositions could be proven to be either true or false. With verification as the goal, 
facts naturally become of prime importance. This helps to explain why our philosopher, 
when asked if he believed in God, replied nonchalantly that “he had little respect for 
‘belief’ because of its ‘instability;’”203 or when asked if he was an agnostic, confessed 
shamelessly saying, “I know nothing,” words that resoundedly evoked the wisdom of 
Socratic irony.  As a positivist, Pascual simply regarded matters of faith as beyond the 
scope of proof, and therefore meaningless to philosophical inquiry.204 Unfortunately, 
people came to the “illogical conclusion” that our agnostic, in assuming a skeptical 
position towards the transcendental, was effectively denying the existence of God. In 
an attempt to correct this erroneous assumption, Pascual argues that agnosticism, far 
from being a fixed proposition, is “an attitude based on scientific probings.” In light of 
insufficient evidence, an agnostic would suspend judgment but never bring his search 
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to an end.  In fact, he adds, “he is an ‘unfortunate’ agnostic who stops in his pursuits.”205 
But regardless of the conclusion that one reaches at the end, Pascual believed that the 
freedom of religion that our Constitution clearly provides must also allow people the 
freedom to have no religion. 
Needless to say, philosophy, as far as Pascual conceived it, was far from merely 
being a mental exercise of proving. Again, in contrast to what Tan claimed, the 
professors of the U.P. Philosophy department did encourage the study of different 
ideologies, including communism, with the intention to provide “a comparative study” 
that would “broaden the intellectual horizon of the students.” In fact, in a radio 
interview, Pascual argued that “in order to love democracy more, the different, 
competing ideologies should be studied to their rock bottom.”206  
In reading Partyless Democracy, one is impressed by the traces of Marxist 
philosophy, in which Pascual most certainly did not merely dabble out of curiosity.  
While he faithfuly advocated democracy to the end, one could see that he wrestled with 
the challenges of Marxism, and at times found inspiration in its ideals for his own 
construction of a “New Democracy.”  Condemning the social inequalities that plagued 
the present system, he distinguished the old form of democracy from the new one, 
which “post Marx, cannot be indifferent to the silent moans and wails of the exploited 
teeming millions.” 207  It was precisely this economic tension between classes that 
partyless democracy could help to alleviate, and hopefully before a class struggle erupts 
and ensures proletarian dictatorship.  
Pascual asserts that in a partyless democracy, where political parties are 
abolished, the State would no longer be caught in the power struggle of groups and 
institutions competing for vested interests and political supremacy. Under the system 
of partisan/geographical representation, we have seen time and again how political 
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parties “destroy each other” in wrangling for constituent votes, leading “to the neglect 
of the welfare of the people.” To avoid this, Pascual proposes occupational 
representation, where representatives of each group will only be elected by members 
belonging to that particular group. In this electoral system, farmers, for instance, would 
never campaign against fisherman, as “their candidates are not competing for the same 
votes.” And even if there were several candidates vying for votes within a group, 
election would be based not on parties or personalities but on principles. In other words, 
voters in their respective group will inevitably elect the representative “who can best 
give them what they need.”208  Furthermore, because “different occupations have no 
ground of competition with one another,” and in fact are “mutually dependent upon the 
good of every other occupation,” this political set-up would most likely lead not to 
factions and antagonism but to greater cooperation and unity.209 Pascual also argued 
that since this “New Democracy” would no longer be based on individual liberty but 
social control and planning, it would allow the State to encourage “not production for 
profit but production for consumption. . .[and] not only by those who can afford but 
basically by those who do not have.”210 For these reasons, Pascual concluded that 
partyless democracy was the means by which social welfare and justice could be 
achieved.   
Whether Pascual was right, or naive, is a matter that could be studied more 
carefully on another occasion. However, there is no doubt that in his earnest attempt to 
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redeem democracy from its reified state, Pascual identified a more serious fetish than 
those that Quezon had long identified. For what lay at the heart of the problem that led 
not only to the decay of democracy but to people’s disillusionment with it, was 
democracy’s reification into res publica, “a state of affairs concomitant with the 
passive consent of the people.”  In other words, people had somehow forgotten that the 
real foundation of a democracy could be “nothing less than the active participation” of 
its constituents. 211  Instead, they assumed that democracy was a given, and were 
disillusioned precisely because they failed to see the gap that naturally existed between 
what democracy promises and what it can actually deliver. As Pascual cleverly puts it, 
the “great implication of [our] democracy” is  
not that we have the cake and we want to eat it, but that we want to eat a cake, 
hence we must prepare it. The test of the pudding is in the eating; but no 
amount of wishing can make us test what we have not. Let us make the pudding 
to our heart’s content.212  
While it seems that the idea of partyless democracy never caught on, Pascual 
has been compared to a few distinguished people in Asia who have equally critiqued 
the Western democratic tradition and helped conceive “a new concept of democracy” 
that was not only faithful and suitable to Asian culture and needs but what could give 
a real alternative to the political structures of the West and of Soviet Russia. This 
includes the Indian Member of Parliament Shriman Agarwal, whose idea of a Gandhian 
Constitution was based on the concept of “decentralised democracy,” as well as 
Indonesian president Sukarno, whose idea of “Guided Democracy” emphasized strong 
leadership inspired by the “family principle” of an “Indonesian Democracy of ancient 
times.”213   
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Pascual’s Intellectual Hero 
Aside from being accused of being a communist, Pascual, as we have 
mentioned, was also depicted as a threat to the Filipino way of life. Not only for being 
an agnostic who denied “our Catholic tradition,” but also, as President Tan pointed out, 
for teaching a philosophical method so foreign that it was obscure and irrelevant to the 
life of his own students. 
Curiously, critics have failed to mention that Pascual was not merely a logical 
positivist; in fact, throughout his career as an academic, he was first and foremost a 
scholar and avid follower of the Filipino national hero, Jose Rizal. While he 
emphasized the importance of Symbolic Logic to philosophical inquiry, and therefore 
recognizing his intellectual indebtedness to Bertrand Russell, Pascual attributed to 
Rizal “the primary position of intellectual leadership in the country.”  
 It would be worth pondering why Pascual, at the height of the CAFA 
investigation, did not simply demand for academic freedom, as many of his colleagues 
did. Instead, he urged Filipinos to study Rizal’s thoughts and beliefs, and to use this 
wisdom to understand present problems.   From the excerpts he quotes from Rizal’s 
correspondence with the Jesuit priest, Father Pastells, one can see why Pascual, being 
a rationalist, revered the Ilustrado from Calamba, Laguna, even claiming him to be “the 
greatest of the Filipino heroes.”  For even amidst the discouragements and criticisms 
of fellow Ilustrados, Rizal persisted in his endeavors to awaken his fellowmen to the 
deplorable reality of their existence and to a consciousness of a Filipino nation. In 
openly criticizing the abuses and transgressions of the religious orders, Rizal exposed 
the fallibility of the Church, an institution like any other, wrought by human passions 
and errors. But his critique was not out of spite but from his love for humanity. In 
hoping to free his people from the dogmatic impositions of the Church, Rizal equally 
emphasized the importance of self-esteem, urging everyone to “look at his own affairs 
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through the prism of his own judgment and self-love.” “Like the sap that drives the tree 
skyward in search of the sun,” self-love was for Rizal not the nonsensical vanity that 
Father Pastells had claimed it to be, but “the greatest good that God has given to man 
for his perfection and integrity.”214 And it was precisely in the hope of inculcating this 
self-love that Rizal, according to Pascual, was prompted to study records of the past, 
making corrections and adding commentaries and explanations of Antonio de Morga’s 
Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, not only to temper prejudiced remarks, but to provide a 
clear picture to his Filipino readers, who unfortunately no longer knew their origins, of 
the culture and achievements of their ancestors, so that “they might take pride in 
accepting their descent from them.”215 In consecrating his life, as well as his death, to 
the freedom of his people and to the struggle against obscurantism, Pascual places Rizal 
in the pantheon of Enlightened free thinkers and philosophers, such as Galileo Galilei, 
Voltaire, and Thomas Paine, who have all equally suffered persecution for their 
beliefs.216   
But it was not just Rizal and these honorable men who have fallen and suffered 
in the name of truth.  The CAFA trial was a reenactment of the Inquisition, and this 
time, it was Pascual’s turn at the stake. It would not be difficult to imagine that our 
philosopher perceived his persecution not in terms of an infringement of his academic 
freedom but as the logical outcome, and more importantly, the consummation of his 
own struggle to bear witness to truth.   
Throughout his academic career, one can see how Pascual looked up to Rizal 
for intellectual inspiration. Not only did he, in declaring publicly his agnosticism, strive 
as a scholar to look at life “through the prism of his own judgment,” but as a teacher, 
sought to impart the same virtue to his students. While he himself strongly believed in 
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democratic ideals, it was never enough to simply provide an encomium of democracy. 
In teaching a whole spectrum of thought, caring little to avoid what was considered 
taboo, he tried to give his students their inherent right to choose the ideology they 
thought was best.217 But more importantly, for Pascual, philosophical instruction was 
never merely a parade of universal concepts. Again, following the wisdom of Rizal, 
Pascual urged Filipinos to examine their own historical heritage, to recognize their own 
intellectual lineage and to understand that their present struggles are born out of a 
particular configuration of time and circumstances. And for this, Rizal’s works 
provided perfectly the history and social analysis that were crucial to understanding 
who we are as a people and what we have been fighting for.  
Naturally, Pascual regarded it as a serious impediment that people were 
ignorant of Rizal’s writings. It is because of this ignorance “that many do not and 
cannot acknowledge the national hero’s singular leadership,” 218  and to bring the 
implications further, why we constantly find ourselves caught in the same deplorable 
situation that Rizal was in decades ago. But while the situation seemed bleak, Pascual 
was also undeniably an optimist. Being a rationalist, there was no doubt in his mind 
that with proper education, people would inevitably see, through the light of their own 
reason, that Rizal was indeed their intellectual leader. If only people dug into Rizal’s 
writings,  and similarly, into his own, these witchhunts would not have occurred.   
 
Rizal Beyond the Grave 
 Obviously, Pascual was wrong. There were some people who did read Rizal’s 
writings, but instead of regarding him as their intellectual leader, took offense at his 
anti-clerical views.  They were willing to honor Rizal as their national hero, but with 
the condition that his criticism be tempered, in the hope of presenting him as an ally of 
the Church.   
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 On May 18, 1935, just a month before Rizal’s birth anniversary, a document 
was discovered by Father Manual Gracia, lying in the vault of the Archbishop of 
Manila. It was, so it was claimed, the “original” of Rizal’s retraction of his anti-
Catholic writing and Masonic affiliation. Understandably, people were skeptical: why 
was the document withheld from Rizal’s family after his execution? And from the time 
that the editorial staff of El Renacimiento in December 29, 1908 noted that “reliable 
persons... had gone to the Archive of the Archbishop’s Palace in order to look for this 
document [retraction]” and found nothing, why did the document resurface only now, 
after “a span of about 26 years?”219 To all this, the response was simply that the 
document was “providentially misplaced.”   
With the document lying all this time at the “providential vault,” and having 
been brought to light at that “providential hour,” Pascual remarks how it all seemed to 
him “too ‘providential’ all the way through.” Thus, on November 15th, 1935, only a 
few months after that strange discovery, Pascual came out with his book, entitled Dr. 
Jose Rizal Beyond the Grave. By applying “scientific technique and method,” Pascual 
analyzes the document in question, in the hope of proving whether Rizal’s retraction 
was genuine or not.  
When the document was first discovered, there were some who argued, in the 
hope of persuading the public, that the retraction was not to be taken as a defamation 
of Rizal as a National Hero.  A “thought-provoking opinion,” Pascual remarked, for 
not only is half of Rizal’s writing about religion but that the greatness of this man, who 
was “not merely a martyr who died by force but principally a thinker,” lies not only in 
his death but in his work, his words and actions.220 Seeing that everything was at stake, 
it was not only clear to Pascual that the matter could not be taken lightly, but that 
the whole controversy was “a frame up and a foul scheme of some of [Rizal’s] enemies 
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who [did] not want the name, work, and spirit of the Martyr to move his People.”221 
Thus, in an attempt to redeem his hero from this injustice and terrible disgrace, Pascual 
summons Rizal from the grave as it were, presenting his life and work in hoping to 
awaken and remind people of his spirit and greatness. With a clear objective, Pascual 
poetically writes,  
It is not our purpose here to disturb those who are asleep, principally Dr. José 
Rizal (requiescat in pace), but paradoxically to awaken those who are awake 
so that those who are asleep may not be disturbed. A paradox that is all the 
more necessary, because of the present confusion among the living about the 
dead. The only and best way out of such a confusion is to make the dead live 
in their immortal thoughts that speak silently but very effectively to the 
understanding of those who can and want to understand.222  
Without any formal training in graphology, (and perhaps armed only with the 
resolve of a man that has become exasperated with what he perceived as a fabrication 
of “proofs”), Pascual boldly engages a study of the document, comparing the 
penmanship in the retraction document and the handwriting in letters Rizal had written 
during that time. Comparing the degree of slants, and identifying “the unnatural stops 
and pen lifts” in the signature, Pascual concludes that the writer of the retraction 
document, “was not writing continuously.” From these moments of hesitation, which 
betrays a lack of “careless abandon,” Pascual infers that the writer was a forger. Quite 
understandably, critics have tried to discredit Pascual, noting that he is “not a 
recognized authority in this field,” and that the document, if it be analyzed, must be 
done by no less than “a board of handwriting experts of unquestionable standing.”223 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, his scholarship, which was seen to exude sharpness and 
audacity, have earned him the respect of prominent scholars of his time.    
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For the skeptical reader who is dissatisfied with Pascual’s handwriting 
analysis, the next chapters of the book may perhaps be considered more tenable. Here, 
Pascual further makes his argument, analyzing the veracity and plausibility of Rizal’s 
retraction by examining the Martyr’s life and his entire corpus, and in the process, lays 
bare the inconsistencies he finds. For instance, how could Rizal, who encouraged self-
esteem and self-judgment, and was clearly against dogmatism insist, even voluntarily 
insert in his retraction the statement that Catholicism was the religion in which he was 
“born and educated?”  While Father Vicente Balaguer, the priest who administered the 
retraction, claims that it was Rizal’s way of making his Catholic education known, 
Pascual finds such explanation preposterous, and thus replies:  
That [Rizal] was “educated in the Catholic religion” was factually true, if we 
are talking of and referring to Rizal, the young and adolescent student, this 
young man who remained and died like a young man only, who was not true 
to Rizal’s life. But if we are talking of and referring to Rizal who left 
Catholicism fourteen years before his execution in 1896 and who was educated 
in the free atmosphere of the civilized world, it follows that such a phrase was 
not true to facts, facts that could not now be altered, unless we want to invent 
bedtime stories and not to record events. I just wonder if Rizal forgot his own 
life history, principally the best years of his life, at the time that he was said to 
be writing that phrase which he himself inserted voluntarily. Because it was 
not the truth and we could not expect Rizal to write something that was not 
true, I cannot believe that Rizal inserted that phrase.224  
 To further build his case, Pascual, comporting himself like a defense lawyer in 
court, then “[calls] for a witness the sister of Dr. Rizal, Miss Trinidad Rizal.”  Unlike 
the people summoned to testify to Rizal’s retraction, who he points out were, quite 
suspiciously, “all priests,” Pascual establishes the credibility of his star witness as one 
                                                 
224 Pascual, Rizal Beyond the Grave, 45.  
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who “does not belong to any sectarian organization,” and who therefore has no other 
interest but to serve the truth. The interview with Trinidad took place on August 17, 
1935, “in the presence of Mr. Guillermo Tolentino as a witness,” but in playfully 
evoking a court case, Pascual provides a transcription of the conversation, presenting 
her statements “in the form of cross-examination.”  Through Trinidad’s testimony, 
Pascual shows, “by way of disproofs,” that Rizal never expressed his desire to retract, 
nor mentioned his intention to marry Josephine Bracken. The latter, being an explicit 
request to be granted the sacrament of marriage, has been argued as proof that a 
retraction must have taken place. But Pascual finds it all too strange that Rizal would 
retract, according to the notarial statement of a certain Father Luis Viza y Marti, on the 
morning of December 29, 1896, but did not say a single word about it to his sister, 
Trinidad, who visited him later that evening.  
Faithful to the rules of a court proceeding, Pascual then summons a Professor 
of Psychology as an expert witness who would show through a psychological study 
how Rizal’s conversion was not plausible. Furthermore, he exposes the “absence of 
reliable records and genuine circumstantial evidence,” and reminds us of the Church’s 
history of “pious frauds,” putting to doubt the credibility of the Jesuit priest Father Pio 
Pi’s claim, in his book La Muerte Cristiana del Doctor Rizal, that the Martyr’s 
retraction was an “historical fact.”  
But while painstakingly discrediting the document and every possible 
argument raised in support of the retraction, Pascual himself is not satisfied with simply 
laying out the facts, or the lack thereof.  Towards the end of the book, he engages a 
discussion of Rizal’s convictions, believing that a study of the controversy would not 
be complete without an examination of the philosophical content of the hero’s works.   
When the mysterious document first went public, varying opinions were raised. 
There were some who entertained the possibility that Rizal, in hoping to be complaisant 
to his old professors or to save his family from further persecution was persuaded to 
recant. Others, however, dismissed the retraction as completely bogus, refusing to 
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believe that their great hero, given his manly character, could be coerced to do anything 
against his will.  Pascual himself did not and could not, at least before the act of 
proving, totally dismiss the idea of a retraction under duress, pointing out that the 
Martyr had to succumb to his own forced death, despite his protests and claim of 
innocence.  But he was equally aware, and rather alarmed, that members of the Church 
were not satisfied in proving that Rizal forcibly recanted; the retraction had to appear 
as nothing less than what Father Pio Pi called a real conversion, a “marked ‘change of 
heart.’” And this was why, according to Pascual, it was not enough to show that Rizal’s 
old teachers prevailed over him, fearing that such retraction would appear merely as a 
kind of appeasement.  No, it had to be Father Balaguer, the Jesuit missionary who was 
with Rizal in Dapitan, who, in the end, was able to convince the great Martyr to 
sacrifice his self-love to God, and “although it would be contrary to the voice of [his] 
reason, [to] ask from God the grace of faith.”225 Through a depiction of a man crying 
and refusing to be condemned eternally, Father Balaguer demonstrates how Rizal 
converted “from being a ‘heretic rationalist and free-thinker’ to being ‘a faithful son of 
Catholicism.’” And only through such narrative, Pascual argues, could members of the 
Church show that the retraction was not forced but “morally and religiously valid.”226  
To strip Rizal of reason and reduce him to a servile follower of the Catholic 
Church—this was, for Pascual, the greatest injustice:   
Because Dr. Jose Rizal was principally a thinker, a philosopher, and an 
educator who paved his way to Martyrdom not through rocket shooting, nor 
opportunism, but by thinking and philosophizing to the best of human reason 
and judgment he was endowed with—thinking and philosophizing that earned 
him enemies, enemies who executed him, and execution that crowned his work 
                                                 
225 Fr. Vicente Balaguer’s notarial testimony on August 8, 1917, quoted in Pascual, 
Rizal Beyond the Grave, 81.  
226 Pascual, Rizal Beyond the Grave, 56.  
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and made his already beloved name dearer still to the hearts of his sincere 
countrymen and enlightened people of the world.  
What better way then to redeem the honor of a philosopher than to uphold and make 
known the ideas he lived and died for?   
In discussing Rizal’s philosophical convictions, Pascual demonstrates how the 
great Martyr consistently declared himself a rationalist throughout his life, not only in 
the letters he had written to Father Pastells, but also in Father Balaguer’s own testimony 
of the alleged retraction. In the letters, one could see that while Rizal was a man who 
clearly had faith in God, he believed not in the revelation found in the Sacred Scriptures 
but “in that living revelation of Nature that surrounds us everywhere,” which reflected 
divine goodness and wisdom more than any book, parchment or temple could. 227 
Furthermore, Rizal could not have been more critical of the dogmas of the Church.  He 
fearlessly disputed, for example, the infalliblity of the Church’s authority, stating that 
while it is “an institution more perfect than others,” it very much remains “human to 
the end, with the defects, errors, and vicissitudes of the works of men.” And in 
demonstrating one of its major flaws, Rizal questioned the doctrine of redemption, 
objecting to the belief that “Christ was the only Redeemer of humanity from sin and its 
punishment,”228 and that before His coming, people were “[in] profound hell.” 
But despite such convictions, would it not have been possible that Rizal, 
fearing his death, retracted in order to save his soul? Certainly, Pascual would not allow 
it; for Rizal had a clear sense of his life-ideal, and struggled throughout his entire life 
to impart to his countrymen that “little of light” which he had found, the light which 
Pascual believes refers to the “rationalist and scientific principles” that opposed 
“narrow dogmatism.”229 But even in Father Balaguer’s own story, corroborated by 
Father Pio Pi, we find Rizal, now with the knowledge of his imminent execution, 
                                                 
227 Jose Rizal’s fourth letter to Father P. Pastells, April 4, 1893, quoted in Pascual, Rizal 
Beyond the Grave, 111.  
228 Pascual, Rizal Beyond the Grave, 126.  
229 Pascual, Rizal Beyond the Grave, 87.  
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declaring, with absolute resolve, that “he was guided by the reason that God had given 
him... [and] that as such he would go before the Tribunal of God, tranquil for having 
complied with the duty of a rational man.”   Considering that Rizal’s conscience was 
“a peaceful and tranquil sea of oil,” amidst “the raging storm of persecution,” Pascual 
asks in vexation, “What then was the conversion for?”  And considering that Rizal was 
one who not only reflected on ideas carefully before accepting them as his own, but 
believed earnestly that “a man ought to die for his duty and his conviction”—is it really 
possible that he would be easily convinced to take back what he had said and done, and 
thus retract?  “No! A thousand times no!” Pascual exclaims. Rizal would have “to rise 
from his grave and descend so low so as to make that retraction a genuine one.”230  
 
The Controversial Book Review 
 
 
                                                 
230 Pascual, Rizal Beyond the Grave, 176.  
Illustration 2: Teodoro Agoncillo’s controversial book review of Pascual’s Dr. Jose Rizal 
Beyond the Grave. 
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But what became of Pascual’s polemical work?  We know that a second edition 
was published in 1950, and the author himself explains that the reprinting was 
prompted not so much by the desire to correct the material defects of the first edition 
but by a “revival of interest” in the controversy of Rizal’s retraction. He was here 
referring to Rafael Palma’s prize-winning biography of Rizal, whose chapter on the 
retraction makes reference to Pascual’s graphological study. With teeming pride, 
Pascual cannot resist inserting his English translation of Palma’s chapter in the 
appendix of the latest edition of his book.231  
Not everyone, however, was pleased with Palma’s biography. Pascual notes in 
his preface how the Catholics have zealously opposed not only the use of taxpayers’s 
money to purchase the English translation by Justice Roman Ozaeta of Palma’s work232 
but also the proposal to make the book a required reading for High School students.  
While the Catholic bishops have made it clear that they are not demanding the ban of 
Palma’s book, they denounced its “unfounded accusations against the Jesuit Fathers” 
as part of an anti-Catholic and masonic propaganda.233   
But such controversy was not the first of its kind, and it was certainly not the 
last. Aside from Pascual who, as we have elaborately explained, was castigated through 
the witchhunts of 1961, Senator Claro M. Recto would equally find himself condemned 
and labelled an anti-Catholic communist by members of the Hierarchy when he 
authored and urged the passing of the Rizal bill in the mid-1950s. The Rizal bill, which 
proposed to make the unexpurgated versions of Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo 
a compulsory reading in the tertiary level, was deemed “as in the case of a certain 
biography of Rizal,” a discrimination against the Catholics in the country.234  
                                                 
231 Pascual, Rizal Beyond the Grave, 187-197.  
232 Palma’s book, in its original Spanish, was simply entitled The Biography of Rizal. 
It was Justice Ozaeta who, in translating the work into English, gave the title Pride of 
the Malay Race.  
233 See “Joint Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on the Book The 
Pride of the Malay Race,” January 6, 1950. From 
http://www.cbcponline.net/documents/1950s/1950-malay_race.html. 
234 “Statement of the Philippine Hierarchy on the Novels of Dr. Jose Rizal,” April 21, 
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What Pascual fails to mention, however, was that there was another telling 
incident in relation to his book. Just a few weeks after its publication, Teodoro 
Agoncillo, who had just graduated with a bachelor’s degree in philosophy and was then 
virtually unknown—and who would later become a well-known Filipino historian—
wrote a review of Pascual’s work, praising the author not just for his astounding logic 
but for presenting an analysis so thorough, “to the extent,” he quips, “of almost 
breaking the microscope in the Geology Department.”  Aside from a few criticisms, 
the review was mostly a reiteration of some of Pascual’s arguments, but with 
occasional, blasphemous references to the connivance of the Church and the devil.  The 
irreverent Agoncillo did not only call the forger “a devil and not a true minister of 
God,” but also argued that it could only have been the “providential devil” who placed 
the document in the Archive. Furthermore, picking up on Pascual’s statement on the 
Church’s history of pious frauds, Agoncillo cites more examples of these forgeries and 
bitterly remarks: 
When the Church’s interests are at stake its so-called ministers do everything 
within their power to attain its end. Satan must be served, not God, for the sake 
of faith! That’s Catholicism. Parenthetically, Catholicism is not Catholic.235  
 Two weeks later, a certain Atilano Salvo wrote an article in response, 
reviewing Agoncillo’s review.236 Calling attention to the fact that Agoncillo was not 
only a co-member of the Filipiniana, a group which Pascual had founded, but also 
“partisan on this question of the retraction,” Salvo points out why the author of the 
review could not be impartial, thus failing to provide a real critique of Pascual’s book. 
In fact, the review, Salvo asserts, is at best a summary. And to make it worse, Agoncillo 
                                                 
1956. From http://www.cbcponline.net/documents/1950s/1956-novels_of_rizal.html. 
235 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, “‘Mr. Pascual’s Dr. Jose Rizal Beyond The Grave’ or A 
Vindication of the Martyr of Bagumbayan (A Psychological and Historical Appraisal),” 
The Philippine Collegian, December 19, 1935, 9.   
236 Atilano Salvo, “Reviewing a Review (Being an Answer to Teodoro A. Agoncillo’s 
Article, ‘Psychological and HIstorical Appraisal’),” The Philippine Collegian, January 
6, 1936, 4-5.  
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fails irresponsibly in distinguishing his opinions from those of the author of the book, 
making it appear as though the ideas were all his. In addition to this serious charge of 
careless, if not intentional plagiarism, Salvo argues how Agoncillo’s review, if one 
were to assess it as a summary, is equally misleading. For while Pascual does mention 
that forgeries occur in the Catholic Church, Agoncillo hyperbolizes this claim to large 
proportions, asserting how such dishonest practice is committed by the Hierarchy as a 
rule of thumb, “to strengthen her position and to establish a precedence of power over 
the existence of the imperio in impera.”  
 Whether Agoncillo was merely making the implications of Pascual’s 
arguments more explicit or indeed using the review inappropriately in a personal tirade 
against the Church remains a topic for an exciting debate. Salvo’s scathing review, 
which nonetheless was a fine and sound rebuttal, must have effectively convinced 
people to question Agoncillo’s judgments, so much so that another review—a “proper” 
one—of Pascual’s book, had to be made. Written by the Vice-President of the same 
club (Filipiniana) which Pascual founded and to which allegedly Agoncillo belonged, 
the review was published a week after Salvo’s article came out.237 But because the 
review criticizes Pascual not merely for his lack of expertise in handwriting analysis 
but also for his biases against the Catholic Church, everyone seemed to have been 
finally appeased and no “counter reviews” followed.  
However, the repercussions of the controversial review did not end with 
Salvo’s critique. While the Editor-in-Chief was suspended from classes for a week, the 
Managing Editor was “severely reprimanded.” It appears though that behind the 
disciplinary action was in fact a Columban priest by the name of Father E.J. McCarthy, 
who demanded that controversial matters be prevented from “seep[ing] into the 
                                                 
237 Jose Ramirez, “A Brief Review of Mr. Pascual’s Dr. Jose Rizal Beyond the Grave,” 
The Philippine Collegian, January 13, 1936, 4.  
 130 
columns of the university paper in the future,” particularly those that offend the 
Catholic community.238  
 
Father McCarthy 
Curiously, as one looks at Father McCarthy’s involvement in University 
affairs, one cannot help but feel a sense of dèjá vu. Like Delaney in the 1950s, 
McCarthy preached in lecture halls and meetings of the Scholastic Philosophy club on 
the Foundations of Morality, deploring the growing problem of immorality in 
Philippine society and condemning the professors who he blames are teaching the 
wrong principles. One book he severely denounced was a textbook by Professor 
Macaraig, entitled “Social Problems,” which McCarthy claims has “at least twenty-two 
passages… which are a direct attack against Catholic preachings and morals.” 239 
Apparently, there were others on his black list, and McCarthy bragged that he had 
sufficient evidence to have four professors dismissed and that there were three other 
faculty members who must take extreme caution in teaching “anti-Catholic” tenets. He 
threatened that if these professors did not “clean house,” he would bring the case before 
the Board of Regents, and if that fails, “write a report to the fourteen Catholic bishops 
in the Philippines” who in turn will instruct all priests to conduct “anti-U.P. sermons… 
from the pulpit all over the Islands.”  To assure compliance, McCarthy also swore that 
an “espionage system” in the University would be established, “by enrolling students 
in the classes of the professors suspected of ‘misbehaviour.’” 240 From this, it appears 
that Delaney was simply following a tradition and that the witchhunts really began long 
before the 1960s.    
                                                 
238 “Dean Espiritu Takes Disciplinary Action on Publication of Retraction Review,” 
The Philippine Collegian, January 6, 1936, 1 and 8.  
239 “Fr. McCarthy Condemns University Textbook,” The Philippine Collegian, January 
13, 1936, 1.  
240  “Anti-U.P. Propaganda is McCarthy’s Latest Stunt,” The Philippine Collegian, 
January 20, 1936, 8.  
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Unfortunately, we do not know for certain if Pascual made it to the McCarthy 
list. What we do know, however, is that around this time, there was news that the 
teaching contract of the Indian scholar and Head of the Philosophy Department, Dr. 
Dhirendra Nath Roy, was not renewed, and was therefore going to be forced to leave 
the University by the end of that school year.  Having served the University since 1928, 
we can assume that Pascual and Agoncillo, both students of philosophy, which was 
then a very small department, were taught by Roy, or at the very least knew the 
professor.   
In an interview, Roy himself explains that the non-renewal of his contract 
might have been prompted by “the displeasure of certain elements in the Philippines 
and the University” at his criticisms against the friars of the country. Justifying himself, 
Dr. Roy explains, “I based my work on researches from documents and the works of 
Rizal. And after I found what I found, I simply couldn’t be very nice to them.”241 
 Roy was here referring to the book he published in 1930, entitled The 
Philippines and India. In the preface, he explains how he got inspired upon hearing the 
news that the Philippine Teachers’ Federation was sending distinguished Filipinos for 
a visit to India. He thought that this could be “the beginning of the end of a long cultural 
isolation” caused and enforced by colonialism between these two nations, and that it 
would be the perfect opportunity to write a book that, in remembering their ancient 
connection, could very well “foster self-confidence and self-respect.” 242  
Unfortunately, the plan for the expedition was dropped, and Roy, being profoundly 
discouraged, admits that he would have abandoned the project if not for President 
Palma who encouraged him to see it through.  
At the very beginning, Roy makes it clear that he is writing in protest to “a 
crime against humanity”—a crime that “force[s] an alien civilization upon a people in 
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total disregard of its past,” and dehumanizes them into “mere automatons.”243 He was 
alluding to the evils of Spanish colonialism, which did not only brainwash the Filipinos 
into submitting to “Castilian supremacy,” but in unleashing a form of “theocratic 
feudalism,” had let loose a “whole gang of most insolent friars to garrote ruthlessly all 
hope of native originality and independent thinking.”244 One could easily see how such 
statement could have gotten Roy into trouble. But what the Indian professor failed to 
mention in the interview was that he was equally critical of the new American masters 
who, “with their democratic persuasion backed by the logic of the bayonet,”245 were 
not really any better than there colonial predecessors. For it seemed that despite the 
Jones Law of 1916, which promised Philippine independence upon the establishment 
of a stable government, the Americans have always been finding excuses to prolong 
their sovereignty in the Islands, proving nothing but their insincerity.    
As part of the attempt to justify America’s continued presence, a series of 
articles began to appear in 1924, written by a certain Katherine Mayo. The series, which 
was entitled The Isles of Fear, was considered by the Filipinos as clearly “a campaign 
of racial prejudice,” which won the approval of the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Manila and was clearly intended to dissuade Members of Congress from supporting 
early Philippine independence.246  
It is in response to Mayo’s pejorative description of the Philippines as “The 
Isles of Fear” that Roy’s first chapter, as Palma tells us in his introduction to the book, 
is entitled “The Isles of Hope.”  For while Mayo portrays a very bleak picture of a race 
hopelessly inflicted by disease, poverty, and malnutrition, Roy describes for us the 
beautiful city of Manila, with “its wonderful sanitary arrangements… [and] sewerage 
system,” as an example for India and China to follow. And while Mayo depicts the 
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beastly, corrupt cacique and the individualist tao [literally, human, and here, 
specifically referring to the Filipino], and not to mention an entire Filipino race lacking 
in political will,247 Roy reminds us of the countless revolts that have repeatedly proven 
this people’s patriotism and desire for political freedom. “With all these movements, 
hopes, and ambitions,” it is no wonder, Roy quips, that Katherine Mayo portrayed the 
Philippines as the Isles of Fear. 
While Roy’s compassion towards the Filipinos is unmistakably genuine, one 
cannot deny that he had his own agenda. As an Indian philosopher, he inevitably 
understood the Filipinos in relation to his own people, who have suffered the same fate 
of colonial aggression and whose face continue to be “blackened by the cruel hands of 
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support for the Filipino missions to appeal their case to the U.S. Congress. While a sum 
was indeed successfully raised, out of the pockets of “poor Juan,” Mayo exposes the 
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Manuel Roxas, Sergio Osmeña, and Rafael Palma. See Katherine Mayo, “Nameless 
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the students were not mere puppets, and knew exactly what they wanted. See Roy, 
Philippines and India, 16-18).     
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Western prejudice.”248  Consequently, he was not preaching national consciousness but 
a “Malayan Renaissance” that emphasized an “awakening of the East.”  And in this 
turning from the West to the East, India was crucial as “the source” of an ancient past, 
and an exemplar for Filipinos to follow. Roy writes, 
Do we not see that this beautiful land of the Philippines this “gem of the Orient 
sea” with its only three centuries of Spanish rule, had to go so far as to disown 
people’s ancestral names, to graft a Western Castile in its extremely Oriental 
heart? Do we not see that the Western hysteria of speed and progress is fast 
depriving it of its natural sympathy for things Oriental and is successfully 
creating a mentality to be almost ashamed of itself? And yet India has not 
yielded.  
Despite the misfortunes and foreign aggressions, the Hindus have remained steadfast 
towards their ideal and civilization.  
 To give him his due, Roy did not only speak of the Indian poet Rabindranath 
Tagore or the philosopher Bhagaban Das. He applauded the countless Filipino martyrs 
who fought for emancipation, as well as the young Filipinos who have awakened to 
Rizal’s call. Deeply moved by such an “intensely patriotic soul,” Roy quotes that 
famous excerpt in El Filibusterismo, where the Martyr implores the youth not only to 
“consecrate their golden hours, their illusions, and their enthusiasm” but “generously 
pour out their blood” for “the welfare of their native land.”249 
Twenty years later, the same excerpt appears as an epigraph in Pascual’s book, 
but here presented in quite an ingenious manner. Printed on onion skin paper, Rizal’s 
words are set on the backdrop of a 1946 painting by Vicente Alvarez Dizon, which 
portrays the martyred priests, Rizal’s execution, and Andres Bonifacio holding the flag 
of the Katipunan. At the foreground, the youth, naked and with open arms, stands on a 
heap of bones and skulls. And below, lies the caption:  
                                                 
248 Roy, Philippines and India, 206.  
249 Jose Rizal, El Filibusterismo, quoted in Roy, Philippines and India, 16.  
 135 
“Rizal, here we are who have consecrated our crimson hours to the good of 
Our Fatherland!”—The Youth of the Land. 
 
So what became of these philosophers who sacrificed their crimson hours? We 
know that Roy was repatriated, and continued to publish and teach as a professor at the 
University of Calcutta. Pascual, on the other hand, fled to America in 1967, after 34 
years as a professor and administrator at the University of the Philippines. One 
remembers that Rizal himself, Pascual’s hero, had, at one point, a strong desire to leave. 
He signed up to work as a medical man for the Spanish army in Cuba at the end of 
1895, hoping to get away as far as possible to avoid being implicated in the revolution 
that he already knew was about to happen. Unfortunately, Rizal was arrested in the 
Mediterranean while on a boat to Barcelona and never made it to Cuba. Pascual, on the 
other hand, was more fortunate and was given a teaching position in the Philosophy 
department at Bradley University, Illinois, where he taught for ten more years until his 
retirement in 1977, and was awarded Professor Emeritus.   
In 1985, Pascual died an expatriate at age 73. But unlike Roy who could have 
easily been forgotten, Pascual’s legacy would linger for many years, and people today 
Illustration 3: Frontispiece of Ricardo Pascual’s Rizal Beyond the Grave.   
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still hear tales about the battles which this philosopher had valiantly fought back in the 
days.  Only a few months ago, a heated email exchange transpired on Yahoo Groups, 
where people were arguing, of all topics, whether Pascual retracted or not. The 
philosopher must have rolled over in his grave; or, perhaps rolled over laughing at the 
irony of it all, if we like to imagine him a good sport. What seemed to have prompted 
the discussion was a comment made regarding the obituary published on November 
17, 1985, at the Chicago Tribune, announcing that a mass was going to be held for the 
late Ricardo Pascual at the St. Mark Catholic Church, Peoria. 250  A certain Eddie 
Calderon remarked that the professor was buried in a Catholic Church, and since 
atheists are not given this privilege, he concluded that Pascual must have returned to 
his original faith. This, he further claims, is corroborated by friends who knew Pascual 
and told him “that he did in fact accept the Lord on the hour of his death.” Contesting 
this alleged retraction, a certain Gil Fernandez retorts that Pascual died of a sudden 
“heart attack,” and thus could not have had the time to suddenly have a change of heart. 
He further argued that he himself had spoken to Pascual’s widow, Lourdes Pascual, 
who happens to be his good friend. In their conversation, she attested that “her husband 
died as an Agnostic, and had not made any changes of his lifetime beliefs,” but that 
being a devout Catholic herself, Lourdes decided to have her husband buried in a 
Catholic cemetery. 251  It seems that in the end, Lourdes herself wrote, addressing 
Calderon directly, explaining that Pascual was, indeed, agnostic, and “the high esteem 
that Bradley University has for him is... related to the philosophy he lived by.” She thus 
warned him “to be careful not to propagate topics that may hurt the feelings of the 
living and the memory of one departed, especially an honored Filipino in his adopted 
country.” 
                                                 
250 See http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-11-17/news/8503190373_1_professor-
bradley-university-sisters. 
251See email exchange in http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RP- 
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 It may seem that the matter has been resolved once and for all, and that Pascual 
was easily proven not guilty of retraction. But perhaps, while we assume that the charge 
of retraction was nothing but a disgrace to his name, Pascual himself is probably 
smiling, and cannot believe his luck that he could follow the footsteps of Rizal and 



























Writing Our Story: Paths and Pathologies 
 
 
 In exploring the intellectual landscape of academic philosophy, we have seen, 
in the previous chapters, the work and struggles of two of the most prominent 
philosophers in the Philippines, who, in their own right, were pioneers in their 
respective advocacies. While these philosophers came from two distinct intellectual 
traditions, and differed significantly in their passions and style of thinking, or in the 
way they responded to the socio-political issues of their time, it is also evident that they 
both sought to grapple with the influence and frailties of religion, and being inspired 
by and defying their teachers, dared to speak out of place in their desire to give their 
people a voice.  
 The history of academic philosophy in the Philippines, however, goes beyond 
the struggles of these two philosophers.  In this chapter, we listen to other voices who 
have equally concerned themselves with the problem of Filipino identity, which is here 
played out in a long-standing preoccupation with the search for a Filipino philosophy.  
Wrought by optimism and despair, and by intellectual congeniality, as well as intrigues 
and disgruntlements, this journey reveals how Filipino philosophers—given their 
biases, self-criticism, and aspirations—have told their story, evaluated their work, and 
defined their purpose.   
 
“We Shall Try to Be Post-Modern”253 
 In 2010, Brother Romualdo Abulad of the Society of Verbum Divini (SVD) 
and Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, 
delivered a paper at a regional philosophical gathering with the theme, Pilosopiyang 
                                                 
253 See Raymundo R. Pavo, “Filipino Philosophy and Post-Modernity,” International 
Journal of Arts and Sciences 3, no. 15 (2010): 238-254. 
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Pinoy: Uso Pa Ba? (“Filipino Philosophy: Is It Still Relevant?”)254 In addressing the 
question, Abulad cites scholars such as fellow SVD confrère, Father Leonardo 
Mercado, and Jesuit philosopher Albert Alejo, lamenting how their work have led 
people to associate Filipino philosophy primarily, if not exclusively, with an 
anthropological approach.  
 While acknowledging Mercado’s attempt at presenting a systematic 
philosophy of the Filipino masses as a “landmark work,” Abulad criticizes the author’s 
methodology of metalinguistic analysis and phenomenology of behavior for neither 
being “indigenously Filipino.” Furthermore, he complains that Mercado’s analysis of 
the kinship of Filipino languages, which “would have been an impressive contribution 
to both philosophy and anthropology,” was just “too brief to be credibly 
anthropologically exhaustive.” Apart from this, he argues that Mercado’s “discovery” 
of a “non-dualistic,” “non-compartmentalized,” and “non-linear” Filipino worldview 
also applies to the Chinese and Indian Weltanschauung, and therefore (again) not 
original or indigenous to the “common [Filipino] tao.” Abulad is skeptical, to a point 
that he wonders whether the Oriental stereotype had not preempted Mercado’s own 
investigation.   
 Abulad finds Alejo’s efforts equally unimpressive. He comments on how the 
latter initially had grand hopes of presenting a complete description of the 
“philosophical concept” of loob (“inner self”) and consequently, a definitive statement 
about Filipino identity, but would realize in the end that “he succeed[ed] in doing 
something less.” Abulad points out that Alejo himself acknowledges his own failure 
by admitting that he was not able to construct a definition. And although Alejo adds 
that it was not, after all, his intention, and sees his work as merely the beginning of 
                                                 
254  See Bro. Romualdo Abulad, SVD, “Pilosopiyang Pinoy: Uso Pa Ba? (The 
Relevance of Filipino Philosophy in Social Renewal),” (paper presented at the 10th 
Philosophy Gathering, Sancta Maria Mater et Regina Seminarium, University of San 
Carlos, Cebu City, November 19, 2010). The quotations in the following paragraphs 
are taken from this source. 
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more works to come, Abulad is convinced that these are merely ways by which this 
Jesuit philosopher tries to assuage his “sense of frustration.”   
 The fault, however, lies not only in Alejo’s inadequate efforts. Noting how 
loob is merely an echo of the “Socratic self” which always already implies the 
imperative of self-understanding, or of the concept of Geist in German Idealism 
Absolute Spirit, Abulad asserts that it is “not really a Filipino discovery,” putting to 
doubt its very value as a philosophical concept worthy of examination.  
 While Abulad makes it clear that his critique is not meant to be pejorative, even 
proving his good faith by stressing that he compares Alejo’s work “to such greats as 
Socrates, Descartes and Hegel,”255 it seems that it is precisely the whole “tradition” of 
philosophy weighing upon him that prevents him from understanding Alejo’s ideas in 
their own terms. Compared to these “great” men, Alejo is not as original as Socrates, 
nor as successful as Hegel, for whom Abulad is all praises for constructing “the greatest 
system ever conceived by the Mind”; but worst of all, Alejo is merely replicating the 
antiquated philosophical problem of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, 
which, though he may not know it, is clearly “indicative of his captivity.” It is this 
“seeming failure” that, for Abulad, constitutes “(Alejo’s) main contribution to Filipino 
philosophy,” in so far that “it becomes something which no one needs to undertake 
again.”256 
  These criticisms may appear odd and misguided, especially when one 
considers the wealth of research and reflection on loob in Philippine studies. But one 
could also see them as part of the historical adventure of Filipino philosophy, a reaction 
or response to the debates of the times, and therefore, part of a mélange of biases, fears, 
and desires. Here, we strive to emulate that virtue for which Abulad admired his teacher 
and mentor, Dr. Emerita Quito—a kind of open-mindedness which she declared to be 
                                                 
255 My emphasis. 
256 For an elaboration on these arguments, see Romualdo Abulad, “Book Review of 
Albert Alejo, S.J., Tao Po! Tuloy! (Isang Landas ng Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao),” in 
Karunungan, Vol. 20, 1990, 137-143.   
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“a sine qua non of philosophical research”—“to render to every philosopher the widest 
possible benevolence of interpretation.”257   
 One wonders, then, why Abulad denies his fellow Filipino philosophers the 
benevolence that he himself esteemed as “a gesture of intellectual charity.”258 But if 
such strong, moral intention does underlie one’s thinking and scholarship, which 
Nietzsche claims to be behind every philosophy,259 then it is no surprise that the same 
benevolence could turn into a kind of self-righteousness, which is committed to 
rectifying any assault made against the virtue that one holds dear. With this in mind, 
one realizes that, beneath the objective, rational calm of arguments, Abulad’s critique 
was really a form of retaliation.  
 Abulad refrains from naming people—he hopes not to offend anyone—, but 
one can sense his annoyance when he states that “the [worst] about the anthropological 
approach is that it tends to arrogate unto itself the truth about the Filipino mind, thus 
excluding or at least debasing other so-called merely expository, descriptive, or non-
                                                 
257 Emerita Quito, Homage to Jean-Paul Sartre, Professorial Chair Lecture No. 2 
(Manila: De La Salle University, 1981), 2.  
258 Romualdo Abulad, Introduction to Emerita Quito, A Life of Philosophy: Selected 
Works (1965-1988) of Emerita S. Quito (Manila: De La Salle University Press, 1990), 
iii.  
259 Nietzsche is a wonderful companion when one tries to understand philosophers, as 
he lays bare the vices and prejudices that fester beneath their calm, rational exterior. 
We have always uncritically attributed to the philosopher that selfless “will to truth” 
and without knowing it or understanding fully, have given him the highest honor of 
being the exemplary thinker. Thus, when Nietzsche, declaring war, vowed “to 
auscultate idols”—to touch these “eternal idols,” he says “with a hammer as with a 
tuning-fork”—to make audible their hollowness which try to remain unheard, we are 
not merely referring to the ideals that philosophers have elevated and secured as 
“truths,” but inevitably, to philosophers, who themselves have been taken as idols. 
Friedrich Nietzsche,” The Twilight of the Idols,” in The Works of Nietzsche, trans. 
Thomas Common (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1899), 98. And this is why Nietzsche 
exposes, first and foremost, that love for wisdom for which philosophers are known is 
nothing but a ruse, and that they are not as childlike, honest, or disinterested as they are 
wont to appear in their pursuit of “truth.” As Nietzsche says, “Gradually it has become 
clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal 
confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that 
the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life 
from which the whole plant had grown.” Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Prejudices of 
Philosophers,” trans. Walter Kaufman, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy 
of the Future (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 13.   
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anthropological philosophies.” In his frustration, he lists the names of “these others 
[who] are, so to speak, legion” who have been ostracized, which strangely enough also 
identifies Alejo as one of the “bright academics” Ateneo has produced in its “legendary 
preoccupation with phenomenology and existentialism.” He tries to name everyone, 
except for himself of course, which only makes us suspect that he is one of those who 
have been cast aside. And if only to further emphasize the virtues of open-mindedness 
and benevolent inclusion which he tries to practice, Abulad warns that “this list is far 
from complete and exhaustive,” and this is only because “[he is] not cognizant of 
what’s going on everywhere.”   
 Abulad’s critique is, however, also an expression of a philosophical preference. 
He objects to the anthropological approach because, as he explains, “the Filipino is 
without roots,” and “unlike India or China..., we are a nation without solid tradition.” 
But it is because of this “historical fact,” of which we must not be ashamed, that we 
can easily fathom the spirit of postmodernity.  Here, it becomes clear that Abulad 
criticizes the notion of loob not because he is searching for the “genuinely” indigenous 
but that he wants to prove that the latter does not exist; for it is in establishing this lack 
of ground, or “the meagerness of our roots,” that Abulad happily announces that 
Filipinos “are in the best position to start anew from scratch,” which he claims to be a 
strength rather than a weakness in the realm of philosophy.  
 It appears that Abulad regards postmodernism as the climax in the historical 
movement of philosophy, whose evolution can be described as a relentless “attempt to 
establish that crucial beginning.” 260  From the Socratic wisdom of ignorance, to 
Descartes’s methodic universal doubt, and Husserl’s universal epoche, Abulad gleans 
a pattern of a constant clearing of presuppositions, and asserts that postmodernism “has 
at last found the key [that] would completely secure the foundationless and groundless 
knowledge whose unpredictable insights are boundless and limitless.” Thus, to ensure 
                                                 
260 Abulad, “Pilosopiyang Pinoy.” 
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and secure our place in this “postmodern metanarrative,” Abulad argues that “the best 
strategy” in doing Filipino philosophy would be “not to indulge in any strategy at all, 
but simply to philosophize as one is inspired to do”—except, perhaps, the 
anthropological approach, which he categorically dismisses as “not the best way” to do 
Filipino philosophy.  
 Abulad is not alone in these views. Dr. Alfredo Co of the University of Sto. 
Tomas (UST) Philosophy Department, is equally critical of those who still continue to 
toil desperately and “wallow in a pseudo-nationalistic… search for a Filipino 
identity.”261 While he remembers and acknowledges how this search for an indigenous 
Filipino philosophy was part of the “historical situation” of earlier scholars, he is 
convinced that “the world has already moved to a new age of Globalization and 
Postmodernism,” and that people must accept that this age requires “a shift away from 
power struggles and towards a greater cooperation through a dialogue of cultures, 
faiths, and world-views.” Those who fail to catch on with the “new millennium” are in 
danger of “really lagging behind.” Furthermore, Co argues that the Filipino, “like the 
Philippines, is a Spanish creation,” and therefore cannot boast a great civilization of its 
own, like China or India, but, like Abulad, he sees this not as a weakness but a virtue; 
that in being inheritors of Western culture, and at the same time imbued with Chinese, 
Indian, Muslim and Malayan influences, the Filipinos are naturally polymorphous, 
allowing them to transcend the limits of their race, and at the same time belong to the 
universe.  
The Filipino culture is East and West, North and South. Truly we are at once 
Postmodern and Global. We are beyond definition, beyond recognition, 
beyond identification and beyond description. We are never anchored on the 
monotony of one but on the countless many. We truly need not have to search 
                                                 
261 Alfredo Co, “Doing Philosophy in the Philippines: Fifty Years Ago and Fifty Years 
From Now,” in Alfredo Co, Across the Philosophical Silk Road, A Festschrift in Honor 
of Alfredo P. Co, Volume VII (España, Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing 
House, 2009), 62. 
 144 
for our identity. Ours is the identity of the new age—ambivalent, 
polymorphous, processual, always becoming.262 
 
In Search of a Filipino (Philosophical) Identity 
 
 Before being initiated into the “postmodern age,” however, Abulad and Co 
were both part of an exclusive organization that was created specifically for “the 
promotion and publication of research in Filipino indigenous philosophy.” Founded by 
Emerita Quito in 1983, the Philippine Academy of Philosophical Research (PAPR) 
gathered, “strictly by invitation,”263 a number of “well respected names in philosophy,” 
including leading scholars of the anthropological approach, such as Mercado and 
                                                 
262 Co, “Doing Philosophy,” 62. 
263  Among the PAPR’s charter members included Claro Ceniza and Florentino 
Timbreza of De La Salle University (DLSU), Alfredo Co of UST, Fr. Vitaliano Gorospe 
and Manuel Dy, Jr. of Ateneo de Manila, Fr. Leonardo Mercado, S.V.D., of the Divine 
Word University (DWU). Curiously, there were no representatives from U.P. So 
exclusive was the group, that as of 1992, only three new members were admitted: 
Romualdo Abulad, incumbent President of PAPR, Leovino Garcia, then President of 
the Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP), and Rainier Ibana, then 
president of the Philosophy Circle of the Philippines (PCP). Alfredo Co, “Filipino 
Philosophers in a Dialogue on Filipino Culture—A Report,” Karunungan 9 (1992): 1-
2. 
Illustration 4: PAPR Pulong-Isip in Kalyabne Resort Years Ago. Left to Right: 
Manny Dy, Emerita Quito, Leo Garcia, Alfredo Co, Florentino Timbreza, Leonardo 
Mercado. Taken from the Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP) 
Facebook page, April 24, 2014. 
 145 
Florentino Timbreza, in the hope of contributing “to the better understanding of our 
national psyche.”264  
 A year later, the PAPR came out with its first annual journal publication, 
Karunungan (“Wisdom”), and beginning in 1986, organized regular meetings called 
Pulong-Isip (“a meeting of minds”). Caught in the euphoric aftermath of the EDSA 
People Power revolution that had overthrown the dictatorial regime of former President 
Ferdinand Marcos, these gatherings were designed as a “Philosophy Laboratory” where 
members could discuss the issues of the times.   
 From journal essays and meeting reports, one can see that the research in 
Filipino indigenous philosophy was concomitantly a search for a Filipino identity. The 
Filipino, having been diagnosed, for as long as one could remember, to be suffering 
from an identity crisis, was perceived as a “cultural hermaphrodite,” dwelling “on the 
borderline between East and West without knowing whether he belongs to one or to 
the other.”265 What complicated the matter was his inferiority complex which, resulting 
from centuries of colonial subjugation and perpetuated by his own cult of the foreign, 
had formed a “patina,” which was believed to be “covering whatever was indigenously 
Filipino.” The task, therefore, that philosophers and scholars alike took upon 
themselves was, as Quito explains, to look into the myths, legends, aphorisms, and 
sayings of the people, believing that beneath the layers, there was something 
“distinctively Filipino” that was waiting to be retrieved.    
 Entangled in this search for a national identity was our philosophers’ yearning 
for their own: an identity not only through a contribution to society that was 
distinctively philosophical, but in having a philosophical character that was uniquely 
Filipino.  As a group, they were made aware of their “alleged absence… in the February 
revolution celebration,” and Quito, bravely broaching the matter, asked: was it because 
                                                 
264 Editorial, Karunungan 1 (1984): v.  
265  Emerita Quito, “Filipino Volksgeist in Vernacular Literature,” Karunungan 1 
(1984): 73.  
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we were confined in our ivory towers and too apathetic to get involved? Or were we 
just “deliberately slow” in expressing our views? Rest assured, the philosophers were 
“very much involved” in the EDSA revolution, although mingling with the crowd not 
as philosophical associations craving attention with their large banners but, in their 
humble and quiet way, as “freedom-loving” individuals. And if they were slow in 
formulating a consolidated view, it could only be because philosophers “have to weigh 
consequences and determine the ramifications of [their] opinions.”266   
 Despite this self-assured exterior, it appears that our philosophers were all too 
conscious of the fact that they had “failed to make a dent in our history.”267 This makes 
it difficult to tell how much the excuses were meant on the one hand to address critics, 
and on the other, to appease their self-doubt. But while they had missed the chance to 
play an important role in this momentous event of a people revolution, they looked to 
the future, hopeful that in defining their task in the age of “national reconstruction,” 
they could come closer to finally having a “strong impact upon the people.”   
 The February revolution was therefore, in many ways, seen as a new beginning, 
a “founding event,” not only for the nation moving towards reconstruction, but also for 
the disengaged philosopher who, after this defining moment, has been forced to realize 
that he “can no longer be divorced from history.”268 In light of this social responsibility, 
suggestions were made on how the philosopher could make an impact in society. 
Known to be “a man of virtue and wisdom,” it was argued that the philosopher should 
influence politics, as was no one more worthy than him to take on such a task, lest it 
fall into the hands of men of lesser stature. 269  Also, because of his indefatigable 
devotion to truth, the philosopher was known to be an “emancipator of mental slaves,”  
whose mediation was crucial in freeing the Filipino from the “cultural barriers that have 
                                                 
266 Emerita Quito, “Pulong-Isip: Meeting of Filipino Minds,” Karunungan 3 (1986): 1.  
267 Romualdo Abulad, in Quito, “Pulong-Isip”: 15.  
268 Manuel Dy, Jr., in Quito, “Pulong-Isip”: 9. 
269 Alfredo Co, “President’s Annual Report: 1985-1986,” Karunungan 4 (1987): 4.  
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alienated him from his brother Filipinos.”270 Finally, in believing the philosopher to be 
the moral and intellectual leader of society, he was equally expected to provide the 
vision and foundation that would facilitate the transformation of Philippine society.271   
 Indeed, these were high expectations, that their recommendations sounded 
more a eulogy for their beloved philosopher than a practical plan of action. 
Nevertheless, the desire among them to contribute to nation building was undoubtedly 
earnest, as one could see in their less ambitious, albeit concrete and relevant efforts at 
providing their own philosophical analyses. 
  To our philosophers, the EDSA revolution was a phenomenon rich in 
philosophical content. Their analyses exposed the Filipino values underlying the 
thinking and behavior of the people, sometimes showing the ambivalent nature of these 
cultural traits, but always with a sympathetic gaze towards the Filipino psyche.272 The 
emphasis on values was, on the one hand, a reaction to the criticism and denigrations, 
colonial or otherwise, that have been consistently hurled at Filipinos for what were 
perceived as weaknesses and “negative” traits. On the other, it was a response to the 
plea made by Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani for a national moral rehabilitation. 
Attributing the source of “our economic problems and political instability” to “the 
weakness and corruption of the moral foundations of our society,”273 Shahani proposed 
the idea of a “Moral Recovery Program,” urging the need for self-examination on a 
national level. The aim, she proposed, was to conduct an “inquiry into the strengths 
                                                 
270 Florentino Timbreza, in Co, “President’s Annual Report”: 7.  
271 Manuel Dy, Jr. in Co, “President’s Annual Report”: 6.  
272 See Manuel Dy, Jr. “Outline of Project of Pilipino Ethics,” Karunungan 5 (1989): 
35-41, Emerita Quito, “Ambivalence of Filipino Traits and Values,” Karunungan 5 
(1989): 42-46, and Florentino Timbreza’s paper in Quito, “Pulong-Isip,” 17-23. As a 
response to criticisms born out of judging Filipino traits against Western standards, 
there were also efforts to define the Filipino psyche by exploring its oriental affinities. 
For examples of these, see Alfredo Co, “Confucian Model for a Filipino Philosophy of 
Value,” in Across the Philosophical Silk Road, 15-27, and Alfredo Co, “Elements of 
Chinese Thought in the Filipino Mind,” Karunungan 5 (1989): 27-34.  
273 Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani, quoted in Dy, “Pilipino Ethics,” 35. See Leticia 
Ramos Shahani, A Moral Recovery Program: Building a Nation, Inspiring Our People 
to Action (Manila: Senate of the Congress of the Philippines), 1988.  
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and weaknesses of the Filipino character with a view to solving the social ills and 
strengthening the nation’s moral fiber.”274 
 However, inasmuch as these philosophers aligned themselves with this 
objective, both celebratory and critical of Filipino cultural values, there was also and 
always the desire to move—sometimes too quickly—beyond the confines of the nation.  
Here, too, lies what was perceived as the unique contribution of Philosophy, which 
many philosophers believed needed to be differentiated from the Social Sciences, 
whose active efforts in exploring Filipino identity were at the time clearly achieving 
pioneering results. Thus, in a colloquium held in 1991, President of the Philosophical 
Circle of the Philippines (PCP) and PAPR member, Dr. Rainier Ibana sought to 
distinguish the task of the social scientist from that of the philosopher.275 While the 
former lays out the data of cultural traits and behavior that constitute a people’s 
civilization (kabihasnan), with no judgment on moral values, the philosopher 
endeavors to develop the culture and way of life (kalinangan) of the people, 276 
specifically in its spiritual aspect, to get beyond the confines of their race and towards 
realizing their noble aspiration to be human (pagpapakatao, the striving to become 
more human). To do so, the philosopher, situating the Filipino in the larger context of 
“Humanity,” sheds light on values that have proven, from time immemorial, vital to 
                                                 
274 Shahani, Moral Recovery Program, 6.  
275 See Rainier R.A. Ibana’s paper entitled “Ang Tatlong Konteksto ng Pagsusuri sa 
Pilosopiyang Pilipino,” in Co, “Dialogue on Filipino Culture,” 10-18. Co’s report was 
a compilation of papers read at a colloquium organized by the Philippine Circle of the 
Philippines, held on February 24, 1991, at the Ateneo de Manila University. The theme 
of the colloquium was  “Critique of Filipino Culture.” 
276  To further understand how Ibana distinguishes the social scientist from the 
philosopher, it is important to clarify the difference between kabihasnan and 
kalinangan. Kabihasnan comes from the word bihasa, which refers to actions that are 
repeated and therefore to which one becomes accustomed, and in this case, what 
constitutes tradition or civilization.   Kalinangan also refers to culture, or a people’s 
way of life, but gives emphasis to linang which implies care or an enhancement. 
Usually, the term is used to refer to land that has been cleared to prepare it for sowing. 
See Virgilio S. Almario, ed. UP Diksiyonaryong Filipino: Binagong Edisyon (Pasig: 
Sentro ng Wikang Filipino-Diliman and Anvil Publishing Inc., 2010), 167 and 702. 
From this distinction, one can deduce that the philosopher is someone who does not 
merely describe culture but toils to bring the latter to a more elevated condition.   
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the growth of civilizations, such as justice, courage, goodness, truth, and piety. 
Metaphorically, Ibana describes the task of philosophizing vis-á-vis these universal 
values as the act of gazing at the eternal stars, which remain unchanged with the 
revolving of the earth, giving light and direction “in the midst of darkness and chaos of 
history.”   
 One assumes that it was also in connection to a solidarity with the rest of 
“Humanity” that some of our philosophers proudly perceived the EDSA revolution not 
merely as an object of philosophical analysis but a philosophy-in-the-making, and as 
such, an invaluable gift of the Filipinos to the world. The peaceful transition from 
dictatorship to democracy that transpired as a result of this momentous event presented 
a formidable critique of Marxism, which has long claimed violence as a necessary evil 
of political and social change.277 Alternatively, the EDSA revolution was seen as a 
“people’s revolution,” where both bourgeoisie and proletariat, along with other 
persuasions, participated “not as forces struggling against each other but as a unified 
front against a common oppressor.” As such, the event was seen not so much a critique 
as it was a realization of a philosophical ideal, specifically “a genuinely Marxist 
phenomenon.”278  
 
A Fetish for the Universal 
 Not all the philosophers, however, were unequivocally optimistic. As the 
euphoria died down, some felt that the lessons of the EDSA revolution were too easily 
forgotten and that the Filipinos had slunk back to their old habits. Expressing profound 
disappointment, one philosopher described the revolution “as clearly one that had no 
teeth, dormant, no intelligence, no consciousness, and no direction.” 279  Abulad, 
                                                 
277 Dy, in Quito, “Pulong-Isip,” 9.  
278 Abulad, in Quito, “Pulong-Isip”:13-14.   
279 Co, “Bakit, Pinoy, Bakit?” in Co, “Dialogue on Filipino Culture,” 6. “Malungkot, 
subalit dapat sabihing ang ating tinawag na EDSA Revolution ay mistulang walang 
ngipin, natutulog, walang talino, walang malay, at walang patutunguhan.” See also 
Florentino Timbreza, “Nationalism and Filipino Cultural Traits and Attitudes,” in Co, 
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however, would explicitly relate the problem to the current feebleness of our 
philosophers: while they may have supported this populist movement, it was not 
because they had a well-thought-out philosophical conviction, but like the rest of the 
herd, were “motivated by a hazy, spontaneous feeling of rebellion.”  He argues: 
What moved our countrymen to EDSA in those wonderful four days of 
February was not a philosophy, but a long pent-up sense of disillusionment for 
a regime which had cheated them of all their dreams and resources. No wonder 
that the “social revolution” that was supposed to follow the “political 
revolution” has been long in coming. Perhaps some would say that there was 
an implicit philosophy in the people’s revolution; however, it cannot be denied 
that no one has yet dared explicitate [sic] this philosophy in its magnificent 
wholeness and convincing logic. If there is still so much confusion in our 
country today, part of the blame—I should say—is due to the lack of conscious 
philosophy which our people can fall back upon.280  
 The reason for this failure, according to Abulad, could only be attributed to the 
fact that our philosophers have stubbornly (and cowardly) preoccupied themselves with 
what he calls “imitative reflection.”  In an earlier essay, he calls it the “regressive” 
option, which describes expository scholarship, along with research with an 
anthropological or historical scheme281 as merely “designed to unveil what already 
exists.” But while he acknowledged the need for “an enunciated Weltanschauung” and 
regarded it as “already a step in the right direction,” Abulad would demand much more 
from philosophy than merely articulating a way of life and making “our people 
conscious of their true selves.”   
 To be worthy of its name, philosophy could not simply be allowed to “regress” 
to the givens. It must rise above the status quo and by looking into the future, into the 
                                                 
“Dialogue on Filipino Culture, 25. 
280 Abulad, in Quito, “Pulong-Isip”: 16. 
281 See Romualdo Abulad, “Options for a Filipino Philosophy,” Karunungan 1 (1984): 
17-27.    
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“not yet,” usher the beginning of a new society. In contrast to the “regressive” schemes, 
Abulad called this nobler task of philosophy, quite predictably, the “progressive 
option,” describing it as the “philosophical attempt to put forward a somewhat novel 
and untried philosophy, often times with the intent of commencing a movement.” For 
this, he looked up to Karl Marx as the exemplary of a philosopher who, with his “new 
philosophical synthesis,” did not merely interpret the world but sought to change it.282  
 Here it becomes clear why Abulad objected to the anthropological schemes of 
Mercado and Alejo—not because they sought out the indigenous (as he would argue in 
his later postmodern phase), but because he found their philosophy too limiting.  He 
had only the grandest hopes for Filipino philosophy, and believed that if it were to be 
“authentic,” it would have to “transcend the limits of this country and its perennial 
quality… recognized by thinkers of other lands.”283 In other words, philosophy, to earn 
its title, must prove to be not only comprehensive but universal.  
 
Philosophia, The Sacred Cow 
 Unlike Abulad, Quito was—at least on the surface—critical of philosophy’s 
claim to universality.284  While he keenly looked forward to the construction of a 
Filipino philosophy, which he believed was immediately possible, she complained how 
our philosophers had become too preoccupied with the idea, brooding excessively over 
the question whether it exists or not. The reason, she explains, is an underlying 
obsession with the Greek concept of philosophia, which with its emphasis on logic and 
truth, and concern for ultimate causes, is just completely the opposite of the Filipino’s 
                                                 
282 See Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert 
Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978), 145. Abulad notes that Marx’s 
progressivism lies not in his critique of Capitalism but in his presentation of 
Communism as “a new social set-up” that will subvert and replace the old order.   
283 Abulad, “Options for a Filipino Philosophy,” 27.  
284 See Emerita Quito, “A New Concept of Philosophy,” in Quito, A Life of Philosophy, 
10-11. Here, she argues: “Despite its claim to universality, philosophy is not actually 
universal; a philosophical truth can wear multiple masks, each of which is a private 
scrutiny of the world and of reality, and each is valid and true.   
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predilection for intuition and practical wisdom. Unfortunately, this bias for philosophia 
has prevented some of our philosophers from being receptive to what Asian sages have 
alluded to as folk wisdom or spirit, making them oblivious to the corpus of Filipino 
myths and legends that could otherwise provide the perfect access to the people’s 
collective consciousness. To further distinguish this folk wisdom from philosophia, 
Quito insists on using a different term (although still very German), saying that she 
would “have no qualms about using the term Volksgeist [spirit of the people], instead 
of ‘philosophy’” to designate the Filipino spirit.285  
 It appears that Quito was trying to undermine the hegemony of the abstract and 
theoretical philosophia, by putting it on equal footing with Volksgeist. And further 
challenging the “classical definition of philosophy,” she argued: 
If the clasical Greek definition were to be rigorously applied, namely, that 
philosophy is “the science that studies all things in their ultimate causes and 
first principles”, then there is no philosophy in Philippine culture. But then, 
what ought to be philosophy if not the collective mind of a people interacting 
with its own universe? What should philosophy be if not the attitude of a people 
toward life and a Supreme Being? What is philosophy (literally, “love of 
wisdom”) if not a people’s concerted effort to acquire wisdom in order to live 
well? This collective mind, this general attitude toward life, this concerted 
effort to acquire wisdom which is manifest on the popular or grassroots level 
constitutes the folk spirit (Volkgeist) of the Filipino and it should (or will) 
eventually emerge as a formalized philosophy on the academic level.286 
 While Quito does not explain what she means by “formalized philosophy,” she 
tells us that this formalization is underway. If Volksgeist refers to the spirit of wisdom 
of the people expressed in myths, legends, rituals, etc., one can assume that 
                                                 
285 Emerita Quito, “Structuralism and The Filipino Volksgeist,” in Quito, A Life of 
Philosophy, 732.  
286 Emerita Quito, The State of Philosophy in the Philippines, Monograph Series No. 5 
(Manila: De La Salle University, 1983), 10.  
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formalization refers to the process of decoding, organizing and conceptualizing the data 
into an intelligible whole. In the end, however, Quito reveals that she still hopes that 
Volksgeist would one day serve as the cornerstone for “a universal philosophy in the 
Greek sense of the word.”287  
 One wonders then if Quito’s preference for Volksgeist was not so much a 
recognition of the Filipino’s unique way of philosophizing as it was her way of saying 
that we have not yet reached an advanced stage worthy of being called “philosophy.” 
While it is true that Quito expressed on occasion an optimism and openness for the 
possibility of a (universal) Filipino philosophy in the distant future, she also had serious 
bouts of skepticism that questioned the Filipino’s capacity for philosophical thought.  
 An interesting case in point is the controversial essay that Quito wrote in the 
late ‘70s, where she declared the Filipino language and mentality as simply 
incompatible with philosophical reflection. Due to the personalistic and optimistic 
behavior of the Filipinos, and not to mention the derogatory manner by which they 
speak of the philosopher,288 she argues that philosophy in the Philippines was clearly 
“a losing proposition.” Furthermore, she argues: 
Even our language does not lend itself to philosophy. There are no equivalents 
to words like being, essence, existence, becoming, actuality, transcendence. . . 
.Is the Filipino language lacking in abstract terms because Filipinos do not 
think abstractly, or is the Filipino incapable of thinking abstractly because 
language does not permit him? Will there ever be a Filipino philosopher in the 
future who, like Sri Aurobindo and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India, would 
give the cultural world its share of philosophical gems of thought? 
 It is my personal opinion that there will not be any. Our mentality or our 
Weltanschauung is too personal and emotional to allow a more transcendental 
                                                 
287 Quito, “Filipino Volksgeist,” 738.  
288 Quito refers to the pilosopo, who is known in Filipino society as someone who likes 
to argue for the sake of arguing, and sometimes argues to get his way.  
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way of viewing things. The Philippines has produced many artists, writers, 
economists, musicians, even scientists, but I doubt whether there will be any 
philosophers. I would be most happy were I to be proved wrong.289  
Here, we see that Quito believed that it was not only “premature to speak of Filipino 
philosophy, moreover, of a Filipino philosopher,” but that the whole prospect was 
completely bleak. Ironically, while Abulad dubbed Quito the “Filipino Socrates” and 
acclaimed legendary her open-mindedness, her view reveals a serious derogation of her 
fellow Filipinos.  
  Abulad, too, saw that Quito’s statement strongly suggested the inferiority of 
the Filipino mind. And yet, he tried to mitigate the harshness in his mentor’s 
indictment, by insisting that it “not be taken as a statement of fact but as a challenge.”  
And indeed, one must admit that Quito’s infamous position became controversial 
enough to elicit significant responses, and therefore marked a crucial moment in the 
history of philosophy in the Philippines.  
 
Writing History/Continuing Their Story: Filipino Philosophy and the Curriculum 
 While Quito is known for her infamous essay, one must not overlook the fact 
that she was also at some point actively engaged in promoting the use of the Filipino 
language in the teaching of philosophy.  In 1974, Quito published a textbook, entitled 
Ang Kasaysayan ng Pilosopiya (The History of Philosophy), which was the first 
philosophy book written entirely in Filipino. Apart from this radical choice of 
language, however, everything else seemed to have followed the usual, philosophical 
narrative.  Out of the nineteen chapters, only one (the first one) discusses Eastern 
philosophy in relative detail—specifically exploring Indian and Chinese thought—
while the rest, as expected, is dedicated to a discussion on the history of ideas of 
Western philosophers. In the chapter on Political Philosophy, Quito makes a one-page 
                                                 
289  Emerita Quito, “Lectures on Comparative Philosophy,” in Quito, A Life of 
Philosophy, 519.   
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detour and mentions Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos’s idea of a democratic 
revolution, which she praises as an “original ideology.”290 But other than that, neither 
Filipinos nor their “other” Asian neighbors are mentioned in the historical narrative.  
 While Quito’s effort to write a philosophy book in Filipino is undeniably 
important, one realizes that the idea of a history of philosophy is often, if not always, 
assumed to be a narrative of Western thought. We should not think however that Quito 
was alone in this. One examines the philosophy curriculum in several Filipino 
universities and realizes that the history of ideas is predominantly a presentation of the 
birth and development of Western concepts. And while it also includes Eastern 
philosophy, it refers mainly to Indian, Chinese, and Japanese traditions.291 The problem 
is, no one really questions these narratives anymore, as they have become the norm and 
structure of our philosophical education.   
 This, however, has never precluded efforts to explore our own philosophical 
tradition, and even to insert “Filipino philosophy” into our curriculum. But the real 
question is, how have we inserted our thinking into the grand philosophical narrative, 
and what place have we given ourselves in the intellectual discourse?  Are we allowed 
to interrogate and challenge Western-European thought, or have we conveniently 
created a space in the margins so that we can talk about our philosophy to our heart’s 
content, without having to disturb the smoothness of the narrative of the “Great West?”   
 It was not until the mid-‘80s that “Filipino Philosophy” (FIPHILO) was offered 
for the first time as a course at the De La Salle University (DLSU).  According to 
Florentino Timbreza, the idea, which came from DLSU Brother President Andrew 
Gonzalez, F.S.C., in consultation with Quito, who was then chair of the Philosophy 
                                                 
290 Quito, Ang Kasaysayan ng Pilosopiya, 217.  
291 Apart from minor differences, the Ateneo, UP, DLSU, and UST philosophy 
curricula present the history of (Western) ideas in four periods: Ancient (Greek), 
Medieval, Modern, and Contemporary philosophies. See 
http://www.admu.edu.ph/ls/soh/philosophy/undergraduate-courses (Ateneo website), 
http://www.pilosopiya.com/courses (DLSU website),  
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department, was indeed “a brave attempt to dig into the unexplored layers of Filipino 
experience embodied in the people’s cultural heritage.”292 And Timbreza, who had 
taken it upon himself to teach the course, attests to the “arduous responsibility” of 
“preparing a syllabus with practically nothing to start with.”293 To this day, FIPHILO 
is taught at DLSU as one of the basic (core) courses, but now with a different content, 
where the emphasis has shifted from the study of culture to the socio-political ideas of 
reformists, revolutionists and present-day thinkers, like Rizal, Jacinto, Bonifacio, 
Quezon, and others. From the course description, we learn that this focus on the ideas 
of individual thinkers is called the “traditional approach,” an initiative that is attributed 
to none other than Dr. Rolando Gripaldo.  
 
Harking Back to the “Greeks” 
 To understand why Gripaldo deviates from his predecessor and chooses a 
“traditional approach” instead, or why he names it as such, it is important to see how 
he distinguishes it from the other schemes, which he calls the cultural and constitutional 
methods. In his Critical Bibliography on Filipino Philosophy, Gripaldo identifies these 
three approaches, as a means to organize and classify the philosophical texts he had 
collected. The cultural approach, which, like Abulad, he identifies with 
ethnophilosophers like Mercado and Timbreza, refers obviously to research on the 
Filipino Volksgeist, as an extraction of the philosophical presuppositions that underlie 
                                                 
292  Florentino T. Timbreza, “Understanding Filipino Philosophy,” Karunungan 4 
(1987), 9.  Gonzalez, who had one point became the chair of the Technical Panel for 
Humanities, Social Sciences and Communications (1995-1997) for the Commission on 
Higher Education (CHED), was also responsible for drafting a philosophy curriculum 
that included a seminar on Filipino philosophy as a major subject See CHED 
Memorandum Order [CMO] No. 44, 1997. In an essay written in 1982, Gonzalez 
reveals that his attempt to indigenize the social sciences at DLSU began in the late ‘70s, 
after being inspired by Alfredo Lagmay of the Psychological Association of the 
Philippines, who had suggested it at an annual meeting of the Social Sciences Division 
of the National Research Council of the Philippines. Andrew Gonzalez, “Indigenization 
of the Social Sciences: A Red Herring?” in Virgilio E. Enriquez, ed. Indigenous 
Psychology: A Book of Readings [Quezon City: Akademya ng Sikolohiyang Pilipino, 
Philippine Psychology Research and Training House, 1990), 109-110).  
293 Timbreza, “Understanding Filipino Philosophy,” 4. 
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a people’s language and literature. The constitutional approach, on the other hand, is a 
relatively curious category which Gripaldo uses to refer to all expository work of 
Filipino scholars on foreign philosophers and philosophies. Here, he insists that all 
philosophical research, despite being foreign in content, must be considered as part of 
“Filipino philosophy” provided that the author is, by nationality, Filipino. While 
Gripaldo acknowledges that this approach is particularly problematic, and expects 
many to disagree, he remains convinced that the Filipino scholar, who is bound to 
interpret the meaning of the text, inevitably produces an interpretation that can only be 
an expression of his “Filipino mind.”294  
 What is interesting is not so much how reasonable or flawed Gripaldo’s 
arguments are as why he insists on loosely defining—or so it appears—the parameters 
of “Filipino philosophy, so much so that it becomes an all-inclusive category. 
According to him, this approach is drawn from a personal reflection on his task, not as 
a philosopher, but as an “historian of philosophy.”  He argues: 
A historian of philosophy is a historian. As a social scientist, the historian of 
philosophy describes, classifies, and analyzes the existing data. Then he 
interprets the data in the light of the existing contemporary state of knowledge 
or thinking. He initially transcends the quarrels of philosophers, philosophical 
schools, or teachers of philosophy. He describes the nature of this quarrel. Then 
he takes a position.295 
 Gripaldo imputes to the historian an objectivity that is humanly impossible. 
Nevertheless, one can understand that he idealizes the historian/social scientist as a way 
of reacting to the petty squabbles that beset our philosophers. For although Gripaldo 
talks of rivalry among logical positivists and existentialists in faraway Europe, and how 
each camp calls the other “charlatans” or “heartless philistines,” and worst of all, 
                                                 
294 Rolando M. Gripaldo, Filipino Philosophy: A Critical Bibliography, 1774-1997, 
2nd ed. (Manila: De La Salle University Press, Inc., 2001), 5.   
295 Gripaldo, Filipino Philosophy, 5. 
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describe the other as “nonphilosophical,” one gets a sense that a similar, homegrown 
quarrel is happening in our midst.296 With this in mind, one begins to understand that 
Gripaldo is trying hard not to provoke ill feelings or to aggravate tensions. And he does 
this, he claims, by rehabilitating the term “philosophical,” using it not to discriminate 
but “to transcend the quarrels of some schools of philosophy.”297 Indeed, what better 
way to do this than to ensure that no one is left out, in acknowledging everyone as a 
contributor, in his/her own right, to Filipino philosophy?    
 In a paper delivered recently, however, Gripaldo further reveals the dilemma 
he was faced with when he was then writing the bibliography. He says, 
If I discard all Filipino writings on foreign philosophers and philosophies, then 
my research work will be reduced into a few pages as there are only very few 
writings done on both (i) ethnic and indigenous philosophical ideas and (ii) on 
original or derivative but distinctive philosophical works by Filipino 
themselves. This is something I was not prepared to do.298  
Not prepared for what, one may ask. While the volume of the work may have been 
slightly a concern, one suspects that Gripaldo was primarily unwilling to be the cause 
of a major polemic and be on the receiving end of resentful invectives, which would 
have surely been the case if he excluded a huge bulk of writings. Despite these 
apprehensions, however, Gripaldo would still offer his own position in the end, 
declaring the traditional option as the “genuine philosophical approach,” which of 
                                                 
296 In the Foreward, Thomist scholar, Tomas Rosario, Jr. sympathizes with the author, 
and encourages the “scholars of ‘pure philosophy’” to rethink their position, to ask 
themselves “whether philosophy in general should be an exclusive enterprise or. . .[a] 
dialogue with the natural and social sciences for it to be relevant.” Being an Ateneo 
philosophy professor, it is interesting how Rosario does not say anything against or in 
defense of the constitutional approach, which his department is known for, but does 
vocally support a shift in interest “from a Western outlook of philosophy to an 
indigenous philosophical world-view.” Tomas Rosario, Jr., foreward in Gripaldo, 
Critical Bibliography, iii.  
297 Gripaldo, Filipino Philosophy, 15.  
298 Rolando Gripaldo, “Filipino Philosophy: Past and Present,” (paper presented at the 
Philippine National Philosophical Research Society [PNPRS] Panel during the PAP 
Philosophical Conference, April 9, 2013), 4. 
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course then completely undermines his initial intention of freeing the “philosophical” 
from being a discriminatory term. But now one wonders if the point of including 
everyone under the classification of “Filipino philosophy” was intended precisely to 
lessen the severity of his later judgment.    
 And so, after benevolently gathering everyone into the all-inclusive category 
of Filipino philosophy, Gripaldo completely discredits the works that fall under the 
constitutional and cultural approach, in favor of his traditional scheme. While 
expository scholarship clearly predominates philosophical research in the Philippines, 
Gripaldo shows not only how fellow scholars are questioning its place in “Filipino 
philosophy,” but how it is on the whole an undesirable phenomenon, for having “no or 
very little originality as inputs.” As for the cultural approach, its contribution to 
“Filipino philosophy” remains indisputable, except Gripaldo points out, similar to 
Abulad’s opinion, that it “undermines the authenticity of the genuine Filipino 
philosopher.” What is interesting is that these are the same arguments we heard twenty 
years ago, which means that there has not been since then a serious attempt to study 
the nature and rationale behind our philosophical practices—in other words, to 
understand, before judging, why we do what we do.  And what’s worse is that we keep 
using these oversimplified arguments, as Gripaldo does, to deem these practices 
inferior.   
 For Gripaldo, in the end, only the traditional approach, which in “follow[ing] 
the Greek philosophical model,” allows us to practice philosophy authentically, no 
longer as a collective worldview but as an individual activity, which presents “one’s 
personal view” on the great, philosophical themes such as freedom, truth, the meaning 
of life, and the like. Consequently, the task in the traditional approach lies in identifying 
Filipino individual thinkers and understanding their ideas, which may very well begin 
with the study of our reformers and revolutionists.299 In the same way that we learn 
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about Greek philosophy by acquainting ourselves with the ideas of individual Greek 
thinkers, so will “Filipino philosophy” be constructed from the philosophies of 
individual Filipino thinkers.  
 There is, of course, nothing new about this.  There have always been attempts 
to study the philosophy of our national heroes, “leaders of the social transformation” 
who Majul aptly reminds us were not all military leaders but “men of ideas.”300 But 
only some of our philosophers have acknowledged them, 301  since others have 
maintained the belief that in the Philippines, “there are no real philosophers in the strict 
sense.”302 
There is no doubt that Gripaldo’s bibliography, with its all-inclusive approach, 
is an admirable attempt at providing a comprehensive list of works. But what makes it 
truly important and intriguing as a text is how it shows, on the one hand, the author 
struggling to overcome the problems and social pressures that he grasps quite 
perceptively, and yet, on the other, how he ends up shamelessly embodying and 
perpetuating the same prejudices and confusion that have long afflicted our 
philosophers. 
 
Our Greek Heritage  
 Nonetheless, let us take a closer look at the traditional approach which 
Gripaldo suggests.  In following the Greek model, he asserts that our task is to identify 
our Filipinos thinkers, in the same way that the Greeks have done, with special mention 
to the originary example of Thales, who is hailed the putative “Father of Philosophy.”  
But while the task itself of recognizing our intellectual progenitors is undoubtedly vital 
                                                 
300 Cesar Majul, Apolinario Mabini, Revolutionary (Manila: National Heroes 
Commission,Vertex Press, Inc., 1964), 1.  
301 In addition to Majul, are for instance the works of Ricardo Pascual’s The Philosophy 
of Rizal (Manila: Pedro B. Ayuda & Co., 1962) and Remigio Agpalo’s Liwanag at 
Dilim: The Political Philosophy of Emilio Jacinto, Professorial Chair Lectures, 
Monograph No. 21 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1976). 
302 Quito, State of Philosophy, 9.  
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and in fact long overdue, does it not seem superficial, and perhaps even misleading, to 
think that the legacy of the Greek tradition can be reduced to this? Haven’t our 
philosophers, for better or worse, internalized the Greeks in more profound ways that 
have shaped and influenced their thinking? Or are we perhaps simplifying and not 
seeing Gripaldo’s connections?    
    The Greek legacy, as we are told, is synonymous with philosophy. As 
Heidegger demonstrates convincingly, the moment we begin to ask what philosophy 
is, we are inevitably brought back to its Greek origin. Ferriols himself wondered what 
philosophy was, and like Heidegger, was convinced that an understanding of Greek 
thought was the key.  For this reason, Ferriols, who was proficient in Greek even as a 
Juniorate,303 took upon himself the task of translating into Filipino the fragments of the 
Early Greek thinkers.  
 Unlike Gripaldo, Ferriols could not readily accept what he had heard about 
Thales, and was doubtful whether the latter should really be considered the first 
philosopher. Ferriols tells us that it was Aristotle who dubbed Thales as the first to 
philosophize “according to the proper method,” for identifying water as the prime 
matter (prote hyle), the stuff of which everything is made.304 But Ferriols, searching 
through the fragments known to be written by Thales, had found nothing to support 
Aristotle’s claim. What he did find was a fragment where Thales speaks of water, not 
as prime matter though but as stoicheion, or what Ferriols translates as element 
(sangkap). What Ferriols discovers here is not only that an inaccurate interpretation 
was committed but that this misreading is reflective of a significant difference in 
attitude between Aristotle and Thales.  While Aristotle was looking for an answer—in 
fact, the answer—in insisting on the idea of an all-governing prime matter, Thales had 
simply offered a conjecture (in Tagalog, hula), for in his observations he saw that water 
                                                 
303 C.G. Arevalo, S.J., “All About Roque J. Ferriols, S.J. (Three Biographical Notes),” 
in Pagdiriwang sa Meron, 4.  
304 Roque Ferriols, S.J., Mga Sinaunang Griyego (Manila: Office of Research and 
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 162 
was what seemed or appeared (para bagang) to have the character of bringing things 
together.  
 From his own reading of the Greek fragments, Ferriols was able to get beyond 
Aristotle’s misinterpretation and see for himself who Thales was. And precisely 
because he could go back to the source, he discovered that beyond this penchant for 
water for which Thales was known, there was a whole spectrum to the philosopher’s 
character that was reflected in the many other stories that are today not so often told. 
Thales was an astrologer, who carefully observed the heavens, and through a patient 
study of the Babylonian account of the movement of the universe, was able to predict 
(hula) an eclipse. But Thales did not only have a scientific mind, for he also understood 
the world metaphorically, declaring that everything was full of god and that the land 
was a leaf floating in a universe of water that trembled with the slightest movement of 
the waves. He was also laughed at once for falling into a well, as he was walking 
absentmindedly, intently looking at the stars, and if only to prove to everyone that a 
philosopher is not always a fool, he bought all the olive mills in spring when they were 
being sold cheaply and sold them expensively when harvest came in autumn.  But what 
seemed to have earned Thales the reputation of a great thinker was, more than his ideas, 
his proclivity to wonder about not merely the fragments of experience but about 
everything all-together as a whole.305    
 Heidegger’s own reflection on the early Greek philosophers has also led him 
to discover that what was distinct about these thinkers was that their relationship with 
Being was still harmonious, a disposition not of control and desire for absolute 
knowledge but one of awe and wonder. Curiously, it was because of this that they were 
considered the “Greater Thinkers” (e.g., Heraclitus and Parmenides), and they were 
called not philosophers but aner philosophos, literally “he who loves the sophon.”306 It 
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was only later that the philosophers (Socrates, Plato and Aristotle) would actually 
appear, when the Greeks were forced to rescue being from the assault of the Sophist, 
who with his reasoning “always had ready for everything an answer which was 
comprehensible to everyone and which they put on the market.”307 To do this, thinking 
became “philosophy,” where the love of sophon, originally a harmony, became a 
“striving towards the sophon,” a yearning for that which we can never have. 
Consequently, philosophy became a search for what being is—that is, its Beingness, or 
that which makes being what it is. And it is as the task of capturing this Beingness that 
Aristotle would later define philosophy as speculative knowledge of the first principles 
and causes. Like Ferriols, Heidegger must have seen Aristotle’s obsession for answers, 
and comments sarcastically on the absurdity of his thinking: “After two-and-a-half 
thousand years it would seem to be about time to consider what the Being of being has 
to do with such things as “principles” and “causes.”308 
 Heidegger gives us crucial insights on the Greek philosophical heritage. In 
asking what philosophy is, he does not only return us to its source, but describes for us 
the physiognomy of its Greek origin. And because philosophia binds us to a historical 
tradition, it is certainly not just a thing of the past but “a path along which we are 
traveling.” But whose path is it really? Heidegger is unequivocal, warning us at the 
beginning of his work, that the “we” of which he speaks refers only to the people of 
the Western-European historical tradition. When he speaks of philosophia therefore, 
he is not claiming to present a universal narrative, but wants to tell the story of a 
particular journey it has taken, which traces the “path that leads from the actuality of 
the Greek world down to us.”309 And here, indeed, in showing the shift in philosophical 
focus on being, and the loss of the original harmony with sophon, and eventually to an 
enframing that is “attested by the rise and dominance of the sciences” and the atomic 
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age, Heidegger traces the path along which the Western-European society has traveled 
and brought the Greek heritage to a completion.  
 Heidegger called this completion the “end of Philosophy.” This is not to say, 
however, that philosophy has attained perfection but that philosophy as metaphysics 
has reached its “most extreme possibility,” which is accomplished not only by Marx 
but in the development of the sciences.310 From this, he claims that “to the extent that 
philosophical thinking is still attempted, it manages only to attain an epigonal 
renaissance and variations of that renaissance.”    
 It is important, indeed, to ponder on what Heidegger is saying here, especially 
in relation to our own articulation of or search for a Filipino philosophy. In 
understanding philosophy as a journey that occurs in history, tracing its determinate 
beginning with the Greeks all the way to its consummation in the Western-European 
historical tradition, we are forced to ask ourselves if the idea of a Filipino philosophy 
is still even viable. Perhaps Quito was right all along, and those who believed in the 
idea was holding onto an illusion. But would it not be possible to root ourselves in the 
Greek intellectual heritage and from there trace our own philosophical journey, without 
being oblivious to nor continuing from (neither would be impossible anyway) the 
Western-European tradition? And then, against Heidegger’s wishes, claim this our 
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right to philosophy and refuse that it has come to an end? Perhaps, but we would miss 
out on a very crucial possibility.   
 To say that philosophy has ended is not in any way a pejorative statement 
against those of the non-Western European tradition in implying that they had missed 
their chance. In fact, Heidegger wishes to end philosophy so that thinking can begin. 
This means: to put an end to “thinking” that has made the “technological-scientific-
industrial as the sole criterion of man’s world sojourn,” and finally allow thinking that 
is “content with awakening a readiness in man for a possibility whose contour remains 
obscure, whose coming remains uncertain.”311 Only in this sense, which is contrary to 
the traditional notion of “thinking” as “re-presenting,” as “a kind of willing,” can 
thinking finally become a non-willing, an act of waiting.312   
 We would have to clarify and explore further what this thinking actually means 
for us, and how it can be carried out. But what is easily discernible at this moment is 
that this task of thinking which awaits us at the end of philosophy can potentially 
liberate us from the burden of categories and prejudices of a Great Tradition, which, 
whether we admit it or not, has determined and against which we have measured our 
thinking even before we could really begin. “That we are still not thinking,” is, 
according to Heidegger the “most thought-provoking.” But it also means that with the 
end of philosophy, we can begin, we are forced to begin to think for ourselves. Again, 
this is not say that we would be completely oblivious to the Western-European 
tradition, or even to the “Greater Eastern” tradition for that matter. Rather, in saying 
that philosophy has concluded, we accept that we no longer need to and can no longer 
continue on this path. And for us who were never meant to travel along this road 
anyway, the task at the end of philosophy lies in reflecting on the path that thinking has 
taken for us--not excluding our adventures along this Western-European path, but also 
                                                 
311 Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy,” 60.  
312  See Martin Heidegger, “Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking,” in 
Discourse on Thinking, trans. John Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1966), 58-68.  
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now including the other paths to thinking that we have neglected or rejected in our 
desperate attempt to be “philosophical.”  
 
Lundagin mo, Beybe! (Jump, baby!) 
 While many scholars sought to establish a Filipino philosophy, seeking new 
strategies on how to go about it, Ferriols was very critical of the whole endeavor, yet 
very different from Quito’s skeptical view. Like Heidegger, Ferriols understood that 
thinking could not and should not be limited within the confines of a concept such as 
philosophy. While he was indefatigable in establishing the Filipino language as a 
medium for philosophical discourse, he believed that to develop a Filipino philosophy 
was simply a waste of time, like “blowing bubbles against the wind.”  As early as 1974, 
he already explained his position on this matter: 
Chuang Tzu did not try to develop a Chinese philosophy. He simply awoke to 
the Way within him and around him, tried to awake even more, knew that what 
he lived could not be put into words—When all that can be said has been said, 
the most important thing cannot be said—yet felt compelled to say all that he 
could say. Hundreds of years later what he said still lives and is called Chinese 
philosophy. He is surprised. It is the Way that matters to him, not the label. 313 
Unlike our German philosopher, however, Ferriols did not dwell on this problem, nor 
did he try to bring philosophy to an end or suggested how thinking must proceed. For 
him, the matter was really very simple: if one really wanted to philosophize, one should 
simply think, and if one were to think, one would have to begin. And so, with words 
that never fail to encourage and amuse students, Ferriols would say in class, Lundagin 
mo beybe! (Jump [into the water], baby!).314   
                                                 
313 Roque Ferriols, S.J., “A Memoir of Six Years,” Philippine Studies 22, no.3/4 (1974): 
339.  
314 In an essay written by Ferriols to introduce philosophy to “beginners,” he warns 
against the automatism of rules and method that impede our thinking. He uses the 
metaphor of students who are trying to learn to swim, who by the poolside are eagerly 
take down notes of everything that the teacher is saying. But when the teacher tells 
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 In understanding the Greek tradition and what it means for us, Ferriols’s study 
of the pre-Socratics has indeed proven invaluable. Through the eyes of Ferriols (and 
not Heidegger’s), we see Thales from an angle slightly askew: not as the great thinker 
who was one with the great sophon, but as a man, who with very human passions and 
faults, wondered about the universe. And for Ferriols, this curiosity, this desire to 
question, to travel, to search, to learn, are not extraordinary abilities of a genius but the 
natural proclivities of every human. Of course, there are people who refuse to nourish 
these tendencies, and some, like Thales, who have chosen to live a life of endless 
wonder and learning, and the reason for which we remember him as an exemplar of the 
true philosopher. Nevertheless, Ferriols, with the soundness not of proof but of his 
common sense (if only Quito had used hers too), conjectures that there were others, 
long before Thales was even born, with the same kind of curiosity, and for this reason 
the latter was most likely not the first man to think.315 He says,  
This is not the place to investigate whether there was this kind of awareness 
that took place in other cultures—and when. But in the Greek world, this 
awareness happened, it seems, at the time of Thales. I will not say that Thales 
was the first among the Greeks to experience this awareness. At the moment 
of the birthing of a new type of thinking, people are not aware that something 
new is beginning. That’s why no one takes note of every detail about this new 
birthing. But at the moment when this new type of thinking begins to exist, 
people will look back to the past, and recognize through the clouds of vague 
memories the shape of heroes of a new thinking. It was the form of Thales, it 
seems, that was recognized, and that’s why he was named the “first 
philosopher” of the Greeks.316  
                                                 
them to jump into the water, they can’t and won’t stop writing. See Roque Ferriols, S.J. 
“Sapagkat ang Pilosopiya ay Ginagawa,” in http://pilosopotasyo.tripod.com/una.html.  
315 Ferriols, Sinaunang Griyego, 9. 
316 Ferriols, Sinaunang Griyego, 10.  
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 In reflecting on the origins of our philosophical journey, Ferriols shows us the 
indeterminateness of beginnings; for while history “officially” recognizes the Greeks 
as the progenitors of philosophy, and Thales as the “first” among them, the past is a 
“cloud of vague memories” to which we must always return, in search for those other 
heroes who may have been ignored or who are now just beginning to emerge in clear 
sight, and whose thinking may have very well existed before and beyond the Greeks. 
Heidegger could not have seen this, so intent was he in tracing the Western-European 
historical tradition, that the beginning, the source of thinking could only be Greek.  
 From all this, we can better understand what Gripaldo was trying to do, 
something that Ferriols himself was not able to; that through the traditional approach, 
we would seek out our own intellectual heroes, and lay out our philosophical journey, 
not as a continuation of but alongside the Greeks. Of course keeping in mind the legacy 
of Thales that Ferriols presents to us, as both “first philosopher” and “not-the-first 
thinker,” so that in seeking out our heroes, we would also remember those who are 
overlooked.    
 Curiously, despite its history of Filipinization, the Ateneo philosophy 
curriculum does not offer a course on Filipino philosophy. But if one considers how 
Ferriols’s views have played a part in this, then it is not that surprising.   This is not to 
say that efforts to indigenize the discipline have not continued in the Ateneo, since half 
of its philosophy core courses are still taught in Filipino. It is more likely though that 
underlying the curriculum was the belief that in order to filipinize philosophy, it would 
be best not to talk about it (i.e., in a module such as Filipino philosophy), but rather, to 
put it in practice, to allow the “Filipino,” through the vernacular, to permeate every 
moment of philosophical discourse, and from there build a philosophical vocabulary 
and tradition of our own.  Of course one would have to study carefully how far this 
ideal is actually being achieved—which is precisely what is lacking—a course (which 
could have easily been titled differently, if Ferriols had qualms about calling it 
“Filipino philosophy”) that would provide a venue consecrated not only to an 
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engagement with the works of our philosophers but to a reflexive study of the history 
and development of the philosophical discipline in the Philippines. DLSU has their 
FilPhilo course, but even UST has its seminar on Filipino Philosophy, which ironically, 
was included in the curriculum through Co’s initiative.317 
 Underlying the absence of a Filipino philosophy course in the Ateneo 
curriculum was not just a reflection of Ferriols’s mistrust for labels. He was, more than 
anything, afraid of being caught in discourse, which he believed distracted people from 
the goal—which is to think.318 On the one hand, when one evaluates the situation and 
sees how our philosophers have been stuck searching, defining, and strategizing the 
best approach to Filipino philosophy for more than twenty years, one has reason to 
believe that Ferriols had a point.  On the other, one wonders how far thinking can 
actually go without understanding or making explicit to itself the path that it has thus 
far traveled, or even be relevant, when it tries to avoid engaging others in discourse.  
 It is hard to imagine that Ferriols would be completely unengaged, especially 
for a philosopher who has always been meticulously watchful of things. But in order 
to consecrate fully his time and effort to thinking, he opted to stay away from polemics. 
Did this make him less relevant?   
 Judging from the force of Ferriols’s insights, one cannot help wonder if his 
book on the Presocratics is the kind of expository scholarship that Abulad and Gripaldo 
believed to be doomed.  Reading his reflections on the task of a historian of philosophy, 
one sees not only how it surpasses Gripaldo’s own musings, but how it profoundly 
                                                 
317 The “Seminar in Filipino Philosophy” at U.S.T., according to the course 
description, is “aimed at a philosophical investigation on the existence, or 
development” of Filipino Philosophy, and does not in any way presuppose the latter. 
In doing so, its aim is to give “a survey of the corpus of writings of published Filipino 
Philosophers,” such as Abulad, Co, Garcia, Ibana, Mercado, Quito, etc. See 
http://philosophy.ust.edu.ph/undergraduate.html. 
318 In an interview, Ferriols explains that while his philosophy was a reaction to the 
irrelevance and impersonal character of Scholasticism (specifically what Etienne 
Gilson calls Cartesian Thomism), he had chosen not to reveal this in any of his books. 
His fear was that if he had engaged in such polemics, that he would be stuck in 
discourse, in an endless debate on who is right and wrong. (Ferriols, interview, 2009.)  
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anticipates and defines an important task. With Ferriols’s words, I, too, am forced to a 
self-evaluation:   
In the discipline of history of philosophy, the aim of the researcher is to 
understand, to be part of, to experience the spirit of the person in search…. A 
respect for what was really thought, thwarting one’s own tendency to hasten 
and claim that what was not thought was thought, courage to engage an 
encounter with the thinkers one is trying to understand…. He also needs a 
critical spirit: he will come to realize that he has unexpected talents for 
thinking—he will be forced to use areas of his brain that he was never been in 
the habit of using—and horizons of understanding will unravel before his 
astonished eyes. He will also sense errors, narrow-mindedness, a disregard for 
what should be obvious--and he will learn from all this too.319   
 
“Philosophers,” in the loose sense  
 When one looks at the various attempts by some of our philosophers to write 
the history of philosophy in the country, one sees that they often begin with the 
“colonial” stage, when philosophy was primarily taught by Spanish friars and priests 
in seminaries and was predominantly a Scholastic Thomism. Abulad calls this the “first 
colonial phase,” to distinguish it from a “second colonial phase,” when waves of 
Filipino scholars, after their studies in America and Europe, brought home a new range 
of philosophical ideas. These were seen as “exciting times,” which not only “brought 
about the emergence of a new philosophical landscape in the Philippines,” 320  but 
challenged and finally overcame the hegemony of Scholastic thought.321 What came 
next was, for Abulad, an “indigenous phase,” when our philosophers became self-
                                                 
319 Ferriols, Sinaunang Griyego, 10.  
320  Alfredo Co, “In the Beginning… A Petit Personal Historical Narrative of the 
Beginning of Philosophy in the Philippines,” in Co, Across the Philosophical Silk 
Road, 39.  
321 Romualdo Abulad, “Contemporary Filipino Philosophy,” Karunungan 5 (1988): 4-
5. 
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conscious of their contribution to the “nationalist cause,” and the question of a “Filipino 
philosophy” became a primary concern. Co corroborates this part of Abulad’s 
narrative, but the two will differ in how the story will go on. For Co, our history of 
philosophy continues with a second wave of scholars who, finishing their Ph.D. from 
1986 onwards, are expected to carry further, match, or surpass the “legacy of the first 
wave of Filipino philosophers” (1950-1985) through an ever greater expertise and 
sustained publication. Abulad, on his part, also sees our history in a linear progression, 
but his measure of progress is qualitatively different. Through the progressive option, 
which we have mentioned earlier, the goal for the future is to move beyond the first 
stage of indigenization (or the “early indigenization,” which refers to the 
anthropological schemes of Mercado, Timbreza, and Quito) towards the second phase 
(“late indigenization”), which is when the Filipino scholar becomes a true philosopher, 
that is, an “original thinker.”322 Unfortunately, it seems that the Filipino still operates 
on “borrowed methodology,” and has therefore “not yet come to a point where he is 
able to develop a research procedure so original that his peers abroad will be in a 
position to imitate him.”323 Consequently, Abulad will argue that we are really still at 
the “groping stage,” in search of a “Father of Filipino philosophy,” “a leading spirit… 
from whose philosophy we shall find a source of eternal inspiration.”324Does this mean 
then that Filipino philosophy has been all this time only moving along what we may 
call pre-history, and that the real one has not even begun? 
                                                 
322 Earlier, we saw that Abulad’s exemplary philosopher was Marx. But for that same 
reason, the philosopher, as an original thinker, had to be Hegelian. Like Quito, Abulad 
believed that Hegel’s originality consisted “in his lack of originality” (Abulad, 
“Contemporary Filipino Philosophy,” 9). Here, originality does not mean, as it is 
popularly believed, the “defiance of what is respectable, honored, and established,” but 
a courageous subversion of all prejudices, including one’s own, in one’s search for 
truth. In other words, the philosopher is one who gets beyond “petty squabbles,” to 
usher “the emergence of the philosophical Jerusalem, where all doctrinal 
incompatibilities melt as in a wedlock.” Romualdo Abulad, “The Filipino as a 
Philosopher in Search of Originality,” Karunungan 2 (1985): 9.    
323 Abulad, “Contemporary Filipino Philosophy”: 8.  
324 Abulad, “In Search of Originality”: 16. 
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 More than twenty years later, the progenitor has not appeared, and I doubt if 
Abulad ever believed that such a figure would be found—well, at least not in his (or 
anyone’s) lifetime. A true-blue Marxist-Hegelian, Abulad is convinced that the road to 
Truth (i.e., originality) can only be “a long and laborious journey… the entire length 
of which has to be traversed since every moment is necessary.” But even the diligence 
and patience of an excellent apprentice cannot ensure success. As Abulad tells us, “the 
Ph.D. and even moreso the M.A., gives no foolproof guarantee,” for although these 
degrees may be important for practical reasons, “they cannot replace that invisible 
instant of transformation,” in Plato’s words, that “leaping spark,” which “brings a 
philosopher suddenly into being.” Abulad explains further:   
This moment of illumination can never be taught; it engulfs one in an almost 
mysterious fashion, when one least expects it, but always after prolonged, 
patient and loyal engagement with the subject. It lasts only a moment, but it is 
a moment of awakening, after which all dark areas light up, all enigmas 
dissolve and all uncertainties vanish.325  
 In the end, however, no one really knows if or when it happens, because “God 
is the only silent witness on this lonely road to authenticity.” And as if that were not 
enough to keep the philosopher out of our reach, Abulad reminds his fellow Filipinos: 
As pioneers of a Filipino Philosophy we can in no way regard ourselves as 
originators of philosophy. Philosophy is not our invention. Arrogance in the 
face of outstanding achievements from both sides of the globe is foolhardy and 
uncalled for. Let us admit, then, at the very outset that we are virtual 
newcomers in an intellectual game which has been producing masters for more 
than two millenia.326 
No matter, with the prospect of having a “Father of Filipino Philosophy” sometime in 
the future, we can still hope, and “do our heroic best to clear the ground for his advent, 
                                                 
325 Abulad, “In Search of Originality”: 10.  
326 Abulad, “In Search of Originality”: 15.  
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even if we ourselves will not live to see the glorious day.”327 This is why, like Co, 
Abulad will suggest that we march happily into the future, for the “best strategy” is “to 
keep on doing the thing which [we] have been called to do, with hardly the need to 
worry about whether the ideas [we] are giving birth to are foreign or Filipino.”  
 At first glance, it appears that Abulad is saying the same thing as Ferriols: that 
instead of worrying about titles, and self-consciously aiming to achieve what we may 
call “Filipino philosophy,” we should simply allow ourselves to think. But at a closer 
look, one sees a crucial difference: while Ferriols does not define a goal or say what 
we must become, Abulad identifies and describes quite elaborately an ideal. One would 
think, that later, when he spoke about the postmodern age, he would finally abandon 
his teleology. But he only reasserts it, so that in 2010, echoing his idea of a progressive 
option, he would argue that the relevance of a philosopher is measured by how 
effectively he achieves what is expected of him, and that is to “lead the pack to new 
spiritual frontiers.”   
 Sometimes, Abulad understood that philosophy was not just about building 
systems. The philosopher, he says, excels not just in his mastery of the philosophical 
traditions of both East and West, but also in the way his intellect “cuts deeply into 
established prejudices and provides thought with a power that knows no sacred cows.” 
Unfortunately, it never occurs to him that philosophy itself has become an idol. For the 
Greeks, philosophy was an endless yearning for the sophon. For Abulad and other 
scholars like him, it was not Being but philosophy and the philosopher that they most 
revered and kept safely out of their reach. And it was with these idols that the sincerest 
efforts of their fellow philosophers were always safely beneath the mark. There are no 
words better to describe such a deplorable situation than that, in Nietzsche’s words, 
“the lie of the ideal has so far been the curse on reality.”328 In the end, one wonders 
                                                 
327 Abulad, “In Search of Originality”: 17.  
328 Friedrich Nietzsche, “How One Becomes What One is,” in Ecce Homo, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Inc., 1989), 218.  
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how this is any different from those scholars, who with their regressive schemes, 
Abulad criticizes for not stepping-up to realize the dream. They are really only the two 
sides of the same coin.   
 
 “The Philosopher and the Pilosopo” 
 Gripaldo was also inflicted by this ideal, this measure that renders reality “not 
quite.” He laments that, while there are a few Filipino philosophers, many have 
remained merely teachers or scholars of philosophy. 329  Quito, who had the same 
grievance twenty years earlier, labeled them as philosophers, “in the loose sense.”330 
But while Quito saw no redemption, Gripaldo urged his fellow Filipino scholars to 
aspire, not simply to become a philosopher, but to be a world-class thinker.   
 In this so-called “postmodern” and global age, when publishing at tiered 
journals has become the measure, and consequently the desire, of every scholar, the 
philosopher realizes that he can no longer merely be a professor in the narrow walls of 
his classroom but in order to survive, must have a “global impact.” Speaking at a 
colloquium on “The Relevance of Philosophy to the Modern Filipino Intellectual” in 
the late ‘70s, former chair of the U.P. Philosophy department and student of Pascual, 
Armando Bonifacio, had already warned us about the danger of underestimating the 
value of teaching. He argued that within the academic setting, philosophy was certainly 
relevant to the student’s intellectual development, but that “the paramount question of 
course [was] whether the philosophy teachers themselves [saw] the relevance of their 
enterprise.” 331  Judging from the way students have become alienated from 
philosophical concerns, Bonifacio thinks that philosophy teachers do not see their own 
relevance, and therefore are not able to convey the importance of philosophy and show 
its application to life.   
                                                 
329 Rolando Gripaldo, “The Making of a Filipino Philosopher,” 39. 
330 Quito, State of Philosophy, 9. 
331 Armando Bonifacio, “Philosophy and National Survival” Sophia 6 (1976-1977): 52.  
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 Both Quito and Bonifacio attest to the pejorative meaning that Filipinos 
normally impute to the term “pilosopo,” referring to a person who not only “perorates 
endlessly,”332 but one “who pretends to know.”333 But while Quito thinks that this 
perception cannot be helped, Bonifacio believes that the image of the “pilosopo” can 
still be rehabilitated. Unfortunately, philosophy teachers have only succeeded in 
maintaining this bad image. And if now being “world-class” becomes the primary goal, 
one can only imagine the philosopher alienating himself even more; for he would 
certainly be running after the latest trends to make himself relevant to the world, which 
may or may not be useful to the society to which he belongs. All the more, indeed, 
philosophy in the Philippines would become a “losing proposition.”  
 It is curious, however, that despite their knowledge of Pilosopo Tasyo, a 
character in Noli Me Tangere, neither Quito nor Bonifacio would use Rizal’s complex 
portrayal of the Filipino philosopher to nuance their own description; for while those 
who could not understand his wisdom dubbed him a fool or a madman, or a charlatan 
who shows off his knowledge, the well-educated, called him, with utmost respect,   
either as “Don Anastasio or the philosopher Tasio.”334 Was the importance of Tasyo 
overlooked because he was merely a fictional character not meant to be taken 
seriously? And yet, Pascual would find it relevant to point out that Rizal himself had 
vouched that Tasyo represented something or someone real in life.335  
 Tasyo was no Socrates, although the latter may have also appeared strange.336 
From the dialogues of Plato, we find Socrates depicted as a man in control, that not 
                                                 
332 Quito, State of Philosophy, 9. 
333 Bonifacio, “National Survival”: 50.  
334 See Jose Rizal, “Tasio” and “In the Philosopher’s Home,” Noli Me Tangere, trans. 
in Ma. Soledad Lacson-Locsin (Makati: The Bookmark, Inc, 2006), 97-107 and 218-
231. 
335 Pascual quotes Rizal’s letter to Señor Barrantes: “But I have pictured side by side 
with evil, the good; I have pictured an Elias and a Tasio, because Elias and Tasio exist, 
exist, and exist. . .; only you and your coreligionist, fearing that this little good that I 
have pictured would serve as example for the bad and would redeem them, shout that 
it is false, poetic, exaggerated, ideal, impossible, improbable….” Letter to Ponce, 
Aug.18,1888, quoted in Pascual, Philosophy of Rizal, xv.   
336  Socrates was notoriously known for walking barefoot and unwashed. Rarely 
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even alcohol could intoxicate him. Though he may be, under that Apollinian guise, as 
a physiognomist had once revealed, “a cave of all evil passions,” Socrates became a 
“master over them all” by making a stronger tyrant out of reason.337  In the Apologia, 
we find him warning the people of Athens, so certain of his worth, that if they kill him, 
it is not he who will suffer but they, who will not easily find another one like him, a 
gadfly given to the state by God to ensure that they may live in humility and virtue.  
 Tasyo, on the other hand, was someone who hardly had control over his 
emotions or any situation. He had to give up his philosophy studies to follow the wishes 
of his mother who was afraid that he would become a godless sage. Later, being 
orphaned and widowed, he floundered in his loneliness, seeking solace in his books to 
a point that he became neglectful of worldly matters, which gradually led to the loss of 
his fortune. And yet, Tasyo was no fool. He was a realist who understood the ways of 
people, and having observed them for too long, saw that “no one loves naked truth for 
its own sake.” And so, with the same prudence that he advises Ibarra to play along and 
feign obedience to persons of power, the philosopher Anastacio (whose name in Greek 
means “resurrection”), writes in hieroglyphics to save his books from being burned, in 
the belief that a future generation will come, with the proper education, to decode and 
make his message known.   
 No one understood the importance of education better than Pascual himself. 
But despite the many books he had written and the intellectual influence with which he 
led the U.P. Philosophy department in the struggle against clerical aggressions in the 
1950s, Pascual is still remembered as “a negligible father of philosophy in the State 
university.” 338  It is said that he was “more interested in provoking his students, 
shattering their religious beliefs, than in writing philosophy articles or books.” 339 
                                                 
changing his clothes, he “efficiently wore in the daytime what he covered himself with 
at night.”http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socrates/.   
337 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols,” 113. 
338 Co, “Doing Philosophy in the Philippines,” 53.  
339 Co, “Doing Philosophy in the Philippines,” 53. 
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Furthermore, people are not aware that Pascual had organized in the ‘50s what he 
would call the Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP), which is today 
thought to have been established only in 1973, under the initiative of Professor Jorge 
Revilla of the University of the East (U.E.).340  
 In addition to these contributions, Pascual wrote a libretto for an operetta which 
was meant to “[embody] Rizal’s theory of complete education.”341 It is here that we 
find a very important dialogue between Tasyo and the schoolmaster, who we know 
from Noli, was borrowing books from the old philosopher, and was discovering 
knowledge that was radically changing his perspective on education.342 As in the novel, 
Pascual writes a scene where the schoolmaster complains to Tasyo: while he himself 
had hoped to put an end to whipping students as a form of punishing, the parents 
themselves are asking that it be reinstated. It is in response to the schoolmaster’s 
anguish that Tasyo sings:  
My young friend, your own task is much greater than mine!  
I expose rottenness long encrusted in time  
But you tend to the seed that must reach the sublime! 
You bravely carve the future out of tender mind 
On teaching truly rests the end fate of mankind. 
Have patience my friend, good luck to you and your kind!343 
 
The Philosopher-Teachers of the San Beda Philosophy Department  
                                                 
340 Dr. Reyes, interview, 2011. 
341 Pascual’s libretto was the first prize winner in a national competition, and was 
performed as an operetta, with the musical composition of Dr. Eliseo Pajaro. Its 
premiere performance, which was held on the evening of August 26, 1962, was 
according to Pascual, “a fitting climax” to a year-long celebration of “the First 
Centenary of the birth of Jose Rizal.” Preface to Pascual, Philosophy of Rizal, ix-x).   
342 See Rizal, “The Tavails of a Schoolmaster,” Noli Me Tangere, 136-147.  
343 Ricardo Pascual, “Ba Be Bi Bo Bu,” in Rizal on Education: A Tetralogy of Dramas 
(Manila: Community Publishers, Inc, 1962), 32.  
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 In idealizing him as an “original” or “world-class” thinker, we run the risk of 
denying the philosopher the possibility of assuming other forms.  In the story that 
follows, we see an instance of how the philosopher takes the most unassuming form of 
a teacher, who, although may not have a “global impact,” can provide an impetus for 
thinking which is crucial in his particular context.  
 In 2008, Arcadio Malbarosa, Rafael Dolor, Feorillo Demeterio, III, and Max 
Felicida, all tenured faculty members of the Philosophy Department of San Beda 
College-Mendiola, were without warning handed, via courier, their termination letters. 
The administration had closed down their department as the result of what it claimed 
to be a “streamlining of course offerings… for national development.” The real reason, 
however, was that these four professors came into conflict with the monks of the 
Benedictine Abbey, as the result of their struggle to change radically the philosophy 
curriculum. With the dissolution of the department, it was obvious that the Benedictine 
monks had enough and decided it was time to eliminate these “trouble-makers.”     
 In an email sent by Malbarosa to fellow philosophy professors, he explains that 
the change started in 1993, the beginning of his five-year chairship, when the San Beda 
Philosophy department “embarked on the progressive and systematic development of 
a program that approximated the Frankfurt School.” 344  The intention was, at the 
beginning, primarily a positioning—while Ateneo was known for its phenomenologist-
existentalist approach, U.P. and U.S.T. for their Analytic and Thomist tradition 
respectively, the philosophy professors at the San Beda College envisioned their 
program as the “country’s center for Critical Theory.”  
 This ideological positioning, however, was more than a search for a niche. 
Malbarosa and Felicida, both former scholastics at the Divine Word seminary, had 
done apostolate in the urban poor in the early days. While scholasticism was officially 
what they learned in the seminary, their immersion had given them an understanding 
                                                 
344 Arcadio Malbarosa, email, March 28, 2008.  
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of the alienation that was prevalent in Philippine society.  Demeterio, on the other hand, 
had studied linguistics in U.S.T., and later in U.P., where he found in the Literature 
department a strong tradition of Marxism and Critical Theory.  It was he, the most 
prolific writer in the group, who would later articulate the “pathology” of philosophy 
in the country as a kind of alienated thinking, whose “fatal emphasis on the answer 
component” has taken philosophical ideas out of context, using them as “answers” 
without really understanding the real questions that arise in our own society. 
Philosophy is therefore, according to Demeterio’s diagnosis, “alien in origin” because 
it “disregards the life-giving circuit” where paradigms, questions, the act of searching, 
and answers are supposedly drawn from tradition and brought back to it.345   
 Coming from their respective backgrounds, and with a shared view of the 
problem of alienation, these professors were convinced that the current humanist 
approach to philosophy, as found in Ateneo or U.S.T., was no longer viable, and that 
in order for philosophy “to bite the social problems that are surrounding us,” it would 
have to be repositioned as a discipline in the social sciences. It was in relation to this 
new thrust that a course entitled “Explorations in Filipino Philosophy” was introduced. 
It was “a critical survey of the central issues, questions, themes on the status or 
existence of Filipino philosophy.” The course, however, was meant not merely as a 
survey of the works of Filipino philosophers, as in the case in Co’s “Seminar in Filipino 
Philosophy,” but a venue to understand Filipino philosophy but in relation to the works 
of Filipino scholars in the social science disciplines. 
 The real trouble, however, began not really with the changes in the curriculum 
but when these professors brought to practice what they taught in the classrooms. Of 
course, the monks had long ago pulled out their seminarians from the program when 
the new one was implemented in 1993, and was sending them to study philosophy at 
                                                 
345  F.P.A. Demeterio III, “Re-Reading Emerita Quito’s Thoughts Concerning the 
Underdevelopment of Filipino Philosophy,” DiwaTao 1, no. 1 (2001). From 
http://www.geocities.ws/philodept/diwatao/emerita_quito.htm.   
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UST and Christ the King seminary. But what seemed to have really triggered the 
animosity was when the four professors became actively involved in supporting 
students in their struggle to uphold their rights in their Magna Carta.346 
 The conflict between students and administration ensued from the latter’s 
implementation of the uniform policy for Freshmen in 2007. The contention was that 
the policy, which was implemented without consulting the student body, was a clear 
violation of the Magna Carta. While the administration tried to make excuses, even 
questioning the legitimacy of the Magna Carta itself, the students saw it as a disturbing 
sign of the lack of respect for their rights.347 To express their indignation, the students 
held a rally from June 21 to 22, which ended in a march through the streets of 
Mendiola.348 Expressing their support for their students, the Faculty Club, under the 
leadership of Mathematics Professor, Dr. Fedeliz Tuy, did not only release their 
position on the matter, but took part in the rally themselves, to reaffirm the students of 
the importance of their struggle.  
 A few months later, the conflict escalated when the administration announced 
that it would no longer collect a schoolpaper publication fee from the tuition fees. 
Without the financial support from the administration, it only meant one thing: the 
eventual demise of the school newspaper, The Bedan.   For sixty-five years, The Bedan 
was known for its critical journalism, and had maintained that reputation during 
Malbarosa’s term as its Technical Adviser. Under the leadership of E.J. Mangahas as 
Editor-in-Chief, The Bedan supported and worked closely with Student Council 
                                                 
346 Felicida notes, however, that their radicalism did not start with the Magna Carta 
issue but way back in the late ‘90s when he, Malbarosa and Demeterio were actively 
involved in forming a labor union. Known and respected as a department of 
intellectuals, it was the philosophy professors who convinced the faculty of the College 
of Arts and Sciences (CAS) to join the union, which was the crucial step in legalizing 
the organization.  (Felicida, interview, 2011). 
347 See “Survey: 85.61% of Bedans Say Uniform Policy Violated Student Rights,” and 
“Administration’s Arguments for Policy Unfounded: Freshies Reject Uniform Policy 
Resoundingly,” in The Bedan (Red is Dead) LXV, no. 1 (2007): 8-9. From 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/18047886/Red-is-Dead-Issue-by-65.  
348 “The Cry of Mendiola: Bedans Unite to Defend Magna Carta,” The Bedan (Red is 
Dead) LXV, no. 1 (2007): 2.  
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president and philosophy major, Janking Suravilla in the fight to uphold the Student 
Magna Carta against the uniform policy.349 But it was precisely for its criticism of the 
administration that the latter tried to supress its freedom of speech. Again, the teachers, 
in support of their students, expressed their indignation, criticizing the administration’s 
action as “a prelude to [the] annihilation of further values, even life,” and commenting 
how it was uncannily similar to the Martial Law days. But Demeterio saw an 
opportunity in the crisis, and predicted that “although the tradition of structured and 
organized publication might suffer a set back, the writing will go on.” And given a 
strong Bedan studentry, he was certain that “the paper could become even more radical 
as it gains total independence from the admin.”350 And true enough, The Bedan staff 
was more than ready for the challenge, with a retort that Managing Editor, Ramon 
King, III captures quite eloquently: Ano ngayon kung wala kaming pondo? (And so 
what if we have no funds?).351  
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 But as we know, the students were not the only ones sanctioned. A few months 
before our philosophy professors were handed their early retirement package, the 
rector-president Father Mateo de Jesus decided to terminate the operations of the 
Graduate School of Philosophy (GSP). Felicida, who was the Dean of the GSP, was 
completely shocked by the news, for it had only been a year since the agreement was 
made between him, the former rector-president Father Anscar Chupungco, O.S.B., and 
the Board of Trustees that the Masters program would be given at least three years to 
establish and develop before being evaluated.  
 The idea, in fact, of a graduate program came from Chupungco himself, who 
as a visionary, dreamed that San Beda would eventually attain university status. But in 
order for this to happen, the College needed a Liberal Arts program, and so in 2006, he 
sought the help of our four philosophy professors to design what came to be a Masters 
program of Philosophy in Cultural Studies and Good Governance, which clearly had 
the thrust of applied philosophy.   
 In retrospect, Felicida believes that aside from the ideological differences, they 
were simply “victims of internal problems in the monastery,” of the feud between 
Chupungco and his successor, De Jesus. Nevertheless, precisely because they believed 
in Chupungco’s vision, they could not simply turn a deaf ear to the many misguided 
actions of the administration. Thus, in an article published in The Bedan, Felicida 
exposes the anomalies behind the closure, claiming that while the decision was done 
through a referendum, the voting ensued without any thorough deliberation grounded 
on vital information. In a sourly tone, he says: 
As the dean, I should have been invited by the board to present the programs 
that I had developed in order for them to have a well-informed discussion…. 
This did not happen. The Board either decided that it knew what I knew and 
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therefore I was unnecessary or it forgot about me in its state of awe at the new 
rector.352  
 However, what makes this abrupt closure even more questionable is its blatant 
disregard for the three students who had already enrolled in the program. In fact, the 
administration used precisely this issue to argue that the program was not economically 
viable and was causing “financial hemorrhage,” exactly the same argument that was 
later given with the dissolution of the Philosophy department.  Needless to say, the 
claim was erroneous (e.g., the Economics department had less enrollees than the 
Philosophy department); and Dolor had found out that while the Vice Dean already 
stopped  all student applications to the philosophy program, there had not been any 
study done with regard to the closure of the philosophy department. Thus, the real issue 
was that San Beda was being run like a monastery, and that the Abbott and his lackeys 
were expecting no less than perfect obedience from everyone. It is therefore not 
surprising that our philosophy professors, who have been accused of radicalizing the 
students, were perceived as a complication that posed a serious threat to the “order.”353 
 
The “Pathology” of Filipino Philosophy  
  Considering this fairly recent case of an ideological and political scuffle with 
a religious order, one can only agree with Demeterio that Abulad’s evolutionary 
scheme is misleading; for while it is true that our philosophers, coming fresh from their 
graduate studies abroad, had brought new ideas that “cracked the granite walls of 
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353 Felicida explains that it was a case of “management style,” and notes how De Jesus 
summarily terminated the entire workforce of the canteen, all 21 personnel, since the 
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Thomistic Philosophy,” we cannot really say that we have evolved out of our “colonial 
phase.”  Quite the contrary, Demeterio points out that Scholasticism is far from being 
“a thing of the past,” being the “the most predominant mode of doing philosophy in the 
Philippines.”354  
 Furthermore, Demeterio questions whether there was indeed an evolutionary 
development, as Abulad’s entire narrative claims, especially from the early indigenous 
to the late indigenous phase. He finds these “smooth transitions” to be “quite tricky,” 
especially when one considers what really happened, which in his assessment was “not 
an evolutionary movement but a devolutionary one.” Demeterio says: 
By distantiating themselves from the agenda of the early indigenous phase, 
many Filipino philosophers slid back to the concerns of the second colonial 
phase, where they took the easy way again of preoccupying themselves with 
the purposeless expounding of one foreign philosophy after another.355  
 One reason, he says, is that this transition from early indigenization to its later 
phase is a “transition motivated by the intellectual boredom resulting from the over-
saturation of works on early indigenous philosophy.” 356  In fact, it was the same 
boredom that propelled scholars to move away from Thomism and seek out new ideas. 
But while boredom could be taken positively, as it is already suggested above in the 
way it urges the mind to search for more, Demeterio sees it as an alienation of the mind 
that seeks out western theories not for their relevance but for their “dramatic novelty 
and exotic foreignness.”357 Without a real engagement with the problems of society, it 
became easy for scholars of the second colonial phase, as well as those of the later 
                                                 
354 Demeterio III, “Re-Reading Emerita Quito’s Thoughts.”  
355 Feorillo Demeterio III, “Thought and Socio-Politics: An Account of the Late 
Twentieth Century Filipino Philosophy, 16. From 
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indigenous phase “to be lost in their profundity, forgetting in the process that 
philosophy is [sic] ought to be a theoretical engagement with reality.”358  
 Coming from a Marxist and Frankfurt School tradition, Demeterio was 
obviously partial to what he called a “critical Filipino philosophy,” (i.e., philosophy as 
a critique of society), which for him could never be “a mere academic desire of some 
armchair intellectual” but “something that is actually premised on a social, cultural, 
and national interest.”359 But the question is—and here Demeterio tries to understand 
further—why did our philosophers shirk away from these interests and instead nurture 
their fetish for the new? 
 According to Demeterio, the reason for the pathological underdevelopment of 
critical Filipino philosophy lies in a historical trauma, citing particularly the intellectual 
suppression that occurred during Martial Law.  Basing his analysis on the data collected 
in Gripaldo’s bibliography, he notes a surge in critical philosophy in the late ‘60s, 
reflecting the political unrest at that time and the birth of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines in 1968. With the declaration of Martial Law, however, one observes a 
sudden plateau in the number of works in critical philosophy beginning in the early 
‘70s, a steady decline until the mid-80s, until finally, a resurgence in the late ‘80s 
during the EDSA revolution.  
 Demeterio further substantiates his argument by citing oral accounts of 
philosophy professors who experienced those oppressive times.  In an open forum held 
at UST on February 8, 2002, for example, Quito recalls how she critiqued Martial Law 
in one of her books but was approached by an agent who asked her to remove this 
portion from her work. Others, like Timbreza and Dy, also attested to the 
precariousness of those times, explaining how it was necessary for one’s survival to 
“lie low.” Indeed, as Malbarosa and Felicilda pointed out, there were many, like Fr. 
Edicio de la Torre and Fr. Balweg, who continued to practice critical philosophy by 
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joining the “underground movement.” Demeterio contests this, not only because of the 
anti-intellectualism that at a certain point became prevalent in the underground 
movement, but because he believes that critical philosophy can only exist in public 
discourse, where everyone is given an equal opportunity to express, defend and critique 
ideas.  
 While Demeterio presents an interesting argument, one wonders how much 
this “trauma” can actually be held responsible for what is perceived as philosophy’s 
devolution. For if Demeterio himself notes that there was a resurgence of critical 
philosophy around the time of the EDSA revolution, then there must have been a point 
when our philosophers came to terms with their fears. Yet this does not explain why 
scholars of the late indigenous phase slid back to an expository form of scholarship 
rather than continuing the tradition of critical philosophy.  Furthermore, Demeterio 
relates the decline of critical philosophy to the rise of philosophy as an interpretation 
of the Filipino Weltanschauung, whose “phenomenal growth” beginning in the late 
‘70s and reaching its peak in the early ‘80s, coincided perfectly with Marcos’s 
dictatorial regime.  For Demeterio, however, this was no coincidence: this kind of 
philosophy thrived during those years of Fascism not only because it was considered 
“politically tame,” but because it fed into Marcos’s construction of a mythic 
nationalism.  Here, he concludes that, like many intellectuals in the social sciences, our 
philosophers too were “collaborators” during this time; that while they may not have 
been part of the “dictator’s intellectual machinery,” many of them “joined the epistemic 
bandwagon that [was] partial towards the churning out of nationalist discourses.”360 
 
A Philosophy of the Masses 
 There was, indeed, a collaboration that took place, but not exactly a dramatic 
complicity in a fascist’s evil designs.  In the maiden issue of the journal, Karunungan, 
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we learn from Quito that the PAPR was in fact an offshoot of a UNESCO-sponsored 
conference on Teaching and Research in Philosophy in the Asia-Pacific Region.  In that 
fateful meeting, which was held in Bangkok, in February, 1983, Quito reports that the 
participants lamented the fact “that indigenous philosophy was neglected in favor of 
European and American trends.”361 The consensus was that Asia, being one of the 
world’s oldest civilizations, had its own distinct philosophical character, but that “it 
will not surface unless local philosophers dig to the roots of their own indigenous 
culture.”  It was then agreed upon that the formulation of a philosophy autochthonous 
to the people, if it exists, would be the aim and focus of subsequent research.362  
 Long before this UNESCO-PAPR initiative however, there were already 
efforts in the early ‘70s to articulate the Philippine worldview. These efforts, which 
constitute the anthropological approach to philosophy, have been subjected to much 
criticism, not only for their unwitting “collaboration” with the Marcos regime but also 
for not being philosophical enough. A closer look into its historical context, however, 
will reveal that underlying this philosophical approach, though it may on the surface 
be merely descriptive (and therefore, regressive), is in fact a critique of the existing, 
predominant prejudices and structures of our thinking.  Such explanation could enable 
us to rehabilitate our understanding of the anthropological approach, against the views 
of its critics, and reevaluate its significance for the history of Filipino philosophy.   
 One of the pioneers of the anthropological approach to philosophy was Father 
Leonardo Mercado of the Society of Divine Word. In 1974, he published a book 
entitled Elements of Filipino Philosophy (EFP) which claimed to present a philosophy 
of the common (Filipino) tao (human person). To do this, Mercado found it necessary 
to get beyond the limits of the philosophical discipline by employing anthropological 
tools of investigation: on the one hand, a metalingguistic analysis of Philippine 
languages, with the underlying premise that language reflects the worldview of its 
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native speakers, and on the other, a phenomenology of Filipino behavior, 
complementing the former with a nonverbal analysis of the actions of people. The crux 
of his arguments, however, is fairly consistent and simple: that in contrast to the 
compartmentalized thinking of the Western man where one sees a dichotomy “between 
mind and matter, between body and soul, between one and the many, and between 
thought and reality,” the Filipino, “like his Oriental neighbors,” has a holistic or non-
dualistic view of the world, where object and subject are harmonized but at the same 
time are both held as distinct.363  
 Throughout the book, Mercado explores this theme of non-dualism in the 
various aspects of the life of the Filipino. While it is not my intention here to discuss 
the work in detail, it would be helpful for the reader to get a sense of how the author 
develops his argument. For instance, in the third chapter, he discusses the phenomenon 
of loob, which he identifies as the Filipino’s conception of selfhood. In explaining its 
holistic and interior aspects, Mercado relates loob to the body in terms of the dialectic 
link between interiority and action. One example he explores is the phenomenon of 
utang na loob, which he translates as “debt of volition.” In the citation below, he shows 
how loob governs and determines human social behavior. 
As the Tagalog proverb puts it, Ang utang na loob ay hindi mababayaran ng 
salapi (debt of volition cannot be repaid by money). Unlike ordinary debts 
where stipulations are made, utang na loob makes no condition. If X saves Y’s 
life from drowning, Y has an everlasting ‘debt of volition’ to X. X does not 
give any terms. But out of his own will (kusang loob) Y tries to show his 
goodness to X whenever he can at his own discretion. Loob becomes an interior 
law which tells Y to behave generously and amiably to X even for a lifetime.364 
Further, he writes: 
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City: Divine Word University Publications, 1974). Henceforth, EFP. 
364 Mercado, EFP, 65. 
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Anybody without the sense of ‘debt of volition’ is considered ‘shameless’ 
(walang hiya), an expression which most Filipinos resent. Likewise to reject a 
‘debt of volition’ leads to hiya, which may be an expression of interiority.365 
In this sense, loob acquires an ethical quality, as it pertains to a way of relating to the 
other.  Kagandahang-loob and kabutihang-loob (“goodness”) clearly show that an 
essential part of loob is human benevolence, which is none other than a sharing of one’s 
interiority (isang pagpapakaloob) as a response to the call of people in need 
(nagmamakaawa).  Loob, therefore, corresponds to moral conscience, which as budhi 
(the Tagalog word for conscience) not only refers to emotions but to “‘understanding,’ 
‘will,’ or the faculty of intuitive discernment.” 
 Mercado further explores this theme of non-dualism to explain, for example, 
the Filipino concept of time. Unlike in Western thought where the emphasis is on the 
objective measure of temporal progression (in categories of past, present, and future), 
the Filipino experiences time subjectively, rendered meaningful only in connection to 
his memory.366 This synthetic worldview of the Filipino, according to Mercado, also 
manifests in his desire to live harmoniously with others. Again, unlike the Westerner 
who is private and individualistic, the Filipino is depicted to be group-oriented, known 
as the sakop (tayo-tayo or “us”) behavior.367  
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366 Here, Mercado cites examples of actual interviews done in Laguna, a province south 
of Manila:   
 What time do you turn on your radio in the morning? 
 When the cocks crow for the second time at dawn. 
 How far is the Center from your house? 
 One cigarette. (Meaning one can reach the Center after he has smoked one 
cigarette).  
 When did you last see a movie in town? 
 That time when the eldest daughter of the barrio captain got married. 
(Mercado, EFP, 114). 
367 See Mercado “Chapter V: The Filipino as Social Being,” in EFP, 92-104. Mercado 
suggests that this sakop philosophy, which is based on “Filipino communitarian 
interpersonalism,” and which can therefore encourage the bayanihan spirit and 
pakikisama (smooth interpersonal relationship), provides an alternative to “the Western 
ideal of democratic procedure which encourages individualism.” (Mercado, EFP, 197).  
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While Mercado believed in the pioneering character of his work, calling it “the 
first systematic attempt to present the philosophy of the Filipino masses,”368 he reminds 
his readers that the study is not meant to be exhaustive, and that as a “humble 
beginning,” it merely “sketches the general lines of Filipino philosophy.” As the title 
of the work suggests, the goal is to present “elements” that would hopefully “serve as 
raw materials for future improvements.”369 
 These explanations, however, did not completely win the sympathies of 
Mercado’s contemporaries. While the book revealed new possibilities for research, 
Mercado was accused of being “non-engage [sic] in his philosophizing,” and that in 
being “guided by superstructural theories of anthropologists and linguists, he placed 
himself high above the subjects of his inquiry,” and failed to connect with his own 
people.370 U.P. Psychology and Philosophy professor, Virgilio Enriquez, would also 
find fault with Mercado, not only for lacking the proof to substantiate his claims but 
also for being too prescriptive.371 Others, still, have criticized his later works: while the 
contents of his work have been deemed “unsatisfactory as social science and just as 
inadequate as philosophy,”372 his eclectic methodology, which combines philosophy, 
theology, psychology and sociology, has been judged as pedagogically unsound, 
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In the Legacy of Religious Filipinizationists 
 While some of these criticisms may have been well-founded, it would still be 
in our best interest, in writing our history, to always keep looking back to the past for 
something that we may have missed. And perhaps in this case, it may be an emerging 
form of a new thinking that, because of prejudices, we easily mistook for nothing. 
Indeed, the harshest thing is not so much judging a work a failure at one point in time, 
but condemning the past as past, as something which Abulad once said, “no one needs 
to undertake again.” 
 Despite the criticisms surrounding him, Mercado never engaged in polemics. 
It was only thirty years after his first book was published that our philosopher finally 
addressed his critics, reflecting on the path that his thinking had taken, and showing, 
as we shall see, how it was part of a larger struggle. Looking back to his seminary days, 
Mercado tells us that the person who influenced him to write on Filipino philosophy 
was his teacher and fellow confrère, Father Ambrosio Manaligod, SVD. It was in a 
Philippine history class in 1957 that Mercado heard his teacher speak passionately on 
the first Filipino clergy, a topic on which the latter had apparently done extensive 
research for his dissertation. It was in the process of gathering data from the archives 
of various local religious orders that Manaligod became aware of the unequal treatment 
against the native clergy, an awakening which later culminated in his advocacy of 
Filipinization that “antedated the Second Vatican Council.”374  
 In response to this discrimination, and following the legacy of Filipino priests 
whom Manaligod identifies as “filipinizationists,”375 he (coming from Isabela), along 
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with Jesuit Father Hilario Lim of Zamboanga, Dominican Father Benito Vargas of 
Catanduanes, Augustinian Father Antonio Garin and Recollect Father Salvador 
Calsado from the Visayas, and Franciscan Father Julio Obvial of Batangas, wrote 
directly to Pope Pius XII, completely by-passing the papal nuncio, in appealing “for 
greater indigenous membership and leadership.”376 A few months later, the letter was 
followed by a Memorial “on the condition of our Native Religious Clergy,” where 
religious orders were accused of “foot dragging in the recruitment and forming of 
future local clerical leaders.”377 This, the Memorial argues, was a violation of the papal 
encyclicals from the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda Faith, that have not only 
encouraged the training of native religious and diocesan clergy, but have unequivocally 
stated that this training be not inferior, and that the native clergy be prepared not merely 
as auxiliaries to foreign missionaries but to “govern the local Church.”  But as facts 
have shown, racial prejudice still exists, impeding the fulfillment of these objectives.378  
 Although the Memorial was simply a request for the enforcement of the 
existing papal encyclicals, the Vatican refused to take action. Because of this, the six 
priests sought to provoke public reaction through mass media, and brought their 
struggle to the level of national politics. It was then that three of the six signatories 
especially stood out:  Manaligod, Lim, and Vargas, who, in proudly being called 
ManLimVar, presented themselves as the modern-day GomBurZa. With the help of 
Hilario Lim’s cousin, Senator Roseller Lim, Senate Bill No.38 was introduced, which 
proposed to prohibit the appointment of foreigners to head positions of educational 
institutions.  Later, in 1970, Manaligod, according to Mercado, would brag that he 
“‘drafted the Filipinization of School Heads Bill presented by Senator Roseller Lim in 
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the Senate and co-sponsored by Senators Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, Quintin 
Paredes, and Eulogio Balao.”379 What Mercado leaves out, however, is that Manaligod 
would also claim that their ideas of reform influenced the “new vision and the new 
approach” of Vatican II in its decree on the missionary activity of the Church.  He says: 
Perhaps it is not mere coincidence that Father Schuette, Superior General of 
the Society of the Society of the Divine Word at the time of the Second Vatican 
Council, was an important member of the commission that prepared this 
decree. I gave him a copy of our MEMORIAL to Pope Pius XII in December, 
1957…. I also gave him copies of the two letters we sent to Pius XII relative 
to our main MEMORIAL.380  
 Unfortunately, the bill failed to pass and was merely criticized by the Hierarchy 
for its excessive nationalism. Nevertheless, Mercado notes how its spirit lived on, 
effecting a substantial increase in Filipino leadership not only in religious 
congregations but in Catholic schools as well.  What became of our six valiant priests, 
however, was another story. After going on a lecture tour, writing in newspapers, and 
fasting and demonstrating in public, Hilario Lim was expelled by the Jesuits. Clazado, 
Obvial and Garin were “eased out of their respective orders”381 and became diocesan 
priests. And while Vargas remained a Dominican exiled as a missionary in far-flung 
Babuyan Islands, Manaligod who for a time was banished to Cagayan, remained an 
S.V.D. for another twenty years until finally leaving the priesthood.382 
 While Mercado was profoundly influenced by Manaligod’s ideas, he wanted 
to bring his religious nationalism further, in seeing that the problem was not just racial 
inequality but also (and perhaps even rooted in) intellectual discrimination. And this 
desire grew more fervently during the time of student activism in the 1960s and ‘70s, 
                                                 
379  Manfred Mueller, Father Ambrosio Manaligod, S.V.D. and the Filipinization 
Movement 1957-1959. A Memorandum based principally on documents of the SVD 
General Archive, 35. Quoted in Mercado, “Floresca,” 118. 
380 Manaligod, “Filipinizationists,” 156. 
381 Manaligod, “Filipinizationists,” 156. See also Mercado, “Floresca,” 120.  
382 Mercado, “Why I Started to Write,” 16. 
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a time when, according to Mercado, it was fashionable to criticize the Philippine 
government for being the tuta (“puppy or slavish follower”) of American imperialism. 
It was then, sometime in 1972, that he gave a lecture to Ateneo students and entitled 
his speech, Tuta sa Isip (“slavish thinking”), which overtly “blamed the westernized 
educational system for alienating the elite from their true identity as Filipinos.” He 
says: 
Filipino leaders are faced with the challenge: either to continue to have foreign 
western models or to accept themselves as Orientals. If the first choice is taken, 
then the Philippines will continue to be mediocre in taking pride to have a 
Filipino Tom Jones, a Philippine Harvard, a Philippine West Point, or a 
Philippine Wall Street. If the other modest choice is taken, the Philippines will 
realize being herself and in doing so perhaps to be a unique contribution to 
mankind.383 
 For Mercado, the goal was therefore to free the Filipino mind from a self-
denigrating mentality, or what Renato Constantino called a “national inferiority 
complex.”  And this could only be accomplished by helping the Filipino to understand 
and take pride in himself, which is precisely why he “needs a philosophy to explain 
and support his identity.” 384  But here lies the problem: Mercado knew that the 
philosophical discipline itself contained a colonial baggage, and that in order to make 
it serve our purpose, it would have to be first redeemed from the western 
ethnocentricism that has consistently afflicted our philosophers.   
 Since the ‘70s, Mercado has been critical of the teaching of Western 
philosophy in Philippine schools, arguing that it has not only taught our students “to 
think like Westerners” but has “instilled the attitude that foreign-made goods are 
                                                 
383  Leonardo Mercado,”On Filipino Identity and Intellectual Colonialism,” Now 
(September 5), 62-63, quoted in Mercado, “Why I Started to Write on Filipino 
Philosophy,”18.  
384 Mercado, EFP, 7.  
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superior to locally-made goods.”385 From this, he demonstrates, comes our double 
standard: “if Thales, the early Greek, says that everything is made of water, that— 
historians of philosophy claim—is philosophy. But if a people with its particular 
worldview [say] that everything is made of something particular, that is not 
philosophy.”386 For Mercado, however, the problem lies not only in blindly agreeing to 
what Western philosophers are saying, but that we also try to imitate their method and 
form. In accepting uncritically the norm that philosophy is all about the ideas of 
individual philosophers, we have deemed other forms of thinking as not philosophical 
enough, including ethnophilosophy which has significantly contributed to the 
unravelling of the wisdom and worldview of the local people. Furthermore, what is 
unfortunate is that such prejudice has prevented us from making philosophy relevant, 
to make it specific to our particular circumstance.387 In its place, what has persisted is 
an elitist way of doing philosophy, one that has become increasingly esoteric and 
technical, and therefore irrelevant.  
 Against this Western ethnocentrism, Mercado urged his fellow scholars to see 
things from within--to judge a haiku not from the perspective of an English sonnet but 
from its own respective rules, he would say.  A closer look at Mercado’s arguments, 
however, reveals that he was not saying anything new or extremely radical. In fact, one 
can see that he returns to the idea of philosophy as ancilla theologiae (maidservant of 
theology), inasmuch as he considered philosophy “an important tool for inculturation.”  
 
In the Spirit of Vatican II 
 Inculturation, which Ferriols called “cultural adaptation” in the mid-50s, 
became a catchword with the convocation of the Second Vatican Council in 1962.  
Perceiving an escalating “crisis in human beings,” which had become the mark of the 
                                                 
385 Mercado, EFP, 196.  
386 Leonardo Mercado, “What is Philosophy?” in Filipino Thought (Manila: Logos 
Publications, Inc., 2000), 5-6. 
387 Mercado, “What is Philosophy?” 8.  
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modern times, the Church, under Pope John XXIII, decided that it needed an 
“updating” or “renewal” (aggiornamento) to make itself more relevant to the world. 
Thus, in response to the “depersonalization and robotization of modern man” caused 
not only by communism, hedonism, and poverty, but also by nuclear war,388 Vatican 
II’s “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World” or Gaudium et Spes 
emphasized on “the dignity of the human person,” as a creature created in “the image 
of Christ the new man.”389 In this regard, it was asserted that “[the Church] cannot...in 
its mission fail...to make the life of those individual men who must be saved more 
human.”390  
 With this salvific mission however was also the recognition that the plurality 
of cultures and the rich diversity of people living in them reflected “the Whole 
Christ.”391 Thus, it is stated in Gaudium et Spes:  
There are many ties between the message of salvation and human culture. For 
God, revealing Himself to His people to the extent of a full manifestation of 
Himself in His Incarnate Son, has spoken according to the culture proper to 
each epoch. 
 Likewise the Church, living in various circumstances in the course of time, 
has used the discoveries of different cultures so that in her preaching she might 
spread and explain the message of Christ to all nations, that she might examine 
it and more deeply understand it, that she might give it better expression in 
liturgical celebration and in the varied life of the community of the faithful.392  
                                                 
388 John Kobler, Vatican II and Phenomenology: Reflections on the Life-World of the 
Church (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 19.  
389 Vitaliano Gorospe, “Moral Theology After Vatican II,” Philippine Studies 15, no.3 
(1967): 451. 
390 My emphasis. See Latin Texts. Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum 
II: Constitutiones, Decreta, Declarationes (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 
1966), 847, quoted in and translated by Kobler, Vatican II, 21.  
391 Kobler, Vatican II, 81.  
392 My emphasis. See “Chapter II: The Proper Development of Culture,” Gaudium et 
Spes, December 7, 1965. From http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ 
ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. 
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 It is from this theological perspective that we can better understand how 
philosophers like Mercado (and Ferriols, as we have seen), conceived the (theological) 
task of Filipinization and the role that philosophy played in it. In fact, many of the 
scholarship that followed Mercado’s work have carried the same (theological-) 
philosophical theme of pagpapakatao (being human), 393  including the works of 











                                                 
393  In his autobiographical essay, Mercado mentions a conversation he had with 
Ferriols, and how that led to the writing of his book, EFP: 
      One day I chanced to meet Fr. Roque Ferriols, S.J. at his office as editor of 
Philippine Studies. He said that one of his students had a term paper on loob. He added 
that the expression has its counterpart in Ilocano and Cebuano Visayan. I did not read 
that term paper but I started my own research. . . .It became a term paper which was 
later published in Philippine Studies under the title, “Reflections on Buut-Loob-
Nakem.” Ysacc later writes that the said article on loob was the first systematic study 
on the topic and has launched several studies by other researchers. Mercado, “Why I 
Started to Write on Filipino Philosophy,” 21. 
394 In the preface, Miranda emphasizes the main problem of his work: “how now does 
one explain the meaning of pagpapakatao in the Filipino context? The present work 
does no more than continue mining, tracking the vein of loob in the suspicion that it is 
one key category for an indigenous philosophical anthropology.” Dionisio Miranda, 
SVD, Loob: The Filipino Within (Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1989), x.  
395 In Anscar Chupungco’s introduction to de Mesa’s work on the idea of bahala na 
(come what may), he affirms that the author’s “methodology can be described as the 
process of acculturation whereby cultural elements with connaturality to express the 
Christian message are re-orientated and assumed as vehicles of Christian mystery.” 
Anscar Chupungco, Introduction to Jose de Mesa, And God said, “Bahala Na!” 
(Maryhill Studies 2, 1979).  
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Chapter Five 
Translations and Transgressions 
  
 In the course of the philosophical discussions revolving around the search for 
a Filipino philosophy, it becomes apparent, as shown in the previous chapter, how some 
of our scholars have lovingly embraced the biases and ideals of the Western 
philosophical tradition, inflicting, as Nietzsche would say, the most terrible curse on 
reality. And here, it was necessary to interject my own voice, that in rehabilitating and 
nuancing our views regarding the efforts of our philosophers, I exposed fetishes and 
provided context to ideas where I could. 
 The story, however, would be grossly incomplete without mentioning the 
contribution of scholars who have challenged the inadequacies of the Western 
philosophical heritage, ushering the birth of new concepts and ways of thinking. In this 
chapter, we return to the works of Ferriols, in discussing the significance of his idea of 
meron and his practice of translation. It also explores Alejo’s insightful analysis of 
loob, and shows his attempts, in terms of method and content, to surpass Ferriols, his 
mentor and teacher. But the same humanism (pagpapakatao) that inspired them to seek 
out the philosophical wisdom latent in their language and their own people, has also 
led to their uncritical acceptance of the limits of philosophy and an intolerance for 
anything that transgresses these limits. To bring out further the antinomies in their 
thought, we explore the works of social scientists who, in their emphasis on context 
and history, have undermined the essentialist and universal claims of philosophical 
concepts. 
 
The Phenomenological Movement in the Ateneo 
 In the Ateneo, the thrust towards pagpapakatao (“being human”) lies at the 
core of its philosophical education. But although its philosophy department is a pioneer 
in the phenomenological-existential tradition, and thus important historically in 
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instigating a radical change from the traditional, Scholastic method, no research has 
been undertaken on its origin or its character. Because of this, many have overlooked 
how its phenomenological movement did not only coincide with but reflected the 
values and ideas that shaped Vatican II. 
 According to Dr. Ramon Reyes, it was in 1966, a year after Vatican II 
concluded, that the philosophy professors of the Ateneo, through the initiative of Father 
Jose Cruz, S.J., began to “formulate a new program of philosophy using 
phenomenology as the basis for conceptual framework.”   Reyes explains that many of 
them had just finished their studies abroad—including Cruz who went to the Pontifical 
Gregorian University in Rome, Reyes to the Catholic University of Louvain in 
Belgium, and Ferriols to the Jesuit Fordham University in New York—and realized 
that, “somehow by coincidence,” they were all teaching the same phenomenological 
approach. The program, therefore, would only formalize what they had already been 
practicing in their classes.396     
 For Gorospe, however, it was no mere coincidence. Introducing the new 
program was not just a philosophical inclination but a conscious alignment with the 
values of Vatican II. A break from traditional Scholasticism, it provided a new model 
for philosophical education in Catholic institutions, and insofar as it was a response to 
Pope John XXIII’s call for aggiornamento (“renewal”) was the perfect vehicle that 
would carry out the Christ-centered pastoral mission of the Church. In the context of 
this vocation, 
the role of philosophy in the Catholic College is to develop in the individual 
habits of personal reflections so that he can gain some insight into what it 
means to be a “human person in the world.” Concretely, philosophy should 
help the Filipino College student reflect on what it means to be this Filipino 
individual in the Philippines today. It should help him understand himself and 
                                                 
396 Dr. Ramon Reyes, interview, 2011. 
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others so that he can make his life meaningful in contemporary Philippine 
society. Now the traditional Catholic philosophy that has been taught in the 
past in an authoritarian manner and on a purely conceptual level is no longer 
adequate to fulfill this task. The original and authentic philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas is still valid and relevant today as it was in the thirteenth 
century, but the outmoded textbook and “essentialistic” approach to 
“Thomism” still being taught in most Catholic colleges and seminaries can no 
longer provide a human and meaningful answer to concrete problems and 
realities of our day. The day of scholastic philosophy found in College 
textbooks and manulas is over.397 
 Ferriols, too, was very critical of the “essentialistic” approach to Thomism, but 
he also made it clear that the phenomenological turn in the Ateneo, at least the way he 
perceived it, had no intention of going beyond or changing the core of what was 
considered to be Christian philosophy.398  Curiously however, Ferriols rarely, if at all, 
mentions Vatican II, not even in relation to his idea of cultural adaptation, the 
theological foundation of his Filipinization, which was obviously identical to the 
latter’s thrust of inculturation. Unlike Reyes who was in Louvain at the time when the 
Second Vatican Council was in session, and who therefore witnessed his teachers, 
advisers to the Vatican, fly to Rome on weekends, Ferriols was in Fordham in the late 
‘50s, when the Council had not yet officially convened. Nevertheless, Ferriols was part 
of a milieu where Catholic philosophers and theologians had been for some time 
battling it out in deciding the fate and future orientation of the Church,399 and was 
                                                 
397 Vitaliano Gorospe, “Christian Renewal of Filipino Values,” Philippine Studies 14, 
no. 2 (1966), 204.  
398 Roque Ferriols, interview, 2009. 
399 We are here referring to the “Scholastic wars” that followed the Scholastic revival 
at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1879, Pope Leo XIII issued a series of Papal 
Briefs, including a declaration of Saint Thomas Aquinas as the universal patron of 
Catholic schools, and an invitation to the members of the Society of Jesus and the 
Franciscan order “to follow the teachings” of the Angelic Doctor. As a result, the Jesuit 
Gregorian University in Rome became “a stronghold of Scholastic philosophy and 
theology,” while the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain was established with 
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therefore exposed to the philosophical and theological ideas that would eventually 
shape and influence the Council.  
 According to Ferriols, one of the major influences in his thinking was his 
mentor, the Jesuit metaphysician, Father Norris Clarke. Clarke was part of a lineage of 
scholars who, following Joseph Maréchal’s Transcendental Thomism, sought to 
liberate St. Thomas’s ideas from the limitations of a Cartesian interpretation.400 It was 
from Clarke that Ferriols learned that St. Thomas’s metaphysics could be interpreted 
in a way other than a metaphysics of essence—a mere collection of abstractions and 
propositions, of what can be known, as the manuals had shown. If one read St. Thomas 
carefully, one would realize that his philosophy was a metaphysics of existence, which 
begins with the affirmation of what is most basic and fundamental to life—that is, the 
very act of existing, when a being “stands” in the horizon of reality to interact with the 
world and make itself known.   
 To further understand what this idea of existence is, which undoubtedly lies at 
the core of Ferriols’s philosophy, we turn to his translation of an excerpt taken from 
the work of another Transcendental Thomist, the Jesuit philosopher, Joseph de 
Finance.401 In this essay, de Finance points out that the word “existence” is often 
                                                 
Leo XIII’s Pontifical Brief in 1889.  In the effort to revive Scholasticism, however, a 
major conflict in interpretation emerged. The progressive Catholic thinkers accused the 
great baroque commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas for grossly 
misinterpreting Aquinas’s ideas, and in the attempt to get beyond the dogmatism of the 
Scholastic manuals, sought a phenomenological “return to the sources  
(ressourcement), a rediscovery of the biblical and patristic texts. See Gerald A. 
McCool, “Twentieth-Century Scholasticism,” The Journal of Religion, Vol. 58, 
Supplement, 1978: S198-S221; for a detailed historical account on how progressive 
Catholic thinkers accomplished this “return to the sources,” see Gerd-Rainer Horn, 
“Chapter 2: Theology and Philosophy in the Age of Fascism, Communism, and World 
War,” in Western European Liberation Theology: The First Wave (1924-1959) (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 53-108).   
400 Ferriols notes that Clarke studied under Andre Marc, a French philosopher who 
studied under Maréchal.  
401 It is unclear where Ferriols takes the excerpts from, except he also mentions some 
ideas from de Finance in his book, Pambungad sa Metapisika, which Ferriols explains 
are drawn from the latter’s notes on ontology, which he had some time in the past read 
on microfilm. Furthermore, he explains that he is told that those notes were de 
Finance’s first outline for a book. Roque Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika (Quezon 
City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 1997), 239.  
 202 
understood as an abstraction, vis-á-vis its more concrete manifestation as existing 
beings. And this is perhaps why St. Thomas almost never uses the word “existence,” 
and instead mentions esse (literally referring to the infinitive “to be,” and its gerund, 
“be-ing”)402 “to emphasize an existential character”; so that while esse is not ens, i.e. a 
being that exists, it is what grants the act of being to “that-which-is” (id quo est).403 
This act of being is also what makes human knowledge both a possibility and an infinite 
desire: for in the act of existence, beings “stand” in the horizon to make themselves 
known (intentionalitas) to the human knower who receives these disclosures. But this 
very same esse, which makes possible for us to know, is also what can never be reduced 
to a concept, not only because of the infinite wealth of its various manifestations 
through beings but also because the very act of being itself is an inexhaustible, dynamic 
movement of revelation. And because all things participate in the act of being, they are 
equally endowed with this inexhaustible dynamism that concepts we formulate can 
never completely grasp.404   
 Ferriols’s entire philosophy hinges on this metaphysical understanding. His 
entire book, Pambungad sa Metapisika (Introduction to Metaphysics) is an attempt to 
affirm the mystery of existence, as well as the dignity and infinite depth of every human 
and nonhuman being, which are all within and at the same time beyond the grasp of 
our understanding. To accomplish this unending task, the phenomenological method 
becomes crucial; for in returning to the things themselves which immerses us into the 
                                                 
402 Ferriols recounts how Clarke would always write being with a hyphen (“be-ing!”), 
to give back to this over-used and worn-out word some of its original meaning, the 
dynamic act that the gerund usually connotes. Roque Ferriols, “Fr. W. Norris Clark, 
S.J., Heswitang Metapisiko,” in Pagdiriwang sa Meron: A Festival of Thought 
Celebrating Roque J. Ferriols, S.J., eds. Nemesio S. Que, S.J. and Agustin Martin G. 
Rodriguez. (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de Manila 
University, 1997), 276. 
403  To clarify, Id quod est refers to being insofar as it is “that which possesses esse.”  
To possess esse however does not mean that the thing is esse itself, but rather that it 
“participates in the act of being (actum essendi).”  Mary T. Clark, ed., An Aquinas 
Reader (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 74-76. 
404 Joseph de Finance, S.J., Ilang Halaw Mula sa Ontolohiya, trans. Roque Ferriols, 
S.J. (N.p.:n.p., n.d.), 17-18.  
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“givens,” we grasp being not primarily through conceptual definitions but in the way 
it unfolds before us. But as one sees in de Finance, as well as in Ferriols as shown by 
the very title of his book, phenomenology is merely a means to an end. The 
phenomenological approach, which is content with merely laying out the way things 
appear to us, fails in the end to affirm being in its totality and mystery.  Thus, “while 
phenomenology is an excellent introduction to metaphysics, it is still not 
metaphysics.”405 
 In reacting to traditional Scholastic philosophy and to what he generally sees 
as the main obstacle to thinking, Ferriols always begins his philosophy classes with the 
idea of the concept. While he affirms that conceptual definitions are crucial to our 
understanding of being, he warns us about the pitfalls of being caught in one’s 
constructed world of ideas.  It is here that he introduces the idea of meron, which lies 
at the heart of his thinking:  
 
Meron  
                                                 
405 de Finance, Ontolohiya, 8.  
Illustration 6: Roque. Ferriols,S.J. Taken from 
http://kilawen.tumblr.com/post/25169082157/puyattuason-
hoy-pusa-mag-ingat-ka-maraming, April 27, 2014. 
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 Mercado was very critical of Ferriols’s idea of meron. He believed it was a 
mere translation of the Western notion of Being, and a very flawed one at that. Pointing 
out the fact that it was a neologism, he complained that the word was too “contrived 
and artificial,” so that when one asks for example, “What is the meron (being) of a 
thing?” the statement is inevitably awkward and does not make sense.  
 Curiously, while Mercado correctly explains that Ferriols uses the word meron 
to emphasize existence, he does not really understand its value. Thus, he insists that the 
“correct” translation of Being, given its primordial quality as essence,” should be the 
prefix pagka-, which not only “denotes nature, being, state of” (e.g., pagka-tao/ being 
human), but is naturally part of the Filipino language, not only in Tagalog but in 
Cebuano Visayan and Ilokano as well.406 He does not understand that Ferriols, coming 
from a Transcendental Thomist tradition, is precisely trying to avoid reducing Being to 
this “what-ness” of things, and hopes to safeguard its integrity as simultaneously what 
can be known and cannot be known.407 But even for Ferriols, this was not always the 
case. Early in his teaching, he used the word pag-iral (existence), and only in the ‘80s 
did he introduce the word meron.408 Similar to St. Thomas, Ferriols must have realized 
that pag-iral was too abstract, and felt that he needed to find something more concrete, 
and more basic to everyday human life.   
 At a closer look, we see that meron may not be as alienated from the Filipino 
language as Mercado claims. While meron itself does not exist in the dictionary, it 
                                                 
406  In fact, in his translation of de Finance’s work, Ferriols writes: 
“existensya=meron=esse.”  de Finance, Ontolohiya, 5). 
407 An understanding of the complexity of meron and how Ferriols developed this idea 
throughout his book and beyond deserves an entire discussion of its own.  For the 
purpose of our present reflections, however, a sketchy description will have to suffice. 
In the first chapter, Ferriols asks, can we ask what meron is? Yes and no. No, because 
meron is what can never be completely reduced to a conceptual definition, to a definite 
content and limitation; for there is no limit, nothing “outside” meron. But yes, if what 
we mean by definition is not what claims to know everything about the object, but a 
preliminary understanding, that would guide us in further explorations. (Ferriols, 
Pambungad sa Metapisika, 8-11).  
408 Eduardo Calasanz, Kuwento, Kuwenta, Kuwarenta (Colloquium in commemoration 
of the 40th anniversary of teaching philosophy in Filipino, and in honor of its founder, 
Fr. Ferriols), August, 2009. 
 205 
closely resembles mayroon, which in ordinary usage means “to have.” The 
resemblance however, is found not so much in writing as in speech: that in colloquial 
language, whenever mayroon is uttered, it is meron that we overhear. It is indeed a 
curious thing that Ferriols would choose a “word” that is not even legitimately a word, 
and therefore what can never be properly written, and in fact, what goes beyond and 
before writing. 
 But if we are to take the resemblance between meron and mayroon further, one 
would have to also ask how Ferriols relates the attribute of having to a metaphysical 
affirmation of existence. Here, we must understand that for this Jesuit philosopher, the 
ultimate mystery of being lies in not knowing why “there is (something)” instead of 
nothing (na meron, at hindi wala).  The word meron, therefore, asserts the “plus” or 
abundance that life is, which sharply contrasts with nothingness (kawalan).   
 But why the need for a neologism? Why couldn’t Ferriols simply use the word 
mayroon and avoid criticism that he is not using language properly? Sometimes, he 
jokes, saying that he is Ilokano and therefore should never be faulted for his improper 
use of Tagalog. But in his more somber moods, he does explain what meron is, by first 
of all asserting that  
It is not an unusual thing. We see it in any language. Heidegger says that Sein 
always has that moment of yes and no, in any language. And I saw, that in all 
Filipino languages, there is a moment of a yes and a no. In Tagalog, meron and 
wala, in Bisaya, naa and wala, in Ilokano, atda, awan, in Bikolano, mayo, 
igwa, in Panggasinan, agkapu and wala. [In this last example], wala is meron, 
and agkapu is wala. That is why when I was using meron, in my thinking, I 
was returning [it] to its primary root… The root is, look at what is really 
happening before it became a concept. And if you are locked in concepts, use 
meron to get yourself out of [them].”409 [5.1] 
                                                 
409 Ferriols, interview, 2009. 
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But because the word mayroon, like the word “being,” has lost the vitality of its original 
meaning because of constant use, one can understand why Ferriols might have felt the 
need to coin a new word—that while meron closely resembles mayroon, drawing from 
the latter the mundane and ordinariness of everyday language, it also needed to 
distinguish itself from the latter, in order to refer to the unique, primordial affirmation 
that life is. And if you find yourself trapped in concepts, use meron to get yourself out 
of [them]. At times, we desire for something other than what is real or what is there, 
and sometimes out of fear we refuse to see what shows itself; and then there are also 
moments when, in our haste or laziness, we distort the truth that lies before us.  In these 
occasions, we find ourselves trapped in the constructs of our mind, which is why 
Ferriols suggests that we pause to examine how truthful these concepts are, by asking, 
Meron ba? (Do they exist?)410   
 Thus, contrary to Mercado’s criticism, meron is not at all “contrived and 
artificial.” It is, in fact, one of the words that we hear quite often in daily conversations. 
But what is interesting is that while keeping the word meron immersed in its mundane 
existence, Ferriols not only uses it as an effective phenomenological tool, as what 
constantly nags us to “return to the things themselves” (Meron ba?), but also draws a 
metaphysical significance out of its ordinary existence (Meron, at hindi wala!). In this 
                                                 
410 The question itself sounds rather simple and deceives us into thinking that the 
answer is, too. But seeing that getting to an honest answer is not as easy as it seems, 
Ferriols offers his philosophy as a guide. Again, this is not the place to explore 
Ferriols’s ideas in depth, but to give the reader a sense of the complexity, I cite two 
examples. One is from his own writing, where Ferriols explains that through desires, 
even the idea of nothing becomes part of meron. To desire what you do not have (wala 
sa iyo) is to acknowledge something that, despite not being physically present is what 
nevertheless exists. The desire which reminds you of what you do not have and 
therefore of the “nothing” is also at the same time an affirmation of you who desire and 
the object you covet.  See Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 8. Another beautiful 
example comes from one of my conversations with Ferriols. He was telling me about 
his mother, a nurse at the Philippine General Hospital, where he had been born. He 
recounts how his mother, whenever she was asked how many children she had, would 
consistently reply that she had five, even when one had actually been stillborn. And 
even when she grew old, she would always say this without fail. One can imagine the 
impact it had on Ferriols, who would later show how even counting can be a crucial 
affirmation (or denial) of meron.  
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sense, even the word “being,” which sounds hopelessly alien to everyday language, 
does not achieve in English what meron does in Filipino. And indeed, here lies the 
genius of Ferriols’s translation—that if meron appears as the Filipino counterpart to 
“being,” “existence,” esse, it is not because it first grasps the definition of these terms 
and then presents itself as the most suitable Filipino word that can contain their 
meaning. Rather, meron returns to the primordial affirmation of life, the same source 
that has given words like “being,” “existence,” esse their philosophical meaning. In 
other words, while Ferriols may not be oblivious to other philosophical traditions, his 
idea of meron is not a mere duplication of concepts that have already been made, but 
an attempt to capture that originary experience of existence within the Filipino 
language.  
 
The Prejudices of Humanism 
 In the early ‘70s, Ferriols became the editor of the Philippine Studies journal, 
and in support of Mercado’s efforts in formulating a Filipino philosophy, helped 
publish several of his early essays.411  Later in an interview, however, Ferriols reveals 
that although he found Mercado’s work promising at the beginning, he was 
disappointed with the way the latter’s thinking had evolved. As Ferriols would later 
say, hindi bumukas, akala ko nagsisimula lang siya (“[His thinking] did not open up, I 
thought he was just starting”).  
 As we know, Ferriols was critical of the idea of a Filipino philosophy. He 
believed that if a person really wanted to philosophize, he would search for the truth, 
and not waste his time wondering if his thinking was Filipino enough. To explain his 
point further, he cites as an example the effort to unravel the idea of Filipino time.   
                                                 
411 This includes “Filipino Thought,” Vol. 20, No.2 (1972), “Reflections on Buut-Loob-
Nakem,” Vol.20, No.4 (1972), and “Notes on the Filipino Philosophy of Work and 
Leisure,” Vol. 22, No.1-2 (1974).   
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The human person lives in time. What is the relationship of the human person 
to time? That broad question is posed out in the open. And then, (you ask) what 
is your attitude to time?  If you have a personal experience of time, if you have 
your own reflections about time, you will share that, not because you are 
Filipino, but because that is what you see as a person…. Now Mercado, what 
concerns him even at the beginning is: “What is the attitude of the Filipino 
about time? And if that is not the attitude of the Filipino, I will not take that 
because I want to philosophize in Filipino.” That is why he limits too quickly. 
And what he wants to do is to construct a Filipino theory…. And [it is] an 
interesting thing, but if that is philosophy, it is a philosophy that limits. What 
you are merely asking is “what does the Filipino think about time?” But if the 
philosopher talks about time, (he asks) “what is the attitude of the human 
person to time.412 [5.2] 
 Ferriols was, however, not merely critical of Mercado. Alejo, who Ferriols 
claims has grossly misinterpreted him, accuses his younger contemporary for sealing 
concepts which were supposed to remain open, as he intended them to be. 413 And while 
he acknowledged that both Mercado and Alejo’s work were important in the fields of 
anthropology and sociology respectively, he categorically denies their value as a 
veritable contribution to philosophy.  
 In this regard, Virgilio Enriquez, putative father of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, 
could not disagree more. Although he may have been also critical of Mercado, as we 
have seen earlier, he perceived Alejo’s work a significant contribution in constructing 
                                                 
412 Roque Ferriols, interview, 2009. 
413 Ferriols says, “Mga bukas na konsepto, sinarhan niya.” Unfortunately, I was not 
able to probe further which concepts Ferriols was referring to, and therefore this will 
have to be a topic of inquiry for the future. Nevertheless, it is clearly important to delve 
into the differences in their thinking, not only from Ferriols’s perspective, but from 
Alejo’s as well. In an interview, Alejo in turn admits that his relationship with Ferriols 
as his teacher had always been a difficult one. He was, Alejo explains, both his 
“inspiration and desperation.”    
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a national culture in the field of philosophy.414 But while Alejo has already gained 
respect and appreciation in various academic circles,415 the philosophical community 
itself has remained ambivalent with regard to the philosophical value of his 
contribution.416  
 At the beginning of his book, Alejo categorically inserts himself into the heart 
of a long-drawn philosophical dispute. It had already been more than ten years since 
Quito claimed that a Filipino philosophy was impossible, and that the Filipino, being 
too personal and emotional, was simply not disposed to philosophical thinking. But 
while others had either taken offense or disregarded Quito’s reproach, Alejo, quite 
ingeniously, found a possible solution in her criticisms:  “if we accept that the kind of 
                                                 
414 Virgilio Enriquez, preface to Albert Alejo, S.J., Tao Po! Tuloy! Isang Landas ng 
Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo 
de Manila University, 1990), vii. Here, Enriquez describes Alejo’s exploration of the 
meaning of loob as “not merely a philosophizing that floats in the air of borrowed 
consciousness but a philosophizing that is rooted in indigenous culture, experience and 
language. . . .” (Hindi basta pamimilosopiyang nakalutang sa hangin ng kamalayang 
hiram kundi pamimilosopiyang naka-ugat sa katutubong kultura, karanasan, at 
wika….) And insofar as the concept of loob leads us from the experience of feeling to 
a relation with others (pakikipagkapwa), and towards being human (pagpapakatao), 
Alejo’s efforts are not only “proof of the meaningfulness and concreteness of the spirit 
of Filipino philosophy,” but a contribution to humanity as well. (Ang Tao Po! Tuloy . . 
. ay hindi lamang isang patibay na makabuluhan at kongkreto ang diwa ng 
Pilosopiyang Pilipino. . . . Lampas dito ang kahalagahan nito sapagkat sangkatauhan 
at hindi sangkapilipinuhan ang obheto ng pagsusuri.) 
415 See for example Lily Mendoza, Between the Homeland and the Diaspora (Manila: 
UST Publishing House, 2006) which cites Alejo’s dissertation on the efforts for cultural 
regeneration of the Tuddok among the Obo Manobo tribe as an illustration of the 
dynamic spirit of the indigenization movement; or Portia Reyes, Pantayong Pananaw 
and Bagong Kasaysayan in the New Filipino Historiography. A History of Filipino 
Historiography as an History of Ideas., dissertation (Bremen, September 2002), which 
acknowledges not only the complexity of Alejo’s philosophical reflections on loob, but 
also his efforts to free Filipino words from being mere ornaments in works written in 
English; or Rebecca Añonuevo, Talinhaga ng Gana: Ang Banal sa mga Piling Tulang 
Tagalog ng Ika-20 Siglo (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2003) which presents a 
wonderful discussion of Alejo’s philosophical poems.  
416 I am here referring not only to Ferriols’s critical assessment of Alejo’s efforts, or 
Abulad’s judgment of the latter as a failure which “no one needs to undertake again.” 
The lack of recognition for Alejo’s contribution is quite evident in the way he has been 
excluded from the roster of philosophical pioneers, for whom the PAP has recently held 
its 40th-year anniversary tribute-conference (entitled “Legacy Lectures: Engaging Our 
Philosophical Pioneers,” held October 26-27, 2012, at De La Salle University, Manila).  
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thinking we have been accustomed to is indeed personal, then would it not perhaps be 
where we could find strength?”417 [5.3] 
 Alejo’s contribution to Filipino philosophy is as much about ideas as it is about 
attitude. Unlike some who refuse to engage works that they have deemed at the 
beginning to be un-philosophical, or not philosophical enough, Alejo has kept an open 
mind and has tried to establish continuity, which are both crucial in building local 
scholarship. And it is precisely through benevolent understanding and critique that he 
takes seriously and proceeds from the work of those who came before him.  
 Indeed, what better way to begin but to redeem Mercado, who, Alejo claims, 
will remain in history—“whatever others may say”—as “one of the pioneers 
(pasimuno) in the elucidation of the philosophical terms in Filipino.”418 [5.4] Affirming 
the idea of a non-dualistic Filipino worldview, Alejo presents the underlying virtues 
(birtud) of Mercado’s philosophy. First of all, he applauds Mercado for listening to 
what the social scientists are saying, which for him is the kind of dialogical engagement 
that shows a philosopher’s earnest desire to be part of a communal effort in 
understanding the world. Furthermore, he commends Mercado’s effort to construct a 
comprehensive philosophy which captures the sensibility inherent in the three 
ethnolinggustic groups—the Visayans, Tagalogs, and Ilokanos.419 
 Along with these virtues, however, Alejo also point out the vices (bisyo) of 
Mercado’s thinking. Precisely because of the desire to encompass such an enormous 
scope, Mercado’s presentation appears sketchy, the result of what Alejo calls a 
“thinking on the run” (pag-iisip habang tumatakbo). Furthermore, he points out that 
Mercado’s juxtaposition of a holistic mentality of the East and a compartmentalizing 
mentality of the West is too simplistic; for not only are there Western philosophers 
such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger who show a kind of thinking 
                                                 
417 Alejo, Tao Po! Tuloy! 8.   
418 Alejo, Tao Po! Tuloy! 13.  
419 Alejo, Tao Po! Tuloy! 16.  
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similar to the Eastern perspective, but that there is, as the psycholingguistic analysis of 
historian-anthropologist, Zeus Salazar, has shown, a dualism present in Filipino 
mentality, that what is inside (loob) is not always in harmony with what is outside 
(labas).  
 While acknowledging Salazar’s point, Alejo however also finds his analysis 
too simplistic. He therefore continues to lay out the reflections of other social scientists, 
theologians, and philosophers, to give a complete picture of the long-winded path that 
our understanding of loob has traveled. Here, Alejo cites historian Reynaldo Ileto’s 
work on the popular religious literature, Pasyon and the millenarian movements as a 
significant breakthrough, not only for analyzing the term loob within a network of 
meanings, in the context of a historical phenomenon, but for drawing out its meaning 
from the perception of the Filipino masses themselves. Furthermore, Alejo is pleased 
by the complexity of loob as portrayed in Ileto’s study: that while this inner self 
(panloob na sarili), which is the basis of the true worth of a person and the equality of 
all people, may be broken and at times weak and susceptible to indifference (walang 
pagdamay), it is also what has given strength and justification for the revolution.  
 Acknowledging the importance of such historical narrative, Alejo is however 
convinced that a reflection on the ontological nature of loob is still crucial in further 
deepening our understanding of the term. This is why he turns to Jose de Mesa’s 
theological hermeneutics which articulates the relational aspect inherent in loob: as an 
opening to the other, through utang na loob, or debt of human solidarity (utang ng 
makataong kapatiran), and to God, through kagandahang loob (goodness), which de 
Mesa describes as God’s love taking root in the heart of a person and revealing itself 
as an agent of change in the world. Finally, Alejo takes up the metaphysical reflections 
of one of his most influential teachers, Father Ferriols, from whom he sees finally an 
articulation of loob as the human person in his ultimate depth. Here he cites specifically 
Ferriols’s explanation of conversion (pagbabalik-loob, or what he called pag-uulit 
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[repetition]),420 which claims that while the human person in his weakness at times 
loses his way, he always has the strength and potential to return to truth and to re-affirm 
his humanity (pagpapakatao).    
 After laying out this historical account of our understanding of loob, Alejo then 
presents his own understanding of the ontological nature of loob, and clarifies for us 
what it means to live with a full awareness of its depth. In attributing to loob the 
qualities of breadth (lawak), depth (lalim), and substance (laman), Alejo proceeds to 
describe its basic structure as the reach of consciousness (abot-malay), the reach of 
sensibility (abot-dama), and the reach of action (abot-kaya). The key to understanding 
these manifestations of loob, as Alejo himself indicates, lies in Ferriols’s idea of abot 
tanaw (literally, the reach or range of sight), which the latter uses as a metaphor to 
describe specifically the limitations and possibilities of human consciousness.421 Thus, 
before we explain Alejo’s conceptual categories, let us take a look at what Ferriols 
meant by abot tanaw. In Pambungad sa Metapisika, he explains that: 
Abot tanaw can be compared to my consciousness in meron. I look up to see 
what’s above. I bend to see what’s below. I glance to my left and right. I regard 
what’s in front and at the back. I turn my eyes, and even my head. I would 
                                                 
420 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 44. Ferriols relates pagbabalik-loob to what he 
calls pag-uulit (repetition), a reflection based on a story by the Danish philosopher, 
Søren Kierkegaard about a man who is unable to commit to his love for a woman. 
When he finally chooses to do so, he finds that it is too late. But why and how is this 
related to a repetition? First of all, Ferriols explains that for this man, and for anyone, 
a profound connection to meron, though he may not be aware or at times choose to turn 
his back on truth, always and already dwells in his inner self (kalooban). In cases when 
a person realizes the error of his ways, or has turned his back on meron, on an 
affirmation of life, a kind of repetition takes place, but not in the sense that one 
“return[s] to the past, in order to repeat the actions that had already taken place back 
then. Repetition is an awakening, to live in a genuine relationship with meron which 
affected/penetrated (tumalab) the inner self (kalooban) then, but now slumbers. This is 
(also) why a true repetition is always a return to one’s inner self (pagbabalik-loob). 
And when a person revives this affect (pagtalab) of meron in his inner self (loob), he 
discovers that his own inner self (kalooban) becomes a potential to do what has not yet 
been done.” [5.5]  
421  “I am indebted to my teacher Father Ferriols for many things, including an 
awareness of the “abot tanaw of meron.” That is why it is not difficult to show that 
there is a close link between abot tanaw with abot-malay, abot-dama, and abot-kaya 
in the world of loob that is being suggested here.” Alejo, Tao Po!Tuloy! 112.   
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really like to see everything that I can see. But, at every corner, there seems to 
be something that blocks my seeing, that seem to be saying: you can see only 
up to here, [and] beyond this, the stretch of your eyes may not reach… And 
there is abot tanaw, not only of those afar, but also of those that are near. I can 
see my chest, but not my back. Abot tanaw is like an obstacle to my extreme 
desire to see. But if I am capable of understanding, this is what the abot tanaw 
tells me: you can only see up to here; but if you make the effort to move a little 
bit, you will see: [that] beyond the abot tanaw, there are things that you have 
not seen. I did move, and I saw what I did not see before; but, the abot tanaw 
also moved. [It] again blocked [my sight] and enticed me. When the person 
looking moves, he will experience the abot tanaw as an unending call and lure, 
in an unending transcendence and seeing.422 [5.6] 
 It is this very structure of abot tanaw, as dwelling between possibility and the 
realm beyond, that appears as the theme, each time repeated (in the sense of pag-uulit) 
differently in the various manifestations of loob. Thus, when Alejo speaks of abot-
malay, he means loob as  
the world of meaning, of thinking, of sense or lack of sense. A world of the 
spirit that is open, awake, and relating.423 [5.7] 
But Alejo also explains that the full realization of loob as abot-malay is achieved only 
in its transcendence (sangkaibayuhan), when the person attains consciousness not only 
of one’s self but of the entire race of humanity.  
 While abot-malay is loob grasping the breadth (lawak) of reality through 
“statistics, dialogue, and immersing and living with others,” Alejo explains that it can 
also interact with the world in a way more profound and beyond the level of 
consciousness.  Abot-damay refers to the adventures of loob in the unquantifiable 
depths (lalim) of emotions. It is when loob, touched to its core, genuinely understands, 
                                                 
422 Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 10.  
423 Alejo, Tao Po! Tuloy!, 91.   
 214 
through identification and internalization (pagsasaloob), or empathy (pakikiramay) 
and concern (malasakit), or as seen in one’s own trembling (pangingilabot) before 
God. But this desire to be one with the world, with others, and with the divine 
(pakikiisang-loob) can never be actual, for at best, it is only an attempt at a kind of 
nearness (pagkakalapit).   
 Finally, loob, in grasping and interacting with the world, is also about 
substance (laman), insofar as it is always in a dialectic relationship with one’s body. 
This refers to the realm of action, which is first and foremost, the result of one’s 
decision (pasya) to build and strengthen (pagbubuo) one’s loob. This includes 
organizing and resourcing all that I know and all that I feel to assess the possibilities 
and extent of what I can do (abot-kaya), given the circumstances. And part of this 
decision is to endure the duration of time (tagal).424 Again, Alejo shows that it is in 
enduring the test of time that one finds strength beyond himself: that I am able to say 
“I can still bear it” (kaya ko pa) or “I can do this” (kaya ko ito), is because of people 
who give me hope; or that I muster the courage to continue with the struggle 
(pakikibaka), knowing that others are depending on me.   
 Unfortunately, this brief summary leaves out Alejo’s real contribution. For 
while he provides us an impressive and exhaustive map of loob and its various 
adventures in the world, his attempt to gather and integrate as many voices and sources 
as possible is as equally significant in radically changing the terrain of philosophical 
discourse. In fact, this is where one sees that his reflections, although on the one hand 
an attempt to bring Ferriols’s ideas further, are a form of critique that hope to go beyond 
his teacher.  Not only does Alejo listen to the riddles and proverbs of the “crowds of 
anonymous people” who Ferriols had once spoken of but almost never hear from in his 
                                                 
424 Ferriols, too, speaks of acting to the extreme possibility of what one can do (abot 
ng aking kaya), and can be related to his discussion on the idea of potential, as the 
search, desire, courage, endurance, and the gathering of one’s resources and feelings 
to make possible that life-changing return to meron. See Ferriols, Pambungad sa 
Metapisika, 44-46.    
 215 
writings; he also gathers the reflections of the revolutionaries, social scientists, poets, 
artists and the like whereas the latter has kept the discourse predominantly a 
conversation with (mostly Western) philosophers. And while there is sense in Ferriols 
keeping anonymity by talking only about the proverbial Juan and Petra (or the dialogue 
of A and B), Alejo gives us the faces and stories of real people: of Kaka Ito of the 
Dumagats from whom he learns about human solidarity,425 or Macling Dulag of the 
Cordilleras from whom he learns the truth about one’s love for the land.426  
 Curiously, despite this willingness to listen, historian Vicente Rafael presents 
an analysis that Alejo himself admits he cannot accept. His main objection lies in 
Rafael’s claim that, in the context of conversion of the early Tagalogs, the importance 
of loob lay not in itself, in the fact that it “designated a ‘soul’… in the core of being,”427 
but in its relation with the outside (labas), within an economy of exchange.  
 In his study of religious conversion and translations of missionary texts from 
the late sixteenth to early eighteenth century, Rafael explains that the Spaniards did not 
only violently reconstruct Tagalog script and grammar in the image and likeness of 
Latin and Castilian, but also exploited Tagalog words, like loob and other terms such 
as “sisi, repentance, casalanan, sin, [and] aua, mercy,” in the process of colonizing the 
natives through evangelization. The objective was that in using these terms, the native 
would be initiated into a relationship of reciprocity, engraining into his consciousness 
a feeling of infinite indebtedness (utang na loob) towards God, as well as towards the 
Spanish hierarchy, for all the gifts he had received. And so indeed, the Tagalogs 
acknowledged their utang na loob and offered token payments, but not because there 
was an interiority that believed itself to be accountable for these debts. Rather, as Rafael 
                                                 
425 Alejo, Tao Po! Tuloy! 95. Alejo narrates that when he reached the dwelling of the 
Dumagats in Tanay, Rizal, Kaka Ito said to him, Tao kayong naparito, tao rin kaming 
dinatnan ninyo (“You come here as human beings, and as human beings too, you have 
found us.”)  
426 Alejo, Tao Po! Tuloy! 95-96.  
427 Vicente Rafael, Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in 
Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 
125.  
 216 
explains, it was merely to elude the shock of shame (hiya), which compelled the native 
to reciprocate a gift, lest he be publicly humiliated and branded as walang hiya (a 
person without shame) or walang utang na loob (no sense of indebtedness). Again, this 
only proves that the significance of loob lies only in its relation to the outside, and that 
instead of referring to it as an “inner self,” it may be more accurate to return to its basic 
definition as space, “within which objects and signs from the outside can be 
accumulated and from which and towards which they can be issued in payment of 
debt.”428 
 Alejo can only describe Rafael’s arguments as mapangahas na pangungusap! 
(“[Such] bold statements!”) For the latter does not only deny the existence of loob as 
what “determines or moves and offers itself, puts its honor at stake, [or] ‘acknowledges 
his indebtedness’”; he also implicates loob in the colonial agenda.  In response to these 
“allegations,” Alejo first of all reminds us how the first missionaries, as the Jesuit 
historian John Schumacher shows, also struggled against the abuses of the Spanish 
colonial administration. Given their genuine concern, Alejo speculates: “would it not 
be more reasonable if we accept that these shrewd missionaries chose loob because 
they already found it as the source of a dynamic soul,” rather than merely for the 
purpose of manipulation?  Secondly, he argues that in reducing utang na loob to the 
economy of exchange, Raphael presents a limited and inaccurate description. Alejo 
says, 
We should not be deceived by the word “debt”…. Utang na loob is really not 
paid. Why? Because the person to whom we are indebted to with our loob has 
freely “shown goodness and [has] genuinely empathized” (nagpakitang-loob 
at tapat na dumamay). Loob, a free expression of goodness (kagandahang-
loob), too, would be the equivalent. And because this “show of goodness and 
genuine empathy” does not reproach, the person who is indebted does not have 
                                                 
428 Rafael, Contracting Colonialism, 125.  
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to be ashamed. If he does feel shame, [it] is not the narrow-minded, societal 
“what others will say” but a “moral feeling” of being-with-others 
(pakikipagkapwa). This is why utang na loob is acknowledged (tinatanaw) or 
known (kinikilala), not returned or (used) to erase one’s debt.429 [5.8] 
 Alejo makes for an interesting case, but his accusations against Rafael requires 
a second look. First of all, it is both inaccurate and simplistic to understand loob as 
merely part of the devious designs of the colonial power. On the one hand, it is true, as 
Rafael mentions time and again, that the Spaniards had meant for loob to mean lo más 
interno (the most inner part of the person),” a “soul” that would be accountable for its 
sins and debts. However, Rafael also argues that in the process of translating/inscribing 
their Christian values into the hearts of the natives, the inevitable occurred: meaning 
“slipped,” and what had been intended was not exactly what was received. Translation 
failed, and the religious conversion did not come through in the exact way that the 
Spanish missionaries had planned. To prove his point, Rafael presents accounts of 
confessions that show that the Tagalogs resorted not only to “digressions and non-
sequitors,” but to divulging not their sins but those of others. To the consternation of 
the Spanish missionaries, the Tagalogs circumvented “the prescribed internalization of 
guilt and repentance” by “converting confession into an occasion for boasting and 
protesting their innocence.”430 Indeed, what better way to demonstrate that colonization 
was not and could never be completely achieved. Loob was, indeed, intended as a trojan 
horse, but it also became the space of colonial resistance.   
 As we have noted above, however, the real issue for Alejo was Rafael’s 
rejection of the ontological reality of loob. While Alejo’s uneasiness is only reflective 
of the metaphysical bias of the Christian philosophical thinking that is still prevalent in 
the Philippines today, it is nonetheless unfortunate, because it fails to grasp where 
                                                 
429 Alejo, Tao Po!Tuloy! 43.  
430 Rafael, Contracting Colonialism, 133-135.  
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Rafael’s analysis not only becomes important for postcolonial studies but can have 
significant repercussions in the field of philosophical practice.  
 To understand the potential impact of Rafael’s analysis to Filipino philosophy, 
we return to the chapter where he discusses the notion of loob. At the beginning, he 
clearly explains how his analysis is both a continuation of and a departure from 
previous studies.  
 As part of a constellation of “values” among the peoples in the 
Christianized lowland areas of the Philippines, utang na loob and hiya have 
attracted considerable scholarly attention since the 1960s. Among the most 
influential such [sic] works were those of Charles Kaut and of Mary 
Hollnsteiner and the late Frank Lynch. Set along the lines of structural-
functionalist theory, their analyses of these “values” have been rightly 
criticized as ahistorical. As Reynaldo Ileto has cogently pointed out, by 
excluding history, studies of utang na loob and hiya end up depoliticizing 
reciprocity by failing to consider the place of conflict in processes of exchange 
and indebtedness. Ileto goes on to resituate these notions of reciprocity in late-
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century peasant movements. He convincingly 
demonstrates the revolutionary potential of utang na loob as it is constantly 
invoked in Tagalog literature of this period and in the writings of messianic 
leaders intended to rally their followers for a series of local revolts against 
Spain and later against the United States. While Ileto’s work is a significant 
departure from those of Kaut, Hollnsteiner, and Lynch, it nonetheless tends to 
join them in regarding the loob in utang na loob as a privileged, a priori entity. 
In this sense, loob assumes its coherence on the basis of a given ontological 
status as that which is part of yet apart from processes of exchange. 
   It is of crucial importance to hold onto Ileto’s insight that reciprocity is 
always predicated on the possiblity of conflict and disruption. But when we 
consider the historical effects of utang na loob and hiya in the context of 
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conversion, we should initially try to circumvent both a phenomenological and 
a purely operational definition of loob—the “inside” that is staked in a debt 
transaction. It is helpful to reexamine loob first of all as a linguistic fact—as a 
signifer that attaches itself to a variety of signifieds. In this way, we can ask 
how loob gains value and force as a cultural term in a larger historical field.431 
What Rafael tries to do therefore is to take the discussion on loob from a 
phenomenological study to the field of semiotic analysis, where everything is perceived 
as a “linguistic fact.” In reexamining loob as such, Rafael wittingly applies Derrida’s 
critique of structuralism, which gives his whole analysis its philosophical weight.  
 Derrida’s critique was an attempt to overcome metaphysics, which throughout 
the history of Western philosophy, has determined and given priority to Being as 
presence. What attests to this is a long list of “names related to fundamentals, to 
principles, or to the center [that] have always designated an invariable presence,” 
whether it be “eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, 
subject) alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.”432 It is of 
course not by mere chance that Derrida describes them as center—not only to evoke 
the idea of a structure or totality in which these concepts operate in relation to others, 
but to suggest the privileged role they play as principles that have long oriented, 
organized, and limited our thinking. 
 The problem is that in claiming an ontological reality, these concepts “leave 
in the domain of the unthinkable the very thing that makes [their] conceptualization 
possible.”433 Taken as “truths,” we become oblivious to their origin and genealogy, 
forgetting that language, as Derrida keeps reminding us, did not just fall from the 
                                                 
431 Rafael, Contracting Colonialism, 123.  
432  Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Human 
Sciences,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge Classics, 
2001), 353. 
433  Ibid., 358.  
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heavens, and that concepts are “no more inscribed in a topos noētos, than they are 
prescribed in the gray matter of the brain.”434 
 In Alejo’s ontological analysis, it is as if loob fell not once but twice from the 
sky: not merely as the seat of “truth” about being human (pagpapakatao), but also as 
what lies at the core of being Filipino (pagka-Pilipino). Here, loob becomes the site of 
perfect translation, where “truth,” both pure and indigenous, is impeccably transmitted 
and received, between god and man, and man and his world. All this is undeniably at 
the very heart of a humanism that Derrida claims is nothing but a willfulness to replace 
all our existential anxieties with the “reassuring certitude” of its invariable “truths”—
“truths” that humanism, in “[dreaming] of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the 
origin and end,” has efficiently inscribed/prescribed in man’s soul as his telos and 
eschaton.435  
 It is precisely this humanist understanding of loob that Rafael tries to shake to 
the foundation. If for Alejo loob was the place where perfect 
communication/communion occurred, for Rafael, it was where translation failed. As 
the site of disparity between intended and received meaning, loob obviously could no 
longer claim to be the fixed, absolute “truth” it was thought to be.  
 For Rafael, understanding loob as a “linguistic fact” was an attempt to restore 
its historicity. And although he himself does not lay out the philosophical implications 
of such claim, we can deduce from his analysis, which we aptly relate to Derrida’s 
overcoming of metaphysics, that it meant understanding loob not so much as a sign 
which, in the metaphysical scheme of classical semiology, is given a “secondary and 
provisional” role in relation to an original presence which it supposedly represents in 
its absence;436 rather, to perceive loob as différance, that is, loob taken in its “radical 
alterity,” as that “which has never been itself,” or what “has never been present” as a 
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435 Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play,” 370.   
436 Derrida, “Différance,” 9.  
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gathering of all its “modified—past or future—presents.” Rather, loob is what will 
never be self-same—that is, a fixed presence that we can pin down and name as “truth,” 
but what is always other—not only as what “has always already been exiled from itself 
into its own substitute,”437 but what constantly reconstitutes itself at every moment of 
its life of perpetual displacement. Thus, in taking loob as such, Rafael does not only 
show how it differs as a concept “inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it 
refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences.”438 
More importantly, in denying its ontological status, Rafael shows how loob always 
differs from itself, how it journeys from one meaning to the next, and in this perpetual 
deferral, what therefore exists not as presence but as a fleeting trace.  
 Without doubt, the implications of Rafael’s analysis goes far beyond the notion 
of loob.  Not only does it put into question all the concepts that we have long taken 
uncritically as “truths,” but it also brings to our attention the fact that any philosophy, 
especially a humanism that claims to speak about the essence of man, did not just fall 
from the sky.  But if we are to take the idea of deferral and the temporalization of 
meaning seriously, then we must realize that Rafael’s own depiction of loob is nothing 
more but a snapshot of a moment in its life. And this only comes out clearly when we 
take his insights not in isolation but in relation to Ileto’s own phenomenological 
analysis, which depicts loob in an utterly different light: as the site where Christian 
values are not only profoundly internalized but radicalized, beyond the superficial 
economy of exchange.  
 The problem is that, with a metaphysical mindset, Rafael’s claim can be easily 
mistaken for an assertion about the origin or essential character of loob, which in effect 
taints all subsequent manifestations with an “originary” complicity in the colonial 
agenda. But such bias can also threaten to oversimplify Ileto’s analysis, which for the 
same reason that Alejo praises it is criticized by Rafael for supposedly taking loob as a 
                                                 
437 Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play,” 353.  
438 Derrida, “Différance,” 11.  
 222 
“privileged, a priori entity.”  While it may be true that Ileto does not question the 
ontological status of loob, his phenomenological analysis, which stays close to the text, 
is not at all a claim about essence, but a depiction of loob within a particular historical 
context. In other words, Ileto presents us with a phenomenological analysis that does 
not necessarily lead to metaphysics, and therefore what remains as an unpretentious, 
albeit significant description of a fleeting trace.  
 
Beyond Translation 
 In trying to understand why Ferriols, in all his wisdom and profound openness, 
had categorically denied the philosophical significance of Mercado and Alejo’s work; 
or why Alejo, despite his willingness to challenge the limits of the philosophical 
discipline, passionately rejected Rafael’s semiotic analysis to ensure the comfort of 
ontological “truths”—what appears to be a recurring bias in philosophy is a humanism 
that hastens all too eagerly to the universal. In repeatedly ignoring the value of 
historical determination, it conveniently subsumes the Filipino into the metanarrative 
of “The Great Family of Man.” And yet, we cannot deny the good will for which our 
philosophers, through the idea of (ahistorical) “man,” have sought to uphold the dignity 
of the Filipino. 
 The truth of the matter is that while we have established the possible dangers 
of humanism, some of our philosophers have also shown that even the fiercest 
metaphysical intention is simply not capable of perfectly inscribing or imputing 
universal concepts onto the Filipino soul. In fact, the process of translating the idea of 
being human to the notion of pagpapakatao has only brought out certain features in the 
vernacular that have an undeniably distinct Filipino “flavor.”   
  For Ferriols, translation was never just about taking a foreign concept and 
expressing it in one’s own language; if it were, it would  merely be an act of borrowing, 
where one is obliged to return what one has taken. But he preferred what one would 
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call “stealing,” as he would often tell his students that “great men do not borrow [but] 
steal.”439  
 Indeed, if one looked closely at the way Ferriols appropriated philosophical 
ideas, one would know that he sometimes ran away with them, clearly with no intention 
of ever returning them back.  One could see this, for instance, in the way he takes 
Plato’s idea of Socratic dialogues, not by merely translating these texts into Filipino, 
but by appropriating the dialectic structure of a conversation and creating a dialogue of 
his own.   
 Anyone who has read Plato’s dialogues would know that Socrates always 
comes out smarter than the other, by often having the last word. He prided himself on 
being an intellectual midwife, and yet he did much more than play a supporting role, 
in posing questions that often already implied the “right” answers.  Ferriols, like any 
philosopher, revered Socrates for being the exemplar of a wise man, and if, like others, 
he was willing to turn a blind eye on this philosopher’s hubris, it was because the latter 
admittedly preached one of the greatest and most humbling philosophical truth: that in 
the face of God, the only thing that was proper to man was the knowledge that he does 
not know. Perhaps Ferriols himself would never admit, but it is quite obvious that, 
amidst the admiration, he wrote a dialogue that completely, albeit surreptitiously, 
undermines the authority of our beloved Greek philosopher-idol.  
 The first thing that one notices in Ferriols’s dialogue is the absence of names. 
In this conversation between A and B, A and B are no more than signs that represent 
virtually anyone who, stripped of his status or authority, enters into a conversation with 
another only with the intention of searching for truth.  Curiously, the topic of their 
discussion revolves around the notion of the conjecture (hula), which as Ferriols shows, 
does not only determine the dialectic character of a conversation, where questions do 
not necessarily lead to fixed and sure answers but to a series of guesses. More 
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importantly, Ferriols uses the idea of the conjecture to further describe the nature of 
our Socratic ignorance: that our knowledge of anything is never certain, but at best, a 
guess, which on the one hand is based on what one knows, and on the other, projecting 
itself to something that one does not know. Consequently, human knowledge is what 
moves in the uncertainty of the “not quite” (alanganin), where everything is medyo 
ganito (somewhat like this) or halus ganyan  (almost like that).   
 What is more interesting than the philosophical ideas, is how Ferriols makes 
the characters in his dialogue bear witness to the “not quite.” In light of his hubris, 
Socrates acted differently from what he preached. With A and B, however, one sees a 
genuine internalization of the Socratic truth, sometimes even more than in the case of 
Socrates himself: A asks not leading but real questions, which reveals an earnest desire 
to know rather than a way of “showing off”; or by the very fact that neither A and B 
has an exclusive access to knowledge but both contribute to the search for answers; or 
with B allowing A to disturb his thinking, so much so that B eventually asks the latter 
for pause, to let him re-think his previous claims over coffee….440 
 When Ferriols decided to teach in Filipino in the ‘60s, it was not because of 
some grand ambition to solve a philosophical problem or to initiate a groundbreaking 
philosophical scheme. It was simply because in his many encounters with the 
“anonymous crowd,” he had awakened to the wisdom that was latent in his own 
language, a wisdom that unfortunately could not be fully brought out for as long as the 
English language was believed to be better and given the upper hand in academic 
discourse. It was, in fact, with the hope of redeeming the vernacular that Ferriols 
initially had a far greater vision: more than indigenizing philosophy, he wanted to 
completely transform the Ateneo into a Filipino university. Indeed, a noble aspiration, 
but one that Reyes, as he would later admit, knew would never happen. And perhaps 
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there was some truth to this, especially when one considers how Ferriols’s vision could 
never be consummated more than what he himself regarded as “a limited success.”   
 
The Indigenization Movement in the Social Sciences 
 There were others who shared the same dream though, and who were far more 
successful in their cause. It was also around the ‘60s and ‘70s, at the height of 
nationalism, when U.P. experienced its own wave of Filipinization. But unlike in the 
Ateneo, the indigenization movement was pioneered not by philosophers (in the 
“strict” sense of academic profession) but by the social scientists.441 Here, we mention 
two of the most influential scholars whose contribution in their respective fields has 
also made a significant, albeit unrecognized impact on philosophical studies: Professor 
of Psychology, Virgilio Enriquez, and historian-anthropologist and ethnologist, Zeus 
Salazar.  
 Although Enriquez is known more for his contribution in psychology, we must 
not overlook the fact that not only did he have an affinity and profound concern for 
Philosophy, but that his founding of Sikolohiyang Pilipino had some significant, 
philosophical implications.  First of all, it is important to point out that Enriquez himself 
traces the roots of Sikolohiyang Pilipino to “liberalism, the propaganda movement, 
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Ang P/Filipino sa Agham Panlipunan at Pilosopiya (Manila: Kalikasan Press, 1991), 
41-43. 
 226 
[and] the writings of Jacinto, Mabini, and del Pilar.”442 It is therefore not entirely 
inaccurate to claim that what ran through Enriquez’s veins was the same “nationalist 
fervor” that inspired his predecessor and contemporary, Alfredo Lagmay, and our 
expatriated philosopher, Ricardo Pascual.  In fact, it was Lagmay who first encouraged 
Enriquez to take on a Filipinist perspective (maka-Pilipinong pananaw), and also who 
paved the way for the teaching of psychology in Filipino, which went in full swing with 
Enriquez’s return from Northwestern University in 1971.443  
 Like Lagmay, Enriquez brought his nationalism to the field of philosophy. Not 
only did he teach philosophy in Filipino, but he was also actively engaged in 
philosophical research. In 1983, he published, under the auspices of the Philippine 
Psychology Research and Training House, a textbook that contained Filipino 
translations of selected philosophical essays. But it also included works written by 
Filipino scholars, such as Bonifacio, Zialcita, and Quito.444 And in 1986, Enriquez 
published, in relation to a project launched by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
in Singapore, a book entitled Philippine World-View, which compiled some of the 
papers that were delivered at a seminar in U.P., held from May 29th to June 2nd, 
1978.445  
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Enriquez obviously understood the importance of philosophy, so much so that he 
invited philosophers to take part in his projects, even in colloquia he specifically 
organized for the advancement of Philippine psychology.  A perfect example was 
Mercado who delivered a paper at the very first Sikolohiyang Pilipino national 
conference, where he spoke about how philosophy is needed in awakening the 
psychologist to his western presuppositions and in debunking foreign theories that the 
latter has too often applied inappropriately onto Philippine realities.446 One wonders 
though if it is not, in fact, the other way around. 
 The problem is that we have too often believed that philosophy is the 
foundation of all disciplines, and thus ascribe to it, and to it alone, the task of theory, 
of critiquing epistemological presuppositions and creating new theoretical framework. 
Because of this misconception, we fail to listen to the social scientists, or hear them 
only for the “data” that they offer, unable to see that aside from unearthing “facts,” they 
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have long been making theoretical advances in challenging the metanarratives or 
metaphysical presuppositions that some of our philosophers continue to uphold.   
 As part of the nationalist movement in the ‘70s, Sikolohiyang Pilipino was one 
of the academic discourses that emerged as a critique of neo-colonial education, and 
an attempt at what Lily Mendoza calls a  “systematic undoing” of the colonial 
“epistemic violence.”447 This violence manifested not only in the imposition of the 
English language as the medium of research and teaching, but in the production of 
knowledge itself, which often presented derogatory images of the Filipino.  What was 
dangerous about these colonial narratives, however, was not so much that they 
produced skewed analyses and information as their essentialist claims about the 
Filipino pretended to be universal and, most of all, apolitical.   
 In the case of Sikolohiyang Pilipino, the struggle was directed against Western 
psychology, which Enriquez explains has always yearned to be a universal science. 
And it is precisely this fetish for the universal that the study of the psychology of other 
cultures has been less about an earnest understanding of the Other than being another 
venue for applying the assumptions and theory of a Western psychology that has drawn 
mainly from the experiences of industrialized and progressive nations.448 Because of 
this, Enriquez complains that Filipino psychology and values are never understood or 
evaluated from within but always against or in relation to Western rationality, which 
uncritically affirms the latter as the universal measure or standard.   
 To explain his point further, Enriquez discusses some of the problems that arise 
when Filipino psychology and values are studied from a Western perspective. First of 
all, he argues that the foreign scholar will see and value traits differently from how the 
Filipinos see them, which consequently affects the content and direction of research. 
Thus, he asks:  Out of all the many terms that can be evoked by this “theoretically 
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 229 
fertile” concept of loob, why the focus on utang na loob? Why not emphasize instead 
on courage (lakas ng loob) or initiative (kusang-loob), which Filipinos themselves 
regard as strengths? In the end, such queries compel one to wonder, “Who benefits 
from utang na loob?”  
 Enriquez also cites the example of hiya, which we have earlier seen in 
connection to Rafael’s work. Here, he mentions the work of American scholars, W. 
Sibley and Frank Lynch,449 who have both inaccurately reduced the term to a single, 
unequivocal meaning, commonly translated as “shame.” Juxtaposed to the more 
nuanced study of philosopher, Armando Bonifacio, Enriquez demonstrates how Sibley 
and Lynch were oblivious to a wealth of signification that could have only emerged if 
they, like Bonifacio, explored the entire spectrum of affixes connected to the word 
hiya.450  
 For Enriquez, this failing by Sibley and Lynch was clearly an indication of a 
lack of appreciation and respect for the character of the vernacular, and consequently 
what leads to a superficial use of the Filipino language.451 Enriquez called this the 
“token use of language,” what he further described as premature (hilaw) or “denture” 
use of Filipino (malapustisong gamit), and which he regarded as far more perilous than 
either its non-use or the prevalence of the English language itself.  To understand the 
nature of this threat, Enriquez invites us to 
Look. . . at the article of Guthrie (1971) who wrote in English in which all of 
a sudden he inserts the word “pagkatao” in Filipino. But the truth is, the word 
                                                 
449 See W. Sibley, Area Handbook on the Philippines (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
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450 See Armando Bonifacio, “Hinggil sa Kaisipang Pilipino,” in Unang Pambansang 
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“pagkatao” is only a token/denture-like translation or a phony stamp for the 
word humanity. The western conceptualization of the word “personality” is 
even closer to what the word “pagkatao” denotes.452 [5.9] 
Nonetheless, Enriquez insists that “it is not appropriate to insert the word ‘pagkatao’ 
because its meaning is different in Filipino thought.”  
 While Enriquez was critical of foreign scholars who lacked a meticulous 
attention to the nuances of the vernacular, he was equally aware that the token use of 
language was also prevalent among fellow Filipino scholars. Quito was, for Enriquez, 
clearly a case in point. While he acknowledges her work, Ang Pilosopiya at Diwang 
Pilipino as the first book in philosophy ever written in Filipino, he criticizes it rather 
sharply with the warning that “the use of the indigenous language does not necessarily 
mean that the philosophy of the spirit of the people had indeed been conveyed.” And 
though the title is rather deceiving in indicating otherwise, Enriquez assures us that this 
was really not Quito’s intention in her book.453 Enriquez was also critical of Mercado, 
observing how his descriptions of the Filipino were all reflections of a Christian spirit, 
and questioning whether such portrayal was indeed an accurate and adequate grasp of 
the Filipino. 
 Unfortunately, despite the growing fame and success of Sikolohiyang Pilipino 
at home and abroad, Enriquez was unable to achieve the same influence on his 
colleagues at the Philosophy department, which as de Villa says, was never able to 
fully commit itself to the Filipino language. This, of course, was for Enriquez a major 
disappointment, especially since philosophy was one of the disciplines he cared 
about.454 And judging from his criticisms of Quito and Mercado, he undoubtedly hoped 
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for philosophy what he had struggled to establish for psychology: an indigenization 
that did not merely “change the subject content of the disciplines from foreign to 
Philippine material” (“indigenization from without”); rather, in getting beyond the 
mere application of foreign theories on Philippine realties, one that actually “uses the 
indigenous culture as, at once, the starting point, source and basis of concepts, methods 
and theories.”455 Therefore, an indigenization that was truly liberating, which, applied 
to philosophy, would mean the emancipation of the discipline from the alienating 
elitism of Western thought. 
 Like Ferriols, Enriquez saw that behind the “Great Cultural Divide,” and the 
alienation of the intellectual from his own people, was a cultural imperialism that had 
seeped into the heart of our education. The problem was not “at home, in the street, or 
in the market” but within the walls of the university, which meant that the solution lay 
nowhere else but in the hands of the intellectual, who needed not only to unlearn his 
colonial baggage but to rediscover the wisdom of his own people by returning to the 
vernacular. But while Ferriols believed in the disinterested character of every language 
in revealing its own truth, Enriquez was more sensitive to the traces of a colonial power 
that continued to inhabit our mind and use the Filipino language to surreptitiously 
perpetuate its existence.    
 Like Enriquez, Salazar, too, was concerned about the state of philosophy in the 
country. From de Villa we learn that our historian was one of founders of the Grupong 
Miyerkoles sa Pilosopiya (Wednesday Group in Philosophy), a movement that 
gathered scholars who were interested in and discussed the possibility of a Filipino 
philosophy.456  In fact, in a paper he delivered at the first colloquium on Sikolohiyang 
Pilipino, he explicitly states the importance of elucidating an indigenous philosophy as 
a crucial part in our understanding of the characteristics of the Filipino, a task which 
he explains requires much prudence.  
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We should not present [Filipino philosophy] as though it is merely the opposite 
of whatever we know about the Western spirit.  Are the westerners 
individualistic? Therefore we must be group-oriented…. Are the westerners 
logical? Therefore we must be synthetic in our thinking. We cannot allow such 
thoughts. First, because this has been done--and not by any of our own, but by 
the westerners themselves! It is part of their dialectic or, if not, of their way of 
thinking that always has two sides—“yes” or “no,” “positive” or “negative,” 
“beautiful” or “ugly,” etc.457 [5.10] 
 Salazar’s criticism was clearly a response to Mercado’s work, which despite 
its nationalist intentions, was caught in the same binary thinking that only led to an 
affirmation of stereotypes. Here, Salazar informs us that this kind of thinking in fact 
represented “a whole tradition in Europe with regard to their attempt to understand the 
non-westerners.” However, citing among others the example of the “primitive,” which 
was believed to denote either an absence of logic or at best, the presence of a pseudo-
logic, Salazar shows that this stereotyping has led not only to a simplistic and 
inaccurate understanding but to denigrating images of the other.   
 Like Enriquez, Salazar was a pioneer in the indigenization movement that 
swept the social sciences in the ‘70s.  He, too, believed that the only way to decolonize 
the mind was through the use and exploration of the Filipino language. But while 
Enriquez, as we have seen, was prompted to provide an alternative and liberating 
scholarship as a response to the simplistic and derogatory neo-colonial representations 
of the Filipino, Salazar saw that the main problem was far more simple: that our 
intellectual discourse, which includes even some of our most nationalist efforts, is and 
has always been trapped in the logic of the colonial encounter, as what has been 
constantly fashioned as a response to the expectations and derogations of an imperial 
Other. From the efforts of the “acculturated group” of elites (ladino) who translated for 
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the Spanish friars and ushered a bilingual culture; and the Filipino secular priests and 
ilustrados who struggled against the colonial abuses and humiliation and sought 
recognition and opportunities equal to their Mother Spain; to the “new ‘intellectuals’” 
who have merely perpetuated the legacy of the ilustrados in creating and developing a 
“national culture,” that although boasts itself as “Filipino,” has been primarily 
fashioned in foreign language and concepts--all these show that we have, all this time, 
consistently addressed the foreign and refused to dialogue with our own people.  As 
Salazar explains: 
From the time of the Spaniards until now, the Propagandists were writing (and 
the intellectuals today who replaced them—i.e., ilustrados with their pensions, 
Fulbright scholars and others who have been sponsored by America, and now, 
by Japan and other nations) in a foreign language. This is to show that they can 
[do it] too—and, indeed, they can. That is, though, to create in Spanish (or 
American English), it would be necessary for those yearning to be “Filipino” 
to become Spanish (or American, and perhaps in due time, even Japanese). In 
other words, it would require them to detach themselves from (and leave) their 
own native culture… [and] later to return to it to use some of its elements in 
their construction (in truth, to create [something] “different” or “original!”) in 
Spanish (and later, in American). This is the “intellectual” work of the 
Filipinos from Rizal and Paterno until Villa, Tiempo and Locsin, Sr. cum Jr. 
What they were able to create therefore was only a local counterpart (“local 
color” in literature) of whatever foreign culture of which they had taken part.458  
[5.11] 
 From this we can understand why Salazar differentiates the various ways of 
writing history: 1) the pansila (for ‘them”) perspective, which flourished during the 
                                                 
458 Zeus Salazar, “Ang Pantayong Pananaw Bilang Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,” in 
Atoy Navarro, et al, eds., Pantayong Pananaw: Ugat at Kabuluhan (Quezon City: 
Palimbagan ng Lahi, 2000), 97.   
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colonial period, where historical narratives were written “from [the point of view of] 
the foreign, towards and for the foreign”; 2) the pangkami (“from-us-to-you”) 
perspective, which despite its nationalist intentions, and precisely because of its 
“defensive” position, fails to engage the Filipino people and instead produces 
narratives that “come from us, towards and for the foreign”;459 and 3) the pantayo  
(“from-us-for-us”) perspective, where narratives are liberated from the vicious cycle 
of a neo-colonial discourse and are finally rooted in and influenced by the actual needs 
and concerns of the Filipino people.  
The crux of pantayang pananaw (pantayong perspective) is in its internal 
interconnections (panloob na pagkakaugnay-ugnay) and relations of the 
character, values, knowledge, wisdom, aspirations, practices, behavior, and 
experiences of an entire culture--a totality circumscribed by, and expressed 
through one language; in other words, within (sa loob) an autonomous cultural 
exchange/discourse.  
  In all Filipino languages can be found an equivalent concept of the 
Tagalog or P/Filipino “kayo,” (you) “kami,” ([exclusive] us) “sila” (they), and 
“tayo,” ([inclusive] we). What the last one denotes is the one speaking and 
everyone he is speaking to, including those who are absent but assumed to be 
part of the totality to which everyone in this discourse belongs. For example, 
the expression “tayong mga Pilipino” (we, Filipinos), and its difference from 
“kaming mga Pilipino” (us, Filipinos), implicitly conveys that those who are 
communicating to each other are only Filipinos. It means, the foreigner or non-
Filipinos are not included.460  [5.12] 
Salazar describes this as a “closed circuit,” where: 
                                                 
459  Salazar, “Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,” 98. See also Portia Reyes, Pantayong 
Pananaw and Bagong Kasaysayan in the New Filipino Historiography. A History of 
Filipino Historiography as an History of Ideas, Dissertation, Bremen September 2002, 
362-363.  
460 Salazar, “Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,”82.  
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Everyone understands each other without having to refer to anything else 
outside or foreign. In other words, a society-and-culture has a “pantayong 
pananaw” only if everyone uses concepts and customs whose meaning is 
known to all, even the relation of these meanings to each other. This happens 
when there is only one code or “equivalence of meanings,” in other words, a 
totality of relations and interconnections of meanings, thinking, and customs. 
What is important (and even fundamental) here is having one language as basis 
and medium of understanding and communication.461 [5.13] 
 What is important to note here is that while Enriquez focuses on the recovery 
of the Filipino language (pagbawi sa wika) through a rehabilitation and rediscovery of 
its wisdom, Salazar emphasizes not just on the language’s capacity for signification but 
also on its communicative function. What seems crucial for Salazar does not lie merely 
in what is said but the very act of communicating itself, believing that the direction and 
nature of our understanding are shaped and influenced by those we seek to address. It 
is not surprising therefore that Salazar along with others would consider Enriquez’s 
later attempt to “market” Sikolohiyang Pilipino discourse to an outside audience as a 
“fatal mistake” and a betrayal of the cause. As Mendoza explains, this tactical move by 
Enriquez meant  
reverting back to writing, speaking, and publishing once more in English and 
addressing other kinds of concerns more pertinent to such audiences’ differing 
contexts, needs, and problems, when the more urgent task would have been the 
deepening of theoretical work and research within the still-emergent discipline 
as grounded in the national discourse.462  
 Underlining the communicative role of language, Salazar’s idea of pantayong 
pananaw clearly resonates with Ferriols’s call to establish Filipino as wikang 
pagsasalubungan, the language of encounter. For while Salazar himself claims that one 
                                                 
461 Salazar, “Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,” 83.   
462 Mendoza, Between Homeland and Diaspora, 77.  
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of the fundamental goals of Pantayong Pananaw is signification (pagpapakahulugan), 
that is, “to build and clarify the vocabulary of the nation’s discourse,”463 what for him 
undoubtedly takes precedence is language before conceptualization, as the venue where 
gathering and discourse take place.  
 Scholars of Pantayong Pananaw, however, have emphasized more on the 
importance of pagpapakahulugan, explaining that discourse, which Salazar often calls 
talastasan—which comes from the root-word talas (sharpness, refinement or 
smoothness) and talastas (to know, to understand)—represents a collective or joint 
knowing or understanding.  More importantly, talastasan has been distinguished from 
diskurso which is “limited to the idea of an exchange of views,” while the former is 
“more comprehensive,” in its intention of “refining and amending the subject 
matter.”464 But what this explanation underplays is the fact that, in contrast to the 
sedimentation of meaning, Salazar stresses more the dynamic movement of exchange: 
At the present stage of consolidating Pantayong Pananaw in terms of its 
history, the nation’s kabihasnan (“kabihasnang pambansa”) refers to what 
could be formed from the encounter/discovery/continuous engagement (in 
whatever way) of a “national culture” (“kulturang nasyonal”) that has been 
formed and what is currently being formed by the elite (which dominates at 
present, as a result of the control of the Anglophone elite of the state) on the 
one hand,465 and kalinangang bayan which has been shaped and continuously 
shaped by the Bayan….466  
                                                 
463 Zeus Salazar, “Email to Bomen, February 22, 1999,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, Manifesto ng Partido Komunista, trans. Zeus Salazar (Quezon City: Palimbaga 
ng Lahi, 2000), 214. 
464 Atoy Navarro, et al., “Introduction,” Ugat at Kabuluhan, 1.  
465 Normally, one would translate kabihasnan as civilization, but as Reyes explains, the 
latter cannot be applied to Filipino ancient communities, given their “developmental 
context,” thus justifying its untranslatability. While the idea of civilization refers 
specifically to the construction of the “city complex” of “stone buildings and paved 
streets,”kabihasnan refers to “the skill and abilities of a people” to create “utilitarian 
structures, both in accordance to their needs and to the context they lived in.” See 
Reyes, Pantayong Pananaw, 394.   
466  Bayan is again another term that Salazar refuses to translate, and in this case, to 
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 Although Pantayong Pananaw has gained a substantial following and has 
successfully established itself as an indigenized/indigenizing academic discourse far 
beyond Ferriols could achieve, Salazar’s views have inevitably provoked criticisms. In 
his desire to give the people a voice, he has tried to “[summon] back those who have 
lost their way in the ‘forest of foreignness’ back to the Bayan with whom they really 
need to speak.” And to do this, he has passionately advocated for a “closed-circuit,” 
which has led critics to accuse him of being an exclusivist. But as proto-pantayo 
historian Ileto argues, “the philosophy behind [Salazar’s] Pantayong Pananaw needs 
to be threshed out more…. To reduce it to a form of crude nationalism gets us back to 
a dead-end sort of discussion.”467 
 One of the ways by which we can redeem Salazar from the crude nationalism 
falsely imputed to him is to realize that his call for Filipinization cannot be simply 
reduced to an ethnocentrism.  In fact, in a paper he delivered at the first Sikolohiyang 
Pilipino colloquium in 1975, he warned fellow scholars about the danger of seeking 
out something uniquely Filipino. More than anyone, Salazar understood that terms, 
such as utang na loob, “although has a Filipino-ness in its form and expression, has its 
equivalent in other nations, even in Europe and especially in Asia.” (“Isn’t this part of 
the customs even of the mafia?)468 Furthermore, as it has been pointed out, Pantayang 
Pananaw proponents have in fact constantly sought to prevent a glorification of a “pre-
                                                 
reduce to the word nasyon, which clearly alludes to the Spanish and American idea of 
nación and nation respectively. Salazar explains that nación was a term that emerged 
from the nationalist aspirations of the elite, which then became the basis for their idea 
of a kulturang nasyonal. Salazar distinguishes this from the nationalist discourse that 
traces its roots to the Filipino people, who in their struggle for freedom in the name of 
Inang Bayan (e.g. Bangkaw, Bonifacio, and the messianic movements) never expressed 
themselves in any foreign language but their own. And it is from their struggles that a 
kalinangang bayan is formed, that is, a culture that truly emerges from the people. 
From this, one can say that Bayan refers not so much to the abstract notion of nacíon 
but collectively, to the Filipino people. See Salazar, “Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,” 
103.   
467 Patricio Abinales, “Saving Philippine Studies Abroad,” UP Forum 1, no.12 (Nov-
Dec.), quoted in Ramon Guillermo, Pook at Paninindigan: Kritika ng Pantayong 
Pananaw (Quezon City: The University of the Philippines Press, 2009), 2.  
468 Salazar, “Ilang Batayan,” 46. 
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colonial, authentically Filipino past,” or an essentialism of the Filipino, that could 
blindly lead a people “to sever communication with or even act rashly against 
opposition.” Rather, the whole point of “privileging Filipino” for them is to promote 
“[the] wider project of invigorating a collaborative school of Filipino scholars, 
strengthening a body of academic literature in the national language, and engaging 
readers in a discourse about themselves.469 
 To avoid reducing Salazar’s ideas to an ethnocentrism, it is crucial to 
understand the value he gives to place (pook). According to Guillermo and Reyes, pook 
has a dual reference: 
It is both the point where a culture or civilization of a particular period stands 
and one’s place in that spatio-temporal continuum. It is from pook that one 
explains and understands oneself through the use of materya. Materya can run 
from language and memory to material culture. For a scholar, it pertains to 
his/her synchronic view of an available reservoir of knowledge and 
understanding of history and culture across time. Pook, used in conjunction 
with its materya, brings about narration. Salazar, in a lecture entitled 
“Pagsasakatubo ng Teorya: Posible ba o Hindi?” names narration as pook’s 
concrete manifestation of itself, its dominant present in the face of its past. A 
historian at the same time possesses and functions as pook in the practice of 
history; pook constitutes her/his being that gives shape to a narrative, through 
which pook takes form through the body of text and its language.470 
 In other words, pook refers to the historicity of our being, the place of our 
existence, as well as our understanding, which is not only passively shaped and 
influenced by our context but what actively assimilates in making sense (saysay) of its 
                                                 
469  Portia Reyes and Ramon Guillermo, “Paraphrasing Europe: Translation in 
Contemporary Filipino History,” Kritika Kultura 13 (2009), 81. 
470 While pook is translated as “location, space, standpoint,” materya refers to the 
“materials of knowledge construction and institutionalization.” Reyes and Guillermo, 
“Paraphrasing Europe,” 80. 
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surrounding and in producing its own narratives (salaysay). To further understand the 
importance of pook, it would be helpful to see how Salazar relates it to karunungan 
(wisdom), which must be distinguished from kaalaman (knowledge).  
A “wise person” has wisdom because he has a comprehensive, profound and 
encompassing perception of actuality/reality….i.e, not only is he 
“knowledgeable,” or “has knowledge” but “wise” or has wisdom that is 
characteristic in signification/explanation/actualization/putting to practice, in 
its usage, in granting/elevating knowledge.471 [5.14] 
 In valuing the specificity of place (kapookan), one of the aims of Pantayong 
Pananaw is to contextualize (pagpopook/pagsasapook) and to appropriate 
(pagaangkin) all knowledge and wisdom that would otherwise have no significance. 
What obviously becomes vital in this endeavor is the act of translation which is “almost 
as valuable as creation itself… as the task of elevating the Filipino (people) as a 
whole…” As Salazar argues, “a kalinangan and kabihasnan is truly alive and dynamic 
when it appropriates (in other words, translates) what comes from outside, instead of 
only taking part at nibbling at, or make one’s own/ internalize/ embrace another 
kalinangan and kabihasnan.  
 From this, it becomes clear that although it may seem that Salazar is insisting 
on a discourse that excludes non-Filipinos, he clarifies that his idea of a “closed circuit” 
is only characteristic of the “inner relation and interrelation” (panloob na ugnayan at 
pagkakaugnay) of ideas within a system, which in this case refers to every specific 
kalinangan. Thus, we are speaking here of how every idea or thought has a place in a 
network of meanings, which may have an equivalent in another context or kalinangan, 
but would have a different and specific way of relating to the other ideas within that 
given structure. In other words, Salazar explains that this idea of “closed circuit” does 
not apply to the osmosis of interaction and exchange that takes place within the 
                                                 
471 Salazar, “Pangkalahatang Tala ng Tagapagsalin,” in Marx, Manifesto, 262-263.  
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trichotomy of sarili (self), kapwa (other, i.e., fellow Filipinos), and iba (other, i.e., non-
Filipinos).    
 As a response to the growing popularity of Marxist ideology in the Philippines 
and what he perceives as a lack of proper contextualization or appropriation, Salazar 
published in 2000 a translation of the Communist Manifesto. What seemed to have 
prompted him to undertake this project was his dissatisfaction with the Leftist 
movement, which he believes has not yet been able to integrate themselves into or heed 
the importance of the nationalist struggle from the perspective not of the elite but of 
the Himagsikan of 1896472 and the messianic movements in Banahaw and other parts 
of the Philippines. This refers to Francisco Nemenzo’s claim that the “pre-Marxist 
elements” of our indigenous tradition have caused a setback to the development and 
actualization of the Marxist ideology.473 But here Salazar also alludes to the English-
speaking Leftists, who have merely transferred Marxist ideas from texts of English 
translations to the vernacular, and therefore denying the possibility of any discourse 
between the elite and the people.  
 Because of its alienation from the thinking and culture of the Filipino people, 
Salazar claims that Marxism in the Philippines has essentially remained a “foreign 
ideology.” And given its historical limitations as a movement that specifically arose in 
Western Europe, Salazar appears to believe that it will remain so.   This, however, does 
not preclude the fact that it can be appropriated. In fact, it is precisely because of its 
otherness that we must appropriate it, that is, to make it our own.  
                                                 
472  Himagsikan is another term that cannot be simply reduced or translated to 
“revolution.” The reason is because Salazar distinguishes on the one hand, revolution 
as revolucion, the political independence struggle of the elite and which is rooted in the 
French revolution, the liberalist ideology, and the idea of nación; and on the other, 
himagsikan, as the nationalist struggle of the peasants and a few ilustrados and 
principalia, rooted in Kalinangang Pilipino (Filipino culture), the idea of kalayaan 
(freedom), and the concept of Inang Bayan. See Reyes, “Pantayong Pananaw,” 520-
521. 
473 See Salazar, “Email to Bomen,” February 14, 1999, in Marx, Manifesto, 203. See 
also Francisco Nemenzo, “The millenarian-populist aspects of Filipino Marxism,” in 
Randolf David, ed. Marxism in the Philippines: Marx Centennial Lectures (Quezon 
City: Third World Studies Center, 1984).  
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 To help facilitate the process of appropriation, Salazar presents his work of 
translation, which is an effort to reproduce the philosophical text in our vernacular, but 
more importantly, an attempt to reveal elements of the Marxist tradition that cannot 
simply be translated to the Filipino experience. First of all, Salazar points out that 
Marxism, which emerged in the context of a Western European culture, must be 
understood not only as a response to the rise of the modern bourgeoisie, but what itself 
was imbued with the spirit of Enlightenment and therefore what embraced the linear 
“progress” of humanity. In this dialectic movement of Progress, we see the rise of the 
proletariat and how they, too, are marching along, leading the whole of humanity 
towards a classless society. But here, Salazar points out an irony in Marxist thought: 
that despite its emphasis on historical movement, it has somehow failed to give its 
actors a historical countenance.  
As the effect/product of the expansion of the Bourgeoisie and its European 
civilization, the advancement and growth of workers within their culture is not 
essential, that is if we are to accept that they have any. They advance only as 
workers used/exploited by, and therefore what opposes against, the monstrous 
expansion of the Bourgeoisie in their midst. They do not exist and advance 
according to what may already be the dynamic/dynamism of their own culture 
and totality.474 [5.15] 
In other words, the proletariat, in Marx’s historical materialism, is reduced to an 
automaton in the onward movement of a universal civilization.  
 Given this description of the proletariat, Salazar then poses the difficult 
question: if we are to apply Marxist theory and categories to the Philippine context, 
how then do we make sense of Bonifacio, the Katipunan movement, along with the 
likes of Balagtas and Hermano Pule? After showing, however, the irreconcilable 
differences between the Marxist tradition and Philippine history and culture, Salazar 
                                                 
474 Marx, Manifesto, 151.   
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never really shows how we can proceed to appropriating Marxist theory. And perhaps 
it was never the point. The task of translation was never meant to provide answers but 
to prepare the ground for the work ahead—so that Marxism, but also all other isms that 
exist in various parts of the world, may be part of the emergence and growth of the 
Filipino people.  
 In this noble and grand scheme, however, one cannot deny that in the 
trichotomy of sarili, kapwa, iba, Salazar favors kapwa from iba. And while he opens 
himself to the influence of the foreign, the foreign is merely an object that must be 
appropriated and what in the end is not allowed to speak or talk back. Salazar clearly 
had good reasons for insisting so, especially when one considers the long history of 
Filipino scholars who have always turned their backs on their fellow Filipinos so that 
they may hear and address the foreign better.  
 Salazar has spoken about the word sila, kami, tayo, but he does not mention 
kanita. Ferriols says we rarely hear it now, and wonders if it is long gone. He says that 
it refers to the conversation that takes place between two people: there is no one else, 
but an “I” and a “you.” And in this intimate space, the encounter is inevitably far more 
intense than having a conversation with more people. I, myself, have no recollection of 
kanita, which Ferriols says appears in statements like “nag-uusapan kita,” but for me 
just sounds awkward. One could translate this as “we are talking,” but such translation 
would probably be more apt for the phrase “nag-uusapan tayo.” Thus, we will have to 
translate “nag-uusapan kita” as “I speak to you, and you to me.” An awful translation, 
but what can we really do when we are faced with the untranslatable? It would have 
been easier if Ferriols just used the example of “mahal kita” (“I love you”) which is 
still commonly heard. But perhaps he had a different intention, considering that this 
statement does not really bring out the two-way flow of conversation.  
 When we speak of tayo, we become part of a group. And in being in a group, 
we inevitably distinguish ourselves from the others. But between an “I” and a “you,” 
we are nothing but our bodies and our faces. With Pantayong Pananaw, Salazar clearly 
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does not make room for this intimate encounter. It is as if everything—to whom we 
speak, how and what we say—must all serve, or be translated to the nationalist struggle. 
As if language were not also about chanced meetings, fleeting encounters, 
pagsasalubungan. And sometimes I wonder if these people ever get tired of 
“discourse,” of always having to battle it out. Or do they, like me, like our perennial A 


























For months, I had been preparing for a trip to Mount Merapi to meet with the 
juru kunci (“caretaker”), Mbah (“Grandfather”) Maridjan, a charismatic and spiritual 
man known for his intimate knowledge of the mountain and his uncanny ability to 
interpret dreams and signs. His prophetic visions had constantly assured people of their 
safety on the slopes of a dangerous volcano, each time defying the Sultan’s orders for 
evacuation. He was considered sakti (endowed with supernatural powers), and some 
people even believed that he had the ability to keep a mountain’s rage under control. I 
was warned, however, that although he spoke Indonesian fluently, he preferred 
conversing in Javanese, which was one of the reasons why I had taken the time to learn 
the language in the first place. While I had only managed to acquire a basic knowledge 
of Javanese, I felt that I was ready to meet Mbah Maridjan. 
The expedition was all set. I had asked Ate Linda, the Filipina NGO worker 
who had generously provided me free lodging while I was in Yogyakarta, if I could 
bring her driver, Pak (Mister, literally “father”) Ego, along. Pak Ego, who had been 
my teacher in the arduous path to understanding kejawen (Javanese philosophy and 
religious tradition), would be, I thought, the perfect companion and translator. On the 
day of our departure, however, he arrived with the news that the road to Mbah 
Maridjan’s village, Kenahrejo, had been closed. Merapi had previously been showing 
signs of activity, but I was nonetheless taken aback. A few days later, Mbah Maridjan 
was reported as one of the casualties of a hot cloud of poisonous gas that had passed 
through Kenahrejo.  
While the people of Yogyakarta were mourning the loss of a great spiritual 
leader, I was saddened by the fact that I had lost the possibility of meeting a wise man. 
At the same time, I began to wonder, how fruitful would it have been to speak to Mbah 
Maridjan? I was remembering how the dhalang (puppeteer) Ki (Venerable) Timbul 
walked out on me after ten minutes in our conversation, saying that if I wanted to talk 
 245 
about the philosophy of wayang (shadow puppet theater), I should talk to his son, and 
that if I wanted to learn to learn wayang, I should come to him. Thus, I wondered, 
would my interview with Mbah Maridjan not have failed in the same way that it did 
with Ki Timbul?  
When I shared my woes with Pak Ego, he said that with research, there is 
always the need to prove. But with the kind of knowledge that I seek—a philosophical 
knowledge or wisdom if you will—that, he says, is not something that can be proven. 
This is why, he says, Mbah Maridjan was known to tell anyone who comes to speak to 
him that if they really want to know Merapi, the best way, and in fact, the only way to 
do it is if one were to climb the mountain herself (kamu harus mlaku sendiri).  
It is interesting that despite all those months that I had been studying with Pak 
Ego and had admired his knowledge, it is only now, as I am writing this epilogue, that 
I realize that I had then failed to grasp one of the more important lessons. In my search 
for philosophy and philosophers, I was trying so hard to look at so-called “veritable 
sources” of wisdom, seeking out the esoteric or the so-called learned or erudite, that I 
failed to see the wisdom of unassuming, seemingly “simple” people like Pak Ego. 
The Indonesian Jesuit philosopher, Father Driyarkara, recognized the wisdom 
o fthe common man. While he is known for his philosophical essays on Pancasila, the 
brief articles he wrote for the bi-monthly journal, Praba are equally significant, not 
merely as snippets of his reflections on current issues but a critique of and alternative 
to the sophisticated style of Western philosophy.  
 In this series of articles called Warung Pojok (corner coffee stall), Driyarkara 
introduces us to Pak Nala, a simple-minded shopkeeper who understands his world 
with no intellectual pretenses but with common sense. In the world of wayang, Nala 
refers to the children of Semar (Gareng, Petruk, and Bagong), who are all members of 
the Punakawan, the clown-servants, guardians and advisers of the Pandawa heroes. 
But while one would normally allude to Semar, in Javanese philosophical and mystical 
discussion, here Drijarkara refers to the sons, who are best known for entertaining 
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audiences with light-hearted jokes and songs, and who speak the language of the 
common people while sharing the wisdom of their father.  
We see the simple wisdom in Pak Nala when, in one of Drijarkara’s article, he 
attends a philosophy class, and listens to the professor describing the human person as 
such: “Man is spirit (Geist), which in order to find himself, must exile himself from 
himself, and only in the exile of himself from himself he finds (himself) in himself.” 
“Wadhuh, wadhuuuh!” Pak Nala exclaims, complaining that he just got himself a 
headache. And so, during the break he runs away, “exiling himself and … finds wedang 
rondhe!!”475  
 
In returning to the Philippines from my Java trip, I was again unwittingly 
searching for what were considered indigenous sources of wisdom. Joining a group of 
                                                 
475  A hot, ginger drink with glutinous rice balls. Prof. Dr. N. Driyarkara, S.J., 
Pendidikan ala Warung Pojok, ed. G. Budi Subanar (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Universitas 
Sanata Dharma, 2006), 3.  
Illustration 8:  Pak Ego, in Kinahrejo, Mount 
Merapi, the village where the late Mbah 
Maridjan lived and died. 
Illustration 9: Frontispiece of  Driyarkara’s 
Pendidikan Ala Warung Pojok:  A cartoon 
drawing of Pak Nala as shop owner, talking to a 
man, who asks: “Wah, you’ve got everything in 
your shop, ya? Are you planning to sell anything 
else?” Pak Nala answers: “[I want to] sell 
dreams.”  
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U.P. students under Professor Nilo Ocampo, I had gone to the sacred mountain of 
Banahaw in Quezon in the hope of experiencing first-hand the pilgrimage 
(pamumuesto) that I had read about in so many books. As I crawled through the narrow 
caves, gasping for air, and feeling the cold jagged rocks against my flesh, I felt I had 
no choice but to succumb and to entrust myself to the darkness. Fears and uncertainties 
had inevitably set in, and the danger of losing one’s way and the possibility of not 
making it became as real as the desire and the hope of seeing the light again. It is not 
difficult to see how this physical journey is a remembering and reenactment of the 
travails of the soul.   
 It was this experience that enabled me to imagine, as it is told in the story, how 
Agapito Illustrisimo, the spiritual leader of the fellowship (kapatiran) called Tres 
Persona Solo Dios, traveled for weeks in total darkness as he opened the caves and the 
mountains.  Here, I realized that while we emphasize so much the importance of light, 
and associate it with reason and the goodness and purity of the soul, what one 
experiences in the cave, more than the desire for light itself, is the darkness that allows 
for an intimate knowledge of space, and a wisdom that does not see with eyes but grasps 
with one’s entire body and soul.  
While the initial experience of pamumuesto had been fruitful, it was clear that 
I needed a serious immersion. To my disappointment, however, I was again being led, 
as I had been in Java, elsewhere, and therefore away from what I had initially hoped. 
Professor Consolacion Alaras, who I had initially hoped would be my pator (guide) in 
my intellectual journey through Banahaw, urged me not to return to the site of the 
source, so to speak, but to follow her in her own journey, to see how she has brought 
the idea of pamumuesto to the level of pamathalaan.  
I cannot deny that I was, at first, disheartened upon hearing Prof. Alaras’s 
suggestion. But I was beginning to realize that the real problem was that I was 
“exoticizing” philosophers and sources of wisdom, and did not trust where my path 
was leading me. In fact, it should not have been so difficult to see that Prof. Alaras was 
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not a typical case, in being not the stereotypical, disinterested scholar but one who went 
through the whole ordeal of initiation in order to be part of the kapatiran she was trying 
to understand. It should not have been so difficult to realize then that she herself 
embodied a crucial part in the journey of knowledge, which is always in a constant flux 
of change and transformation.  
But what then is pamathalaan? Old habits die hard, and I was compelled to 
look, beyond and before Alaras, to what is believed to be the source. I went to meet 
Marius Diaz, a former SVD seminarian, to whom Alaras attributes the coining of the 
term. But he himself admits that the idea did not come from him, pointing beyond and 
before him, to yet another source.  
It was in the UP campus in Los Baños, Diaz narrates, that one day he met a 
“hermit-looking old man,” simple and unassuming but with the quiet wisdom of 
common sense that “floored [him] intellectually in 10 seconds flat.” Sharing his 
frustration with the current state of the government (pamahalaan)—“its foolishness, 
its venality, its unspeakable corruption,”—this man began to speak of Bathala 
(Sanskrit-inspired Tagalog name for Supreme Being) and drew from this one term an 
array of concepts that presented a way of viewing the world: 
Ang bathala ay siya nating kataalan at katalagahan. Ang lahat ng mga 
gampanin natin ay dapat nakabatay sa katalaan at katalagahan ng bathala, at 
iyan ay paglikha, kalikhaan, at kalikasan. (“Bathala is our katalaan, our 
katalagahan [origin and destiny]. All our actions and concerns should be based 
on the essential and indigenous [attributes] of bathala which is creativity, 
creation, nature.”)476 
 Thus, the word bathala contains within itself and thus reminds us of the idea 
of taal (the real, indigenous, native, original). But more importantly, it is itself the 
expression of “wonder and fullness” when one awakens to the truth of one’s native or 
                                                 
476  Marius V. Diaz, “Pamathalaan: A Paradigm of Katipunan Governance,” 
Pamathalaan Manual.  
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indigenous elements. Here, the word bathala becomes the shortened version of the 
exclamatory statement, Aba, tala a!   
Overwhelmed by the simplicity of the whole concept, Diaz narrates how he 
bought the old man lunch, coaxing the latter to again explain to him his ideas.  
Over siopao and a hot bowl of chicken mami, pamathalaan was served to me 
hot and spicy with sprinklings of Katipunan overtones, imploding and 
exploding in all the availabe receptors in my brain …. 
Diaz never got the old man’s name, and was therefore forced to later dub him 
“Tatang Banahaw,” for what he said resonated with concepts he had encountered in his 
immersions at the sacred mountain. Unfortunately, Tatang Banahaw was never to be 
seen again, and Diaz tells us that he is sometimes tempted to rename him “Tatang 
Bulalakaw” (shooting star) “for that was what he was---a once-in-a-lifetime comet, 
brilliant and searing in its passing, the very stuff of memories and legends.”477 
How he passed the pamathalaan concept to Connie Alaras, Diaz says, is 
another story. But it appears that along the way, Diaz got disillusioned, as he saw how 
pamathalaan was slowly politicized into a government tool to control the Filipino 
people. Diaz explains how Former President Ramos sought to integrate the concepts of 
pamathlaan “in existing training programs of government,” under the rubric of a 
“Moral Recovery Program,” in an attempt to address the people using their own 
language. For Diaz, it was a ploy to deceive people into thinking that the government 
cared and that government officials were emissaries (sugo) of Bathala, especially when 
one considers that what seemed to be “net effect” of their so-called “moral recovery 
program” was more corruption. The people themselves, although illiterate were not 
stupid and were beginning to feel that they were being used. Eventually, Diaz decided 
to leave the pamathalaan project altogether. 
                                                 
477 Diaz, “Pamathalaan.” 
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What Diaz could not understand was how a concept, which was fairly simple, 
could be so misunderstood and distorted to serve a political agenda. The whole idea of 
pamathalaan was clearly to reestablish the idea of Bathala as creator, and to rediscover 
that within every person was a co-creator, each having an inherent capacity for taal. 
Thus, as an attempt to promote and cultivate one’s initiative and native understanding 
(kusa at kaloob na unawa) and a search for a science that gives life (agham na 
bumubuhay), the core of pamathalaan was in fact, first and foremost, economic, and 
its aim was to establish the dignity of every Filipino through work.  
In relating the concept of pamathalaan to the kapatiran discourse, and to the 
popular religious groups collectively called the Kapatirang Espirituwal (Spiritual 
Fellowship), Alaras brings Diaz’s idea further, by emphasizing the political aspect. 
First of all, Alaras explains that while the Kapatirang Espirituwal is scattered in 
various parts of the Philippines, each kapatiran that comprises it inhabits and represents 
a sacred space that “speaks of a story—a story of a call and a commitment: to be holy 
for God, country, and fellowmen.”478 
A crucial aspect of kapatiran is the journey as pamumuesto. Here, Alaras 
explains how the pilgrim in Banahaw travels through various puestos (sacred places), 
alone or with the companion of others, in the desire to achieve “purification, 
enlightenment, and commitment.” In the journey, Alaras tells us two important things: 
1) that “no puesto is insignificant,” and that each puesto has “its own inherent identity 
and power”; and 2) “that the whole mountain must be traversed, to experience the 
language and landscape of God.”479 
First of all, what is important to point out is that the process of pamumuesto is 
not merely a spiritual journey for personal gain but what inevitably involves a national 
                                                 
478 Consolacion R. Alaras, “Pamamathala as a Kapatiran Discourse—The Notion of 
Sacred Space,” in Pamamaraan: Indigenous Knowledge and Evolving Research 
Paradigms, eds. Teresita Obusan and Angelina Enriquez (Quezon City: Asian Center, 
University of the Philippines, 1994), 59. 
479 Alaras, “The Notion of Sacred Space,” 61. 
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(and even a universal) dimension. Alaras always goes back to the example of the 
Kaamaamahan Kainainahan, a kapatiran from Rosario, La Union, which began a 
pamamathala from Ilocos Norte to Manila, a pilgirimage on foot “for the purification, 
enlightenment, and commitment of the country for peace, unity, and justice.” In their 
urgent call for social transformation, one sees how their journey is an expression of 
exile, one that echoes the “kapatiran cry of the katipunan descendants:”  
Hangga’t hindi binibigyan ng patotoo ang kaloob naming mga maliliit at 
inaapi, hindi magkakaroon ng kaganap ang baying ito! (Until the kaloob [gift 
of enlightenment] bestowed on the poor and oppressed is not affirmed by 
patotoo [a pure and true proof of commitement], there will be no fulfillment in 
this country!)480 
And yet, in their belief in the effective powers of prayer and sacrifice, their exile 
becomes not merely an aimless wandering, but an active process of transforming the 
world.  
It is precisely through this element of unity and justice that Alaras shows that 
pamathalaan is as political as it is economic. Thus, while it is about pamahalaan 
(government), Bathala (God), and taal (ancestral, indigenous, native), it is also about 
providing a mathal (meaning “model” or “exemplary” in Muslim Mindanao), a process 
of creating “a model governance based on ancestral, spiritual, and heroic legacies.”481  
Like Diaz, Alaras was not oblivious to the government efforts to co-opt 
pamathalaan to serve its political agenda. But unlike the former, Alaras could never 
give up on government leaders. She told me that what gave her the strength to continue 
the work on pamathalaan was in fact a dream, telling her not to lose hope in Ramos. 
Indeed, one cannot help admire the strength and wisdom of a person who allows herself 
not only to be led by the light of certainty and reason, but to move in the dark spaces 
of the “not quite” (alanganin), to trust in an intuition that knows how to interpet dreams 
                                                 
480 Consolacion R. Alaras, “Pamathalaan,” Diliman Review 53, no.1-4 (2006): 265. 
481 Alaras, “The Notion of Sacred Space,” 65. 
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and read signs. For Alaras, to understand pamathalaan in the context of pamumuesto 
is to realize that every space has the potential to be sacred, and that in order to see the 
divine landscape, “the whole mountain must be traversed.”  
As my writing comes to an end, I realize that this entire journey for me has in 
many ways been a pamumuesto—a purification of biases, a series of brief discoveries, 
a commitment to find my own voice. But I would not have been able to traverse this 
terrain of knowledge if it were not for the people along my path—some thoughtful and 
inspiring, others who were boring and annoying—who enabled me to see that while we 
usually seek philosophy in dusty books and in the writings of bearded European men, 
wisdom can dwell in unexpected places and appear in the most unassuming form. 
In my obsession with “veritable sources,” I am reminded of how long ago, I 
went to Europe in my desire to have a sense of the life and culture that gave birth to 
my beloved Western philosophers. One January night, as I was missing home and 
crying myself to sleep, Tristan, the three-year old boy I was baby-sitting, suddenly 
appeared at my door, asking for a glass of water. Sensing that something was wrong, 
he came in and sat quietly beside me. And after awhile, barely half-awake, he said to 
me gently, Laisse tomber (“let it fall”). I was in Europe and surrounded by so much 
philosophy, but even I never expected that I would hear such great wisdom from a 
child, words that I would never forget. When one is not burdened by the search for 
“veritable sources,” one becomes open to the encounter between persons, between tao 
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Below are excerpts from the original texts, which have been translated in the body of 
the dissertation. Below each translated excerpt in the chapters, there is a number in 
square brackets which refers to the original excerpts below. 
 
Chapter 1   
 
1.1 Sozein ta phainomena. Ang ibig sabihin ay 'Iligtas ang mga nag-aanyo'. O, 
sapagkat ang mga nag-aanyo ay nagpapamasid: 'Iligtas ang mga 
nagpapamasid'. Huwag kang gagawa ng teorya na hindi nakabatay sa lahat ng 
mga napagmasdan na pag-aanyo. Huwag ka naman mag-imbento ng mga 
pag-aanyong hindi nangyari. Ngunit huwag mo rin ipalagay kailan man na 
hindi nag-anyo ang nag-anyo.  [Roque Ferriols, S.J. Pambungad sa 
Metapisika (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publications, Ateneo de 





2.1 Pero hindi ko nilalabanan ang mga Amerikano. Nag-udyok ako na magpaka-
Filipino. At kung ikaw ay magpaka-Filipino, may mga gawaing Amerikano na hindi 
ka maaring sumang-ayon. Hindi sapagkat ayaw mo [ng] Amerikano, pero sapagkat 
gusto mo ng Filipino. (Roque Ferriols, S.J., interview, 2009.) 
 
2.2      Kayo kasi. Mapaka Forbes-Parkish ang inyong mentality. Sa mga Tundo at 
ibang sulok diyan e bale wala yan. Yan ang problema sa Ateneo education. Masyado 
kayong nagiging puritanical. Nawawala ang pagkadown-to-earth na inherent sa 
inyong tunay na wika.”  (Roberto Javier, “Alaws Stir: Ututang-Dila, Nagmamantika,” 
The Guidon, August 21, 1969, 4.) 
 
2.3 Matagal ko nang iniisip iyon [Filipinization], mula pa noong ako nagbabasa. 
Kasi noong ako’y nasa High School, basa ako ng basa, ng mga nobela ni Dickens, 
halimbawa, at naisipan ko bakit ba walang mga Filipinong nobelang kasing galing ni 
Dickens; kasi ang buhay Filipino kasing yaman ng buhay Inggles, pero walang 
nobela na nilalahad ang kayamanan ng buhay Filipino. At naisipan ko na, kailangan 
magkaroon ng, lumikha sa wikang... ginagamit sa Filipina. Kasi kung…halimbawa 
magsusulat ka ukol sa buhay Filipino sa wikang Inggles, iba ang dating, iba ang lasa. 
(Roque Ferriols, S.J., interview, 2009.) 
 
2.4 Kasi kung mamimilosopiya ka sa Ingles--ang filosofia ay isang pagmumuni-
muni sa kalooban ng isang tao, at kung magmumuni-muni siya sa kanyang kalooban 
sa wikang dayuhan, hinihiwalay niya ang pagmumuni-muni sa mga karaniwang tao. 
(Ferriols, interview, 2009.) 
    
2.5  Kung may tao sa aklatan, at sinubukan niyang mamilosopiya sa isang wika 
na ibang di hamak sa sinasalita ng mga nagmamaneho ng dyipni, nagwawalis-tingting 
sa mga kalsada, nagsisilbi sa mga turo-turo, masasabi kaya na ang taong iyon ay 
gumagalaw sa katotohanan? Sapagkat hindi mapagkakaila na, angkinin man ng tao o 
sadyang limutin, palaging mananatiling totoo na lahat ng tao, pati ang mga 
namimilosopiya, ay napapaligiran ng mga kapuwa tao na nagsasalita. At kapag 
nagsisikap mamilosopiya ay pumipili sa wikang gagamitin niya, ang kanyang pagpili 
ay bunga ng kanyang atitud sa salita ng mga pumapaligid sa kanya. At ang kanyang 




2.6  At natauhan ako. Kung tatlong linggo sana kaming nag-iingles o 
nananagalog, palagi ko sanang winawasto ang kanilang salita at bigkas. Ang yabang 
yabang ko na sana. Baka iniisip ko na ngayon: ako lamang ang edukado, at taga-
bundok silang lahat. (Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 238.) 
 
2.7   Kakaiba talaga ang nangyari. Tatlong linggo nilang winawasto ang aking 
salita at bigkas, pero hindi sila yumayabang. Mapasensiya sila. Tatlong linggo nilang 
ibinabahagi sa akin ang kanilang wika: isang espesyal na uri ng pagtingin, ng 
pakiramdam, ng karunungan. Ibinabahagi nila ang buong sibilisasyon. Sa boses, sa 
galaw ng kamay, sa kilos ng katawan, tinuturuan nila akong magsalita. Sapagkat ang 
nag-aaral ng bagong wika ay parang batang nagsisimula magsalita. . . . Sa oras ng 
pagpapalaam nadama kong nagpapaalam ako sa aking mga guro. At noong inikot ng 
aking tingin ang mga bundok na pumapaligid, nagalak ako na kay yaman ng mga 
bundok. . (Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 239.) 
 
2.8 Kasi nung mga 1990s lamang…nakalagay doon [sa listahan] ang mga courses at 
yung mga teacher na nagtuturo ng courses, tapos kung Filipino, naka-parenthesis: 
”Filipino.” Pero sabi ko, dapat una kung English, dapat naka-parenthesis: “English,” 
pero kung Filipino, bakit kailangan lagyan ng “Filipino,” nasa Philippines naman 
tayo. Pero hindi, ayaw nila. At pati yung aking libro, yung aking mga libro sa 
Filipino, sa palagay ko dapat nakalagay yon under Philosophy sa library, hindi ba? 
Pero sa library, under Filipiniana yon. Kaya, parang sinasabi, hindi ito Philosophy, 
pinagbibigyan lamang namin siya, kung gusto niyang magsulat sa Filipino, yan, okey, 
pero hindi naming tatawaging Philosophy, tatawagin naming Filipiniana. (Ferriols, 
interview, 2009.) 
 
2.9   Pero ang atitud ko ay meron akong appreciation sa kanilang ginawa, pero 
yung kanilang ginagawa ay magiging buo, magiging mas buo, kagaya ng sinasabi ko 
sa isang meeting namin. Sabi ko, the Americans have done a great deal for the 
Philippines, but they have to do something harder. To let the Filipinos become really 
Filipinos. To do that, the Americans have to give up some of their American ways. 
The Americans can do it because… kasi may slogan ang mga Amerikano during the 
war, eh: the difficult we do at once, the impossible takes a little longer. Yun ang isa 
sa mga slogan ng mga Americans. SEACBEES – isang engineering department ng 
US Navy ata yon. (Ferriols, interview, 2009.) 
 
2.10  Ang hinahanap ng tunay na pagiisip ay ang katotohanan. Ang daigdig ng 
pagiisip ay isang malawak at malalim na larangan na pinaglalakbayan ng mga taong 
naghahanap. Ang mga taong ito ay naghahanap sapagkat nakatuklas na sila; At alam 
nilang nakatuklas na sila sapagkat naghahanap pa sila. (See http://lilipad-
malagipko.blogspot.sg. 
 
2.11  At kaya nga nagsisimula ang aking klase palagi, magsimula ka sa isip na 
purong konsepto, tapos tanungin mo, Meron ba? Pagkatapos magugulat ka na ang 
talagang nangyayari ay hinding hindi makokonsepto. (Ferriols, interview, 2009.) 
 
2.12  At kung nakulong ka sa konsepto, gamitin mo yung Meron upang makalabas 
ka sa konsepto. Ang konsepto kailangan mo pa upang ituro ang meron, pero ang 









5.1  “At hindi ito isang pambihirang bagay, nakikita iyan sa lahat ng mga wika. 
Sinabi ni Heidegger, yung Sein palaging may sandali ng oo o hindi, kahit na anong 
wika. At nakita ko, na sa lahat ng wika sa Filipino, may sandali ng oo o hindi. Sa 
tagalong, meron at wala, sa bisaya, naa at wala, sa ilokano, atda, awan. Sa Bikolano – 
mayo, igwa. Sa panggasinan – agkapu at wala. Yung wala, meron, yung agkapu, 
wala. At kaya nga, noong ginagamit ko yung Meron, ang aking pagtingin, binabalik 
ko yung Meron sa kanyang unang ugat, sa unang ugat ng paggamit sa salitang meron. 
Ang ugat ay, tignan mo ang talagang nangyayari bago naging konsepto. At kung 
nakulong ka sa konsepto, gamitin mo yung Meron upang makalabas ka sa konsepto.” 
(Ferriols, interview, 2009.) 
 
5.2 “Ang tao ay nabubuhay sa panahon. Ano ba ang relasyon ng tao sa panahon. 
Nakabukas ang malawak na tanong na yon. Pagkatapos anong atitutde sa panahon. 
Kung mayroon kang sariling karanasan sa panahon, kung may sarili kang 
pagmumuni-muni sa panahon, ibabahagi mo yon, hindi sapagkat ikaw ay Filipino, 
pero sapagkat iyon ang nakita mo bilang tao. Ngayon yung kay Mercado, ang 
kanyang inaatupag sa simula pa ay ano ba ang atitud ng Filipino sa panahon, at kung 
hindi yan atitud ng (?) Filipino, hindi ko yan kukunin kasi gusto kong mamilosopiya 
ng Filipino. Kaya kumikitid siya kaagad. At ang kanyang gustong gawin ay gumawa 
ng teorya na Filipino… At isang interesanteng bagay pero kung filosofia yon, 
kumikitid ang filosofia, ang tinatanong mo na lamang ay anong iniisip ng Filipino 
tungkol sa panahon. Pero kung panahon ang pag-usapan ng filosofo, ano ba ang 
atitud ng tao sa panahon.”  
 
5.3  Kung tanggap natin na may pagkapersonal nga ang kinagisnan nating pag-iisip, 
baka naman kaya dito tayo maaaring magpalakas? [Albert Alejo, S.J., Tao Po! Tuloy! 
Isang Landas ng Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao (Quezon City: Office of Research and 
Publications, Ateneo de Manila University, 1990), 8.] 
 
5.4  Anuman ang sabihin ng iba, mananatili pa rin siya sa kasaysayan bilang isa sa 
mga pasimuno sa paglilinaw ng mga katagang pilosopikal sa Pilipino. (Alejo, Tao Po! 
Tuloy! 13.) 
 
5.5   Kaya’t ang pag-uulit ay hindi isang pagbalik sa nakaraan, upang muling gawin 
ang mga kilus na naganap na noong araw pa. Ang pag-uulit ay isang paggising, 
pagbuhay sa taimtim na pakikipag-ugnay sa meron na tumalab sa kalooban noong araw 
pa, ngunit ngayon ay “natutulog.” Kaya’t ang tunay na pag-uulit ay palaging isang 
pagbabalik-loob. At kapag binubuhay na mag-uli ng tao ang pagtalab ng meron sa 
kanyang loob, natutuklasan niya na ang kanyang mismong kalooban ay nagiging isang 
potensyal na paggawa sa mga hindi pa nagagawa”).  (Ferriols, Pambungad sa 
Metapisika, 44.) 
 
5.6  Maihahambing sa abot tanaw ang pagmumulat ko sa meron. Nakatingala 
akong tatanaw sa itaas. Payuko akong tatanaw sa baba. Lilingon ako sa kaliwa at sa 
kanan. Babaling ako sa harapan at sa likuran. Paiikutin ko ang aking mata, at pati ang 
ulo. Ibig na ibig kong tanawin ang lahat ng matatanaw. Ngunit, sa bawat dako, parang 
may sumasagupa sa aking tingin, na parang nagsasabi: hanggan dito ka lamang 
makakakita, lampas dito hindi makaaabot ang pag-unat ng iyong mata....At may abot 
tana, hindi lamang sa malalayo, kundi pati sa malalapit. Matatanaw ko ang aking 
dibdig, hindi ang aking likod. Parang harang ang abot tanaw sa aking matinding 
pananabik na tumanaw. Ngunit kung marunong akong umunawa, ito ang sasabihin sa 
akin ng abot tanaw: hanggan dito ka lamang makatatanaw; ngunit kapag pinaghirapan 
mong gumalaw ng kaunti, makikita mo: lampas sa abot tanaw, may mga matatanaw na 
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hindi mo pa natatanaw. Gumalaw nga ako, at natanaw ko nga ang hindi ko pa 
natatanaw; ngunit, gumalaw rin ang abot tanaw. Hinarang at inakit ako ulit ng abot 
tanaw. Kapag gumalaw ang tumatanaw, mararanasan niya ang abot tanaw bilang isang 
walang hanggang tawag at pag-akit, sa walang hanggang paglampas at pagtanaw. 
(Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 10.) 
 
5.7   Ang loob ko bilang aking abot-malay ay isang daigdig ng mga kahulugan, ng 
kaisipan, ng katinuan o di katinuan. Daigdig ito ng diwang bukas, gising at nakikipag-
ugnayan. (Alejo, Tao Po! Tuloy!, 91.) 
 
5.8  Hindi tayo dapat magpalinlang sa salitang “utang”. . . .Ang utang na loob ay 
hindi talaga binabayaran. Bakit? Sapagkat ang pinagkakautangan ng loob ay 
malayang “nagpakitang-loob at tapat na dumamay.” Loob, malayang kagandahang-
loob din ang katimbang. At sapagkat ang “pakitang-loob at tapat na damay” ay hindi 
nanunumbat, hindi rin kailangang mahiya ang nangungutangan ng loob. Kung siya 
man ay makaranas ng hiya, ang hiyang ito ay hindi ang makitid na panlipunang 
“sasabihin ng iba” kundi isang “pandamdam na moral” ng pakikipagkapwa. Kaya ang 
utang na loob ay “tinatanaw” o “kinikilala,” hindi isinasauli o binubura ng bayad. 
(Alejo, Tao Po!Tuloy! 43.) 
 
5.9   Tingnan. . .ang artikulo ni Guthrie (1971) na nagsusulat sa wikang Ingles na 
bigla niyang pinapasukan ng salitang “pagkatao” sa wikang Pilipino. Pero ang totoo, 
ang salitang “pagkatao” ay isa lamang malapustisong salin o huwad na tatak para sa 
salitang humanity. Ang kanluraning konseptwalisasyon ng salitang personality ay 
higit pa ngang nalalapit sa tinutukoy ng salitang “pagkatao. [Virgilio Enriquez, 
“Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Perspektibo at Direksyon,” in Sikolohiyang PIlipino: Teorya, 
Metodo, at Gamit, ed Rogelia Pe-Pua (Quezon City: Surian ng Sikolohiyang Pilipino, 
1982), 9.] 
 
5.10   Hindi dapat ipakita [ang “pilosopiyang Pilipino”] parang kabaligtaran lamang 
ng anumang nalalaman tungkol sa diwang Kanluranin. Indibidwalista ba ang mga 
Kanluranin? Samakatwid tayo ay makagrupo. . . .Lohikal ba ang mga Kanluranin? 
Samakatwid, tayo’y mapagbuo ang kaisipan. Hindi maaari ang ganitong pag-iisip. Una, 
sapagkat nagawa na ito--at hindi ng sinumang katutubo, kundi ng mga Kanluranin 
mismo. Bahagi ito ng kanilang diyalektika o, kung hindi man, ng kanilang pag-iisip na 
laging may dalawahang panig--”oo” o “hindi,” “positibo” o “negatibo,” “maganda” o 
“pangit,” atbp. (Zeus Salazar, “Ilang Batayan Para sa Isang Sikolohiyang Pilipino,” 
Unang Pambansang Kumperensya sa Sikolohiyang Pilipino, 46-47.)   
 
 
5.11  Mula noong panahon ng Kastila hanggang ngayon, sumusulat ang mga 
Propagandista (at ang humalili ritong mga intelektuwal ngayon--i.e., mga ilustradong 
nadagdagan ng mga pensionado, Fulbright scholars at iba pang inisponsor ng 
Amerika at, ngayon, ng Hapon at iba pang bansa) sa wikang dayuhan. Ito ay para 
ipakita na puwede rin sila--at, mangyari pa, puwede nga. Iyon lang, upang makalikha 
sa Kastila (o Amerikanong Ingles), kakailanganin munang maging Kastila (o 
Amerikano at, baka pagdating ng oras, Hapones pa) ang nagmimithing maging mga 
“Pilipino.” Ibig sabihin, kailangan munang humiwalay sila sa (at iiwan nila ang) 
katutubong kalinangan. . . .at mamaya-maya ay babalik lamang dito para gamitin ang 
ilang elemento nito sa kanilang paglikha (sa katunayan, upang makalikha naman ng 
“iba” o “orihinal”!) sa Kastila (at pagkatapos, sa Amerikano). Gawaing “intelektwal” 
ito ng Pinoy mula kina Rizal at Paterno hanggang kina Villa, Tiempo at Locsin, Sr. 
cum Jr. Ang nilikha nila tuloy ay bahaging lokal (“local color” sa panitikan) lamang 
ng alinmang banyagang kulturang kanilang sinalihan. [Zeus Salazar, “Ang Pantayong 
Pananaw Bilang Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,” in Atoy Navarro, et al, eds., 
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Pantayong Pananaw: Ugat at Kabuluhan (Quezon City: Palimbagan ng Lahi, 2000), 
97.] 
 
5.12  Ang buod ng pantayong pananaw ay nasa panloob na pagkakaugnay-ugnay at 
pag-uugnay ng mga katangian, halagahin, kaalaman, karunungan, hangarin, kaugalian, 
pag-aasal at karanasan ng isang kabuuang pangkalinangan--kabuuang nababalot sa, at 
ipinapahayag sa pamamagitan ng isang wika; ibig sabihin, sa loob ng isang 
nagsasariling talastasan/diskursong pangkalinangan o pangkabihasnan.” 
“Sa lahat ng mga wikang Pilipino, matatagpuan ang mga konseptong katumbas ng sa 
Tagalog o P/Filipinong “kayo,” kami,” “sila,” at “tayo.” Tinutukoy nitong huli ang 
nagsasalita at ang lahat ng kanyang kausap, kasama kahit na iyong wala subalit 
ipinapalagay na kabahgi sa kabuuang kinabibilangan ng nagsasalita at mga kausap. 
Halimbawa, ang ekspresyong “tayong mga Pilipino,” sa pagkakaiiba nito sa “kaming 
mga Pilipino,” ay implisitong nagpapahaiwatig na ang nagkakausap-usap ay mga 
PIlipino lamang. Ibig sabihin, hindi kasali ang mga banyaga, ang mga di-Pilipino.” 
(Salazar, “Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,”82.) 
 
5.13 Nagkakaintindihan ang lahat nang hindi na dapat tukuyin ang iba pang bagay 
na nasa labas o panlabas. Samaktuwid, ang isang lipunan-at-kalinangan ay may 
“pantayong pananaw” lamang kung ang lahat ay gumagamit ng mga konsepto at ugali 
na alam ng lahat ang kahulugan, pati ang relasyon ng mga kahulugang ito sa isa’t isa. 
Ito ay nangyayari lamang kung iisa ang code o “pinagtutumbasan ng mga kahulugan,” 
ibig sabihin, isang pangkabuuang pag-uugnay at pagkakaugnay ng mga kahulugan, 
kaisipan at ugali. Mahalaga (at pundamental pa nga) rito ang pagkakaroon ng iisang 
wika bilang batayan at daluyan ng pang-unawa at komunikasyon. (Salazar, 
“Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,” 83.)   
 
 
5.14  Ang “taong marunong” ang siyang may karunungan dahil sa may 
pangkalahatan, pangmalaliman at pangmalawakan siyang pagtingin sa 
katunayan/reyalidad. . . i.e., hindi lang siya “maalam” o “may nalalaman” kundi 
“marunong” o may karunungan siyang taglay sa pagpapakahulugan/ pagpapaliwanag/ 
pagsasagawa/pagsasapraktika,paggamit, paggawad/pagpapaibayo ng kaalaman. [Zeus 
Salazar, “Pangkalahatang Tala ng Tagapagsalin,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Manifesto ng Partido Komunista, trans. Zeus Salazar (Quezon City: Palimbaga ng 
Lahi, 2000), 262-263.] 
 
5.15  Bilang ‘epekto’/bunga ng paglaganap ng Burgesya at ng taglay nitong 
sibilisasyong Europeo, hindi esensyal sa mga ‘manlulubid’ at ‘sigarera’ ang kanilang 
pagsulong at kaunlaran sa loob ng sariling kalinangan, tanggapin mang mayroon nga 
sila nito. Sumusulong lamang sila bilang mga manggagawang 
ginagamit/pinagsasamantalahan ng, at samaktuwid ay sumasalungat laban sa, 
dambuhalang paglaganap ng Kaburgisan sa kanilang piling. Hindi sila umiiral at 
sumusulong ayon sa maaaring naririyan nang dinamiko/dinamismo ng kanilang 
sariling kalinangan at kabuuan. (Salazar, “Diskursong Pangkabihasnan,” 151.) 
 
